A Dilemma Between Security and Inclusion: Rethinking Japan's Policy Towards the Chongryon and Chōsen Gakkō schools
Inga MarekwiaJagiellonian University
Edited by Eliza Inglis, IE University
Abstract
Japan's approach towards the Chongryon organisation and Chōsen gakkō schools sits at the crossroads of national security concerns and the protection of minority rights. This article explores what policy Japan can implement that effectively limits North Korea's political influence while simultaneously protecting the cultural and historical identity of its ethnic Korean minority.
Japan’s policy towards its significant Korean minority, also known as Zainichi Koreans, is one of the most interesting and complex intersections of protecting national security and minority rights, while also considering the complex historical context of their identity.
The Chongryon, a Zainichi Korean organisation, and the https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ and Inclusion: Towards the schools Chōsen gakkō schools sits at the crossroads of national Both of these institutions aim to preserve Zainichi Korean influence, which poses a policy dilemma for Japan. This and Chōsen gakkō and their activities can Japan while simultaneously protecting and respecting the of Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō, as well as their policy approach towards them over the years, how Korea relations, and describes domestic and international study argues that Japan’s policy is shaped as much by national that the best solution is to treat the Chongryon and than threats, and concludes that the most effective security is North Korea Chōsen gakkō schools it runs are one of the most critical connections between Japan and North Korea, despite the two countries still not having established diplomatic relations. Since the 1950s, when Chongryon and its schools emerged, they have served both as prominent supporters and advocates of the Zainichi community in Japan, as well as conduits for North Korean propaganda and influence. Although both Chongryon’s and Chōsen gakkō's impact and ties to North Korea are diminishing, the complex situation still leaves Japan with a significant dilemma in shaping its policy - it needs to balance between protecting its national security, while also respecting the cultural identity of Zainichi Koreans. This study aims to answer the question: What policy regarding Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō and their activities can Japan implement that effectively limits North Korea’s political influence while simultaneously protecting and respecting the cultural and historical identity of its ethnic Korean minority? This dilemma and situation are relevant, as although the role of Chongryon is diminishing, the problem of the Zainichi community's assimilation and cultural preservation persists. As a result, it affects individuals and their lives, for example, children studying in Chōsen gakkō schools. In a broader context, it can help better understand the relations between the DPRK and Japan, and generally, how countries like Japan can manage marginalised communities in today’s world.
2.1 Historical background 2.1.1 Japan’s colonial rule In 1910, the Korean Peninsula came under Japanese rule through the signing of the Treaty of Annexation between Japan and Korea. This rule, essentially colonial, was highly destructive and oppressive for Koreans. In 1910, there were few Koreans in Japan. Still, the rapid repatriation of Koreans to Japan began in the 1920s due to labour shortages as well as migrations, resulting in approximately 2 million Koreans living in Japan by 1945, with most of them coming from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. In the 1930s, Japan attempted to intensify the assimilation of Koreans into Japanese imperial society through targeted education and encouraged intermarriage, which was related to social discrimination against Koreans and their inequality in Japan. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, many Koreans left Japan; however, around 600,000 remained in the country. This community is called Zainichi, which means “residing in Japan”. Some of them stayed because they had already been assimilated in Japan, and others worried about the possibility of living impoverished in Korea. 2.1.2 Citizenship status after World War II The status of Zainichi Koreans at the time was quite problematic - initially, in 1947, the Alien Registration Act was imposed in Japan, which granted Koreans the status of “foreigners for the time being.” This meant they had to register as foreigners, in the sense that they were residents of Japan, but with Korean nationality, when back then, there was not even a country of Korea yet. In 1952, when Japan regained its independence, a new law was passed — the Alien Registration Law — which invalidated Koreans’ citizenship rights, subjecting them to numerous requirements as foreigners and depriving them of some of the most critical rights held by Japanese citizens. They had the right to stay in Japan under special conditions, but generally, Koreans were left at the mercy of the Japanese authorities. This law was viewed as discriminatory by many Koreans and sparked a strong opposition movement, which persisted until the 1960s. However, some Zainichi complied, fearing deportation or oppression. Nowadays, the number of Zainichi Koreans is steadily declining, as the Korean descendants of those who were repatriated from Korea to Japan in the 1930s become naturalised citizens of Japan, and many of them decide to marry Japanese. It is important to note, though, that Zainichi Koreans and their descendants still experience discrimination nowadays, leaving them a vulnerable group in Japanese society. 2.1.3 The emergence of two Korean organisations in Japan During the post-war period, two Korean organisations emerged, aiming to represent Koreans in Japan. The first was Joryeon, with a more pro-North Korea orientation, and the second was Mindan, also known as the Community of Korean Residents in Japan, which was more pro-South. Joryeon gained much more popularity and appeal among Koreans in Japan than Mindan, and it quickly became the main representation for Koreans in Japan. In 1945, Joryeon began organising the first unofficial Korean schools, based on the belief that all Koreans would be repatriated to Korea. However, in 1948, the Japanese government decided that all schools operating in Japan would have to obtain accreditation from the Japanese education administration, and most importantly, that the language used in all schools would have to be Japanese. This sparked mass demonstrations in some Japanese cities where many Koreans lived, which ended tragically - the actions of the military police during these protests resulted in three protesters dying. At that time, Koreans in Japan were starting to be viewed as a massive issue for the Japanese authorities, as well as the Allied forces occupying Japan at the time, especially when Joryeon began openly supporting North Korea. As a result, Joryeon was shut down by the aforementioned powers in 1949. In 1955, after the Korean War had ended, Chongryon, or the General Association of Korean Residents, emerged as a kind of successor to the Joryeon. At the time, it was a well-organised organisation with branches in every Japanese prefecture, arranging a diverse range of activities, including those of a political nature, as well as managing schools (Chōsen gakkō), associations, banks, and its own publishing house with a newspaper. Its main goal was to protect Koreans residing in Japan generally, as well as to promote the unification of Korea under communism, and because of that, also promote North Korean propaganda. In terms of international relations, the organisation aimed to support the normalisation of the bilateral relationship between the DPRK and Japan, with a particular focus on the North Korean perspective in this matter. Considering these aims, it is noticeable that Chongryon’s goal was, and is, not the integration of Koreans into Japanese society, but rather upholding their Korean ethnicity and instilling North Korean values in their minds regarding their identity. It was also encouraging eventual repatriation to North Korea, even though, as mentioned above, most Zainichi Koreans have their ties in South Korea. This was moderately successful, as in the 1960s, many Zainichi Koreans returned to North Korea. However, this trend has steadily declined and largely ended by the early 1960s, with some eventually returning to Japan upon seeing the situation in North Korea. Most importantly, to avoid the fate of Chongryon’s predecessor, Joryeon, Chongryon declared that it would not interfere in Japanese politics, nor engage in illicit activities. The Chongryon was so effective and influential in its promotion of North Korean propaganda at the time, firstly because North Korea was in a better political position than South Korea, which was poorer, and its subsequent governments were less effective in governing than the North Korean government. Secondly, the other functioning organisation for Koreans in Japan, the Mindan, received significantly less support from South Korea, unlike the Chongryon, which was heavily funded and supported by the DPRK. 2.2 How the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō function 2.2.1 The activities of the Chongryon It is well-known that the Chongryon (otherwise called Chosen Soren in Japanese) has strong ties to North Korea (although this relationship loosened over time). North Korea provided the organisation with financial and ideological support. Although it is considered a private organisation and not a diplomatic entity, the Chongryon’s headquarters function as a de facto embassy of North Korea in Japan, as Japan and North Korea have not established diplomatic relations. Chongryon oversees cultural projects, such as the Guemgangsan Opera Troupe, as well as sports teams. It aims to protect the rights of Koreans living in Japan, viewed as, according to the Chongryon’s website, “proud overseas citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. It issues North Korean passports and manages trips to the DPRK for Zainichi Koreans. In 1994, Chongryon established a Compatriots Marriage Counselling Centre, which encourages marriages between Koreans in Japan, rather than intermarriages, to preserve the Korean lineage. Through the Joseon Chamber of Commerce and Industry, it aims to protect Korean businesses and the livelihoods of Korean merchants and workers. 2.2.2 The Chōsen gakkō schools Although all activities of the Chongryon mentioned above are relatively substantial to the legitimacy and continued functioning of the organisation, its crucial aim is the education of ethnic Koreans. The association manages ethnic Korean schools throughout Japan, known as Chōsen gakkō, and also operates a Korea University in Tokyo, both of which are a crucial part of the organisation’s mission. The Korean education system, managed by the Chongryon, provides ethnic Korean education at all levels: from kindergarten through elementary, middle and high schools, as well as the university mentioned above. After World War II, when the first schools were established, they aimed to teach Korean children residing in Japan the Korean language and culture, intending to eventually return to Korea. This was especially important because the Korean language and culture were suppressed under Japanese authority, and Korean children had to attend Japanese schools. The peak number of students attending these schools was reached in the late 1940s, with approximately 60,000 students, after which it steadily declined. As of 2019, the number of students on all levels except university is about 5,000, and as of 2016, around 6,000 students attended the Korea University in Tokyo. Since 1975, while previously being completely unrecognised by the Japanese government, all schools managed by Chongryon are classified as “miscellaneous schools” under Japanese law, rather than regular schools, which means students studying in Chōsen gakkō do not have the same benefits as regular Japanese students. It was evident at the higher education level, as students of Chōsen gakkō high schools had to attend courses at a Japanese high school and later take a qualification exam to be eligible to take an entrance exam for the Japanese university they wanted to attend. This changed in 2003, when universities under the Japanese Ministry of Education started allowing those students to take entrance exams without the need to take the qualification exam before. Even though the mission of these schools sounds promising, in reality, they are a way of spreading North Korean propaganda. As mentioned earlier, the initial goal of these schools was to educate children in a manner that would facilitate their eventual return to the DPRK. In the 1960s, the North Korean juche ideology was acknowledged. This ideology is the North Korean official state ideology, which dictates the way of life there. Juche can be translated as “self-reliance”, and that is mostly what it focuses on - independence and self-reliance in politics, economy and defence, as well as emphasising the Korean identity and “psychological decolonisation”, meaning abandoning the mindset of serving the great powers. After Chongryon acknowledged this ideology, Kim Il-sung’s personality cult and the general Korean Workers’ Party ideology were taught at Chōsen gakkō schools, following the idea that the students were overseas DPRK citizens. Then, in Chōsen gakkō schools, direct copies of North Korean textbooks were used; however, that changed in the 1980s, when the programme was adapted to the idea that Chōsen gakkō students are unlikely to repatriate to North Korea, and will most probably stay in Japan. Over time, these textbooks became less focused on promoting the DPRK’s ideology, and adjustments were made to facilitate a better integration of Zainichi Korean students into Japanese society. At some point, the Chongryon even decided to remove the portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il from classrooms. These actions, although a step towards reducing North Korean propaganda in Chōsen gakkō, did not lead to the complete objectivity of these schools. In history classes, the Korean peninsula is still described as one country, and school trips to North Korea are still organised. That is why they can still be viewed as at least sympathetic towards North Korea, and its associated propaganda and ideology. Although, as mentioned above, fewer and fewer children enrol in these schools every year, some parents still decide that it is the education path they want their children to pursue. For some families, even those who do not affiliate themselves with North Korea, it is the only opportunity to ensure their children connect with their heritage and language. Mindan, the other Zainichi Korean Association in Japan, also operates a few schools, but they are conducted in Japanese with Korean as an elective course. In contrast, Chongryon schools are conducted almost entirely in Korean; therefore, it is a better option for some. Another factor is that there are far more Chongryon-run schools in Japan than Mindan-run ones, which makes them more accessible and sometimes makes them the only choice for Zainichi parents who want their children to attend such schools. The fact that these schools at least partially serve as a North Korean propaganda outlet cannot be overlooked; however, it is also essential to consider their role in nurturing language, culture, and a sense of belonging among Zainichi Korean children who attend them. 2.3 Japan’s policy towards the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō over the years 2.3.1 The period of relative tolerance As mentioned above, when Chongryon emerged in 1949, to avoid the fate of suppression like its predecessor, Joryeon, it declared that it would remain neutral in Japanese domestic politics. The only moments when Chongryon would criticise the Japanese government were when it concerned Japan’s foreign policy towards North Korea. It also did not call for granting Zainichi Koreans Japanese citizenship, residential rights, or postcolonial reparations, but rather aimed at gaining their support for North Korea's newly emerged state. During the 1950s, this stance helped it achieve its somewhat autonomous position within Japan, which was comfortable for the Japanese authorities. At the time, Japan's political system reached a state of stability when the major parties from both sides reached a consensus in 1955, while in other Asian countries, conflicts between the right and left led to devastating wars and instability, hence Chongryon’s mostly neutral stance, and letting the organisation function as a representation for North Koreans was better than possible conflict with the substantial Zainichi community. While the Japanese government was closely observing Chongryon, it allowed the organisation to act, for example, in developing the Chōsen gakkō system, as long as the actions remained within the boundaries of non-engagement in domestic politics. 2.3.2 The nuclear crisis, missile test and Chongryon’s role Throughout the Cold War, this situation remained essentially unchanged until the 1990s. That is when tensions began to intensify: in 1994, the North Korean nuclear crisis took place, and in 1998, North Korea test-launched its Taepodong missile over Japan. This situation raised a previously unseen national security concern for Japan, prompting the strengthening of its alliance with the United States. At this point, it was known that Chongryon played a significant role in the development of North Korea's nuclear programme, either by sending currency remittances to North Korea or by providing materials and components critical to this development, sourced in Japan. Still, the Japanese government did not take much action towards the Chongryon at the time, apart from closely monitoring it. 2.3.3 The 2002 North Korea-Japan summit and the abduction issue Then, in September 2002, another crisis arose (arguably the worst one, which remains relevant to North Korea-Japan relations today), first affecting the future of North Korea-Japan relations and, hence, also Chongryon. That is when a North Korea-Japan summit took place in Pyongyang, aimed at normalising the bilateral relations between the countries. The leaders attending this summit, Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan, and Kim Jong-il of North Korea, had two significant obstacles to overcome: the first one being talks about possible reparations by Japan to North Korea for the complicated colonial past, as well as the alleged kidnappings of eleven Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. During this summit, Kim Jong-il not only directly admitted that North Korea was behind those abductions (which the DPRK had been denying before), but also said that North Korea was responsible for three additional Japanese citizens being abducted at the time, stating that eight of them had died, and five had survived. As Kim Jong-il stated, the abductees were used as Japanese language instructors for North Korean spies, and were also intended to penetrate South Korea. This situation not only worsened the relations between the DPRK and Japan but also damaged Chongryon’s credibility and caused public outrage in Japanese society. It became the core issue shaping Japan’s policy towards North Korea. Nevertheless, the summit led to the signing of the Pyongyang Declaration between Japan and the DPRK, in which both parties committed to the normalisation process of their bilateral relations, as well as to Japan’s recognition of the historical damage of the colonial rule over Korea. Japan also agreed to discuss the status of Korean residents in Japan, as well as issues related to cultural property. In the Declaration, the DPRK affirmed that it would take measures so that the incidents involving Japanese nationals, e.g. the abductions, would never happen in the future. This Declaration, although a step towards thawing the complicated relationship between North Korea and Japan, in reality didn’t even bring recognition of the DPRK by Japan, nor the establishment of diplomatic relations. The abductions issue is still lingering in Japanese politics today, as the new Prime Minister of Japan, Sanae Takaichi, attended a rally calling for the resolution of the abductions issue at the beginning of November, and promised to settle the issue “by any means necessary”. She also revealed that Japan has requested a meeting with Kim Jong-un, aimed at an unconditional return of all abductees. Another major event, which led to Japan’s policy towards the Chongryon shifting, was North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, as well as tests of long-range missiles and short-range missiles at a similar time. 2.3.4 Shift in Japan’s policy towards the Chongryon All these situations were significant, not only in Japan’s policy towards North Korea in general, but they also had a considerable influence on shaping policy towards the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō. Japan imposed new controls on sea links that Chongryon held with North Korea. Chongryon operated the Mangyongbong ferry, which regularly sailed between the Japanese city of Niigata and the North Korean Wonsan. Officially, its role was to link Zainichi Koreans living in Japan with their families residing in North Korea; however, the ship transported cash remittances, most of which were not processed through Japan’s financial institutions, as well as components and materials used for North Korea’s weapons programme. After the 2002 summit, when Kim Jong-il admitted to the abductions of Japanese citizens, Japanese authorities carried out harsher safety checks and inspections of cargo, which the Mangyongbong was transporting. At the beginning of 2003, the ferry’s operation was suspended, allegedly due to the imposition of safety regulations; however, it resumed operation in August of that year. After North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006, Japan imposed harsh sanctions on the DPRK, which included prohibiting all North Korean imports, as well as prohibiting the Mangyongbong ship from entering the country. In 2016, North Korea launched a Kwangmyongsong-4 rocket, which it presented as an “earth observation satellite”. However, Japan, the U.S. and South Korea perceived this as a missile test, disguised as a satellite launch. This led to Japan banning all North Korean ships from its ports and also prohibiting the entry of third-country vessels that had visited North Korean ports. At the same time, the Japanese government banned all remittances of money to North Korea, unless they were less than 100,000 won and intended for humanitarian purposes. Japan also changed its taxation policy towards the Chongryon in 2003, as the organisation had not paid local taxes since 1972, when the then-Governor of Tokyo granted it diplomatic tax-exempt status. In 2003, the Governor of Tokyo at the time reversed this status and demanded the payment of taxes. When Chongryon refused to pay, three of its facilities were seized. During that time and later, many Chongryon facilities, including its Tokyo headquarters, were raided by the police and Japanese taxation authorities due to suspicions of illicit activities.
In 2010, due to Chongryon's massive debts, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that its headquarters in Tokyo could be seized, making it available for sale. Nevertheless, even after the sale, the building is reportedly still in Chongryon’s control. There were also many scandals regarding the apparent trade of drugs from North Korea to Japan through the Chongryon. 2.3.5 Shift in Japan’s policy towards Chōsen gakkō All issues gathered in the beginning of the 2000s, which fuelled anti-Zainichi propaganda, became a problem for Chōsen gakkō schools as well, when these schools were excluded from the 2010 Tuition Waiver Program organised by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The Tuition Waiver programme is a financial aid programme, aimed at equalising educational opportunities for students by the Japanese government, providing financial relief regarding school tuition. The programme did not only include Japanese schools, but was also intended to reach international schools and schools with foreign curricula; however, eventually MEXT excluded ten high schools managed by the Chongryon. It also became a problem at the local government level, which determines whether schools receive subsidies. In March 2010, the Governor of Osaka announced that subsidies for Chōsen gakkō will cease, unless the schools adopt the Japanese school curriculum, as well as take down Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s portraits from the classrooms. After this decision, local authorities in other cities, where Chōsen gakkō were located, have also ceased the subsidies. These decisions operated on the abduction issue, and the presumption that these schools supported anti-Japanese education. In 2013, Chōsen gakkō were officially excluded from the programme by MEXT, which based its decision on Japan’s foreign policy approach towards North Korea. In 2019, the Japanese government imposed the Free Preschool Education and Childcare Programme, aimed at making preschool education free. Again, preschools managed by the Chongryon were excluded from the programme, which was explained by the fact that these miscellaneous preschools do not guarantee “the quality of early childhood education”. Lastly, in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, MEXT did not accept Korea University, managed by Chongryon, for the Emergency Student Support Handout for Continuing Studies, a programme aimed at supporting students facing financial difficulties due to the pandemic. It was again explained by the fact that Korea University is regarded as a miscellaneous school. 2.3.6 The diminishing role Due to all situations mentioned above, the 2000s were and are a time that witnessed the slow downfall of the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō. The international and domestic contexts have inevitably changed - many Zainichi Koreans became South Korean citizens, especially after the ROK’s situation improved in the 1990s, as it became a stronger state than North Korea, finally stabilising its domestic politics and economy. Even though Zainichi Koreans still face discrimination, their situation as residents of Japan has also changed for the better, and many of them have started living in better conditions. Additionally, more and more has been acknowledged about the situation in North Korea, which turned out not to be a “paradise” like it was promoted. Since the 1980s and 1990s, fewer and fewer families enrolled their children into Chōsen gakkō schools, and if they did, it was not for political reasons or plans for repatriation, but instead to uphold the Korean ethnicity of their children. Additionally, the fact that many Zainichi Koreans became naturalised Japanese citizens provided them with a better perspective on life and assimilation in Japan, rather than repatriating to North Korea. This trend of naturalisation also diminished some of the rhetoric used by the Chongryon, which portrayed North Korea as the “home of the Zainichi”; as a result, it essentially lost its former legitimacy among the Zainichi Koreans. It also drifted away from North Korea, and the DPRK is now paying much less attention to Chongryon, both politically and financially, which leaves the organisation with limited support from its once strongest ally. The latest 2016 statistics of the Public Security Intelligence Agency in Japan estimate the number of Chongryon members at 70,000. At its peak, Chongryon had around 500,000 members. This comparison shows the diminishing role of Chongryon among Zainichi Koreans, which does not mean that the organisation stopped functioning. 2.4 Domestic and international reactions 2.4.1 Reactions of the Japanese society All situations mentioned above generated mixed reactions from Chongryon, as well as the Japanese society. Japanese nationalist and ultranationalist groups, opposed to foreigners (and some of them specifically targeting the Zainichi community), have harassed and intimidated Chongryon members, as well as Chōsen gakkō students, since the 1970s. This especially intensified after North Korea’s confession about the abductions in 2002, when verbal and physical assaults towards Chōsen gakkō students (whose school uniforms make them easily distinguishable) started being more frequent. In 2009, members of these nationalist groups tried to break into a Chōsen gakkō school in Kyoto, and in 2018, they attacked the Chongryon headquarters in Tokyo. Some of these actions, however, were not left without a response. In 2014, a court in Osaka ordered a Zaitokukai ultranationalist organisation to pay a fine of 12.6 million yen to a Chōsen gakkō school in Osaka, for verbally attacking its students and staff. 2.4.2 Reactions of the Zainichi community On the other hand, the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō also try to demonstrate their right to existence. The first major demonstration is Friday Action, where students of the Korea University demonstrate every Friday under the MEXT building. Another event is Tuesday Action, which is held every Tuesday under the Osaka Prefectural Government building. The Tuesday Action’s idea is to highlight the importance of ethnic education and the discrimination associated with it. Some of these actions elicited adverse reactions from the public, and some Japanese individuals aimed to disrupt these peaceful demonstrations by verbally attacking the participants. 2.4.3 International organisations’ reaction The complicated situation surrounding Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō has not gone unnoticed by international organisations. In 2019, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child investigated the issue of Chōsen gakkō schools. It was recommended that the Japanese government should grant them the status of free high school education, and the exclusion was recognised as unjust discrimination.
The constructivist theory is valid when describing the topic of Japan’s policy towards the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō. Applying a constructivist framework reveals that Japan is not acting solely based on security concerns, but also on identities and social norms. Constructivist theory views the international system as socially constructed, where material structures matter, but their meaning is dependent on ideas, identities, and norms. This means that threats and interests are a product of the subjective construction of meaning, rather than objective material facts. Therefore, as the history of Japanese policy shows, Chōsen gakkō are not first seen as schools. They are firstly seen as an extension of North Korea - the enemy, or “the other”, against which Japan can define its own national identity. These schools, as they are, are not seen for what they are capable of doing, but rather for the identity assigned to them, which Japan might perceive as dangerous. Chongryon builds this North Korean extension identity through its institutions, and the Japanese government builds its policy on that notion, for example, by excluding Chōsen gakkō from the Tuition Waiver Programme, reinforcing the idea that Chōsen gakkō schools are “outside” the standard Japanese system. This means that this sense of identity is reinforced both by the Chongryon and the Japanese authorities. The Japanese system embeds the idea that Zainichi Koreans associated with the Chongryon or Chōsen gakkō are politically “other”, and therefore not only the real practical threat of North Korea, and, for example, its nuclear programme shapes Japanese policy towards these institutions, but it’s also the given identity of politically “other” that makes them a threat. It could be argued that Japan’s view of Chōsen gakkō and Chongryon’s identity drives its policy as much as security concerns do. Constructivist theory applied in this context also helps to understand the process of securitisation in Japan, where politicians frame Zainichi as “threats”, turning a social issue into a security one. A policy concerning the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō in the spirit of the constructivism theory should balance between the security of Japan, as well as the protection of the ethnic minority of Zainichi Koreans, and should aim to at least mitigate the strong identity of “the other” assigned to Chongryon members, Chōsen gakkō students, as well as Zainichi Koreans as a whole.
Japan should adapt its policy towards the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō, so that it can effectively limit North Korean influence in Japan while preserving the cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of Zainichi Koreans.
Firstly, Japan’s authorities should recognise Chōsen gakkō as educational and cultural institutions, and realise that the children are not at fault for the DPRK’s actions. It should support the teaching of the Korean language, upholding heritage, while also ensuring the transparency of the curriculum in these schools, and disconnecting it from North Korean political propaganda. Partnerships between Chōsen gakkō schools and regular Japanese schools should be encouraged to facilitate cultural exchange, leading to better assimilation of Koreans studying in Chōsen gakkō into Japanese society and acceptance by Japanese children from an early age. This approach aligns with the constructivist rationale. If the Japanese government were to emphasise reducing the Chōsen gakkō schools’ identity as political entities and, in exchange, support them as educational and cultural institutions, it could lead to better assimilation, as well as reduce tensions between Japanese society and Zainichi Koreans.
The Japanese authorities should maintain strict oversight over Chongryon to prevent any illicit activities that support North Korea, limiting its role to a cultural institution and advocate for Zainichi Koreans in Japan. At the same time, these actions should be measured appropriately to avoid completely disrupting the valuable cultural and community-building role of the Chongryon for Zainichi Koreans, and to avoid being perceived as discriminatory. Rather than focusing on identity, these actions should be based on legal concerns.
level The Japanese government should also focus on providing cultural programmes and initiatives aimed at preserving the language and heritage outside Chongryon and its supporters, which could lead to strengthening the inclusion of Zainichi Koreans into Japanese society and shifting their perceived identity away from North Korea. On the international level, Japan should continue political engagement with North Korea to show that it targets the DPRK’s political influence, instead of targeting the Zainichi community in Japan, and thereby separating the ethnic group from political affairs.
On the other hand, given the diminishing relationship between Chongryon and the DPRK, the organisation should focus on its primary role as a prominent supporter of the Zainichi population in Japan. Instead of focusing on the DPRK’s support, it should focus on its cultural and educational role, as well as the preservation of Korean heritage. In essence, Japanese authorities' primary goal should be to reframe the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō schools as cultural and ethnic entities, rather than national threats. The outcome of these actions could be positive for both parties - the Zainichi community and their rights would be better protected, tensions between Japanese society and the Zainichi community would subside, and Japan’s credibility as a country would be strengthened.
Japan’s approach towards the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō is a complex combination of history, identity and security. The continued legacy of Japan’s colonial rule, as well as Cold War affairs, and decades of political tension continue to dictate how these institutions are perceived today, showing that the issue extends far beyond contemporary policy debates. The Japanese colonial past on the Korean Peninsula led to the emergence of these entities, which later became a crucial problem for Japan, situated between domestic and international issues. This historical continuity demonstrates that the issue cannot be separated from the narratives of Japan’s national memory, which still influence how the state acts towards Zainichi Koreans and the affiliated organisations. Japanese policy towards them was often oscillating between moderate tolerance and restriction, shaped by security concerns about North Korea and, in general, Japan's complicated relationship with the DPRK, as well as by social constructs, when viewed through the lens of constructivist theory. The constructivist theory helps to clarify why these oscillations persist: the perception of threat is not only modelled by tangible, material actions such as missile tests, but also by socially induced meanings that present the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō as political, rather than cultural institutions. This framing has contributed to the turning of an ethnic community into an extension of a hostile state. Applying the status of “the other” to the Chongryon and to Chōsen gakkō complicates the assimilation of Zainichi Koreans into Japanese society, leading to tensions that must be resolved for a harmonious society to emerge. As younger generations of Zainichi Koreans have minimal ties to North Korea and identify themselves with Japan more and more, this “otherness” status assigned to them becomes even more futile. Recognising this change in the Zainichi community itself opens the possibility for Japan to reassess their assumptions, thereby also its approach towards Zainichi Koreans. Policies that disconnect the status of “the other” or “extension of North Korea” from the Zainichi community can help Japan manage its security threats and national interests, while upholding the heritage of the significant Zainichi population. Such policies would not weaken Japan’s security, but rather could strengthen it by reducing marginalisation, social tensions, and ensuring trust between the Zainichi minority and the state. Such an approach of inclusive governance would complement, rather than undermine, national security goals. Ultimately, this approach balances Japan’s security and social cohesion, proving that proper security cannot be based solely on sanctions, but also on inclusion. The case of the Chongryon and Chōsen gakkō illustrates how the social and governmental perception of identity directly shapes policy outcomes, and how redefining this identity can calm social tensions and enhance stability. Further research on this topic could deepen our understanding not only of the Zainichi community in Japan, but also generally our understanding of how history, identity and security intersect. In the long term, Japan’s stability will depend not only on how it responds to external threats from North Korea, but also on how it acts domestically by possibly striving for an inclusive society for all - a shift that would not only strengthen internal cohesion, but also Japan’s credibility on the world stage.
Huge thanks to my editor, Eliza, for her constructive feedback and many nice words, and to my friends for their unwavering support.