A Future for Cyprus: Possible Re-Unification and its Role in Eastern Mediterranean

1. Introduction: A Cypriot partition

The Treaty of Lausanne was ratified in 1923. Its aim was to resolve all outstanding territorial and maritime disputes between Greece and Türkiye in the Aegean Sea region. At the time, Türkiye had renounced all territorial claims to Cyprus. By the 1950s, the island's demography consisted of around 80 percent Greek Cypriots and 20 https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Re-Unification and represent a significant development for the geopolitical military intervention in 1974, Cyprus has become the and military development. Due to Türkiye’s military the EU deemed to be "incompatible," Türkiye’s accession to Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı 2025 with the goal of rebalancing the island's regional power. regional stability during reunification talks. It draws on analysis, and first-hand Cypriot experiences. These sources forces from the TRNC could occur under the supervision a long-term goal of creating a unified national military, solution addresses the issues of exclusive economic joint energy development initiatives. These initiatives would EU Accession, Greece-Türkiye Relation percent Turkish Cypriots. The start of the partition of Cyprus began with a Greek Cypriot insurgency that demanded an end to the 90-year British rule over the island. On the 20th of July, 1974, Türkiye invaded Cyprus amidst the instability, claiming the then capital, Nicosia. The Turks occupied roughly 30% of the island, and following the talks between Great Britain, Greece and Türkiye in Geneva, Switzerland, this expanded to approximately 35%. Cyprus has since remained divided into two entities. The Republic of Cyprus is the only globally recognised state, and a member of the EU, while TRNC remains only recognised by Türkiye. Families have been displaced to the south amidst the war and suffered great property loss. This Turkish intervention was strongly condemned by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Greece’s active involvement in EU affairs has subsequently led to Europe’s deeper engagement in the Cyprus issue, hence negatively affecting EU-Türkiye relations. This paper will explore the relationships between the key parties involved in the Cyprus issue. Furthermore, it will discuss how the potential reunification of Cyprus could boost cooperative efforts to ensure energy security and strengthen military defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and across the wider European region.

2. Background: Türkiye - Cyprus Relations

2.1 What Does Control Over Cyprus Mean to Türkiye? Cyprus remains a significant obstacle in Türkiye’s accession to the EU. In 1959, Türkiye applied for an associate role in the European Economic Community, shortly after Greece’s application. Türkiye has yet to be successful in the process of obtaining full membership. One of the main problems, categorized as a “formal obstacle” by Bogdani, is the Cyprus issue. After the partition, Türkiye did not recognise the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state. The rejection of a recognised EU member state has subsequently impacted Türkiye’s accession talks. Due to "uncooperative" actions on the Turkish side, where the state had refused to open Port Cyprus, the Council of Ministers froze eight of the thirty‑five accession chapters in 2006. In 1986, Greece opposed the normalisation of EU-Türkiye relations and urged the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the land of Cyprus. Hence, Greek-Turkish relations, rooted in the Aegean Sea territorial disputes and the Cyprus problem, play a critical role in Türkiye’s accession to the EU. Since the early 2010s, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt have crafted a trilateral framework to enhance regional stability and coordinate responses to security threats and energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. This cooperation has allowed the three states to consolidate their influence over disputed areas, including hydrogen-carbon-rich zones that Türkiye claims, thereby limiting Ankara's regional reach. This restricts Turkish agency over these regions, challenging Turkish assertion of control over Cyprus’s EEZ boundaries. Additionally, such joint military exercises pose a threat to Turkish naval power, hence increasing military pressure on Türkiye. The Eastern Mediterranean region bridges the East and the West. It facilitates commercial trading between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Approximately $1.7 trillion worth of goods are shipped through the Suez Canal and routes like the Bosphorus per year. Hence, maintaining control over these trade routes is essential for a state’s regional power and economic stability. The EU Parliament has criticised Türkiye’s disregard for the UNCLOS provisioned exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for islands. EEZs safeguard the rights of individual territories, granting them control over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources such as hydrocarbons. Despite said violation, the Turkish state has yet to ratify the UNCLOS. Hence, the state is not legally bound to its agreements. A key consideration is what action the European Union will or should take to ensure that Türkiye signs the UNCLOS, and whether Türkiye should be obliged to sign it at all. Ultimately, the European Union faces an intricate challenge in balancing the importance of Türkiye as a partner on issues like migration, security, and energy, while addressing contentious topics such as maritime rights and accession negotiations. In 2025, it is estimated that more than 60 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves sit in Cyprus’s EEZ. These reserves significantly contribute to the region's potential role in enhancing Europe's energy security. The EastMed pipeline project , supported by the EU and the US, plans to connect the gas supply from the Eastern Mediterranean region to Europe through Cyprus and Greece. However, it is planned to bypass Türkiye entirely. This exclusion would further perpetuate obstacles that impede Türkiye’s involvement in Europe. Hence, Türkiye needs either an improvement in EU-Türkiye relationship, or a direct involvement and control over Cyprus.

3. Analysis: EU-Türkiye Relations

3.1 Why Might a Turkish-alienation Be Disadvantageous for the EU? On 7 September 2025, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, stated that Türkiye should not be allowed to join the EU's new defence funding mechanism, the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) initiative, which aims to raise up to €150 billion by 2030 to support collective defence investments. Greece emphasised its 1995 “casus belli” declaration and pointed out that if Türkiye extends its territorial waters beyond six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea, it would be considered an act of war. Greek officials also communicated with the European Council President reinforcing the idea that Türkiye’s participation in the SAFE programme was unacceptable as long as the Turkish state threatened Greece’s sovereignty over the islands and maritime regions. The SAFE programme is designed to support urgent defence capabilities such as weapons systems, air defense, drones for EU members and allies. If Türkiye successfully joined this programme, it could be more integrated into the EU defence system. However, Greece and Cyprus use their veto power in the EU to block Türkiye’s involvement, stating that if Türkiye is involved, it would violate the EU’s security policy and implicitly legitimize Türkiye’s actions in Cyprus since 1974. In NATO, Türkiye acts as an important defence frontline for Europe amid the escalating tensions in the Middle East. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan accused Greece of using anti-Turkish rhetoric and undermining European security. He stated that the veto is a “hijack” of the EU’s security system, and preserves Greek national interests rather than the collective interests of the European Union member states. Some member states, such as Germany, have pressured Greece to allow Türkiye’s involvement in SAFE. It was understood that the exclusion of the Turks would weaken the EU’s defence strategy, hindering its capacity to develop independent defense capabilities amid growing global geopolitical instabilities and threats.

4. Discussion: The Proposed Reunification Plan

On October 19, after Tufan Erhürman was elected as the leader of TRNC, Nikos Christodoulides, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, stated that they were ready to resume reunification negotiations. He further commented on October 22, in an interview with Euronews, that he was willing to begin negotiations “even next week”. Erhürman endorses a bi-zonal, bi-communal reunification framework that aligns with UN Security Council resolutions. However, he still rejects the two-state solution proposed by Türkiye. The plan for reunification is to have two constituent states with equal political power. The two constituents will potentially share systems for foreign policy and citizenship. The plan includes the withdrawal ofTurkish troops from the island under EU oversight. Environmental and mine clearance operations are planned to be funded by the EU. The Greek Cypriot party, the UK and the UN support this plan, but Türkiye and some groups within Northern Cyprus still remain opposed, stating that only a two-state solution can ensure sovereign equality for Northern Cyprus. 4.1 Implications for Türkiye For Türkiye, reunification would entail the loss of control over the TRNC, as the plan calls for a phased withdrawal of Turkish troops and full demilitarisation of the island. In the reunification process, some land currently controlled by the Turkish Cypriots would be returned to Greek Cypriots. The region may be susceptible to further disagreements due to such territorial adjustment. The plan may diminish Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean regions where it will lose important leverage in both geopolitical and territorial matters. However, the improved relations that come with normalisation may be an opportunity for Türkiye to make progress towards EU membership. 4.2 An Opportunity for Cyprus For Cyprus, resumed reunification talks offer significant progress in fostering social and economic stability. With the 2026 EU Council presidency, Cyprus will be well positioned to pursue further constructive developments in the negotiations. Currently, the north of Cyprus is not eligible for any EU funding, and instead relies on Turkish support. The TRNC economy is much smaller and less diversified than that of the Republic of Cyprus, and the GDP growth rate remains relatively volatile, with 2-3% per year. Due to the lack of international recognition of the TRNC, it does not have sufficient funding and access to international support, which hinders healthcare and social welfare development. Additionally, youth unemployment lies between 18% and 25,%, while an annual inflation rate of over 30% persists in the defacto state, which shows a gap between the economic opportunities for younger generations in the TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, the families from the North evacuated to the South due to the war were deprived of all their former properties.The reunification plan allows a more cohesive development across the island, where funding could be allocated to the North to bridge these economic and social disparities. There would be an improved system of resource management. A coordinated development of offshore gas resources between the North and the South could generate greater revenuesand strengthen Cyprus’s energy security and regional trade prospects, which affirms its strategic significance in the Eastern Mediterranean region. EU involvement could ensure compliance with EU market regulations, which could encourage stronger collaboration with the private sector and international firms. Furthermore, as Türkiye has imposed an economic embargo against the RoC. The Cypriot Republic is barred from having direct economic relations and is unable to access Türkiye’s much larger economy for trade and investment. These economic and political barriers are hindering the development of Cyprus and prevents them from accessing crucial resources in close proximity to the island. 4.3 Impacts on Greece and the EU The reunification could reduce the risk of military confrontations in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean by removing a prolonged source of tension between Greece and Türkiye. Thus, relieving the pressure on Greek defence spending. From an EU point of view, European energy security would benefit from the reunification. It would facilitate smoother export of gas from the region. This aids in achieving diversification of the European energy market, which increases the competitiveness, and reducesRussia's influence in the energy sector.

5. Policy suggestions

5.1 Military To deal with any potential objections regarding Turkish troop withdrawal in the reunification plan, a de-escalation mechanism could be established, allowing both parties to deploy their own non-military police force. This promotes autonomy and safety for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, while simultaneously minimising any potential military threats or tensions between the North and South. The issue is whether the Cypriot National Guard, the Republic of Cyprus's existing military troops, should extend their authority to the TRNC in the event of reunification. With a history of marginalization and a desire for political equality, Turkish Cypriots would reject any reunification plan that supports the removal of Turkish troops. As shown in the Annan Plan's failure, such power imbalances would perpetuate distrust between the two parties and risk conflict rather than progress. There are now British naval personnel on the island, which may serve as a temporary substitution for a larger military entity in Cyprus. However, relying on British forces risks evoking historical sensitivities, making it an unacceptable option for both communities. A more viable option is to deploy international peacekeeping personnel for a restricted period, until the two areas can build a national military together. There is already deployment in the green zone that separates North and South, so expanding this presence is expected to be efficient. The Republic's national guard does not necessarily have to demobilise, as it may simply temporarily suspend operations for the duration, and merge with, presumably, the North's newly established military. The newly formed military group should organise multilateral training and exercises with Greece, Türkiye, and the British Forces in the region. This serves the interests of all parties. Multilateral training boosts regional stability and defence capabilities, which appeals to both NATO and the EU. Additionally, Turkish involvement can help nurture constructive relations between Greece and Türkiye, assisting Türkiye in expanding their military presence and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. 5.2 On the Economy, and Regional Resources The disputes and infringements over EEZs remain a major sticking point in the Eastern Mediterranean. The control over Exclusive Economic Zones directly correlates to the territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea region, where Greece cooperates with Cyprus in managing the Cypriot EEZ, and Türkiye asserts the EEZ rights on behalf of TRNC. As mentioned previously, the Türkiye – Libya agreement on EEZ may entail further disputes on which state is entitled to exploit resources in the Cyprus EEZ region. In the reunification plan, management of EEZs should be discontinued to safeguard the interests and the equilibrium of both states. Instead, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) should be established for Cyprus, with policies encouraging foreign investment, reduced taxation, and increased trade opportunities. In this scenario, the states can still invest in energy resources in the regions of Cyprus and maintain their commercial presence and economic interests in the region. This mechanism reduces the risk of disproportionate control over the Eastern Mediterranean maritime space, restoring Cyprus’s capacity to exercise its own jurisdiction and autonomy rather than serving as leverage for the regional ambitions of other states. 5.3 Social Policies Furthermore, the reunification plan should involve the setting up of grassroots reconciliation mechanisms that tackle cultural and socioeconomic tensions. A Cypriot who was interviewed for this paper stated that there is “propaganda in school where it teaches students from the age of 5 to never forget what the Turkish did.” Similarly, military training often centres around preparing for conflict with the Turks, which reinforces a wartime mentality. A region cannot achieve peace if the communities remain hostile and segregated. When people in the communities meet and collaborate without a barrier, it humanises the “other” and weakens prejudices and fears. Such programmes could be implemented prior to the reunification talks, enabling cross-border access and collaborations that bring communities together. When the conflict and tension on a civilian level have been reduced, the two governments are more likely to reflect the dynamic. Subsequently, coming to an agreement on the reunification plan would be easier. The plan could also include programmes that provide support to those who were displaced during the armed conflict and assist them in reclaiming their former properties.

6. The EU Approach to Turkish Accession:

Enlargement and Defence The reunification of Cyprus would remove a major political obstacle blocking Türkiye’s EU accession. The EU expects Türkiye to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and respect its sovereignty before advancing accession talks. Türkiye’s ongoing military occupation of Northern Cyprus, and its refusal to recognise the Republic, are blocking their accession progress. Hence, solving the Cyprus issue functions asa test from the EU for Türkiye’s compliance with European norms and regional alignment. A reunified Cyprus acting as a member state in the EU would mean that Turkish Cypriots automatically become EU citizens, which could end their current isolation in the international community. From the EU’s perspective, Türkiye’s accession is important because of the countries’ size, its geographical location, and the fact that it is a NATO member, which could potentially strengthen European defence and military cooperation and security in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The role of the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean includes supporting the reconciliation and resolution of conflicts or disputes, monitoring maritime security in the region, and overseeing collaborations between states in energy resource development. Cyprus is situated on Europe’s geopolitical and geographic frontier. Hence, Cyprus is an important actor in maintaining the stability and supporting the EU’s broader strategic development. Cyprus will hold the EU presidency in 2026. It has the opportunity to influence EU policy towards Türkiye’s accession, the Cyprus partition problem, and regional security issues. This could promote better focus and efforts on reconciliation in the region. It could encourage the EU to prioritise what is best for Cyprus, rather than the competing interests of other nearby states.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, a Cyprus reunification, despite having great prospects, will be a long journey due to deep-rooted geopolitical tensions between Greece and Türkiye. As a key state in the Eastern Mediterranean, and a pathway to the Middle East, Cyprus has great potential in safeguarding Europe’s security and economic stability. Through coordinated resource development and EU-facilitated energy cooperation, Cyprus can become a major contributor to European Energy Security. Furthermore, utilising its prime geographical position, Cyprus will become a key player in the EU's defence strategy. However, the disputes over the maritime territories will remain the biggest hurdle in the reunification talks. The removal of Turkish troops, and the inauguration of a new national system, will require immense efforts to reconcile the competing interests of two communities. It is possible that grassroot reconciliation methods and UN peacekeeping intervention may ease the transition. The main focus should now be on the EEZs of each island in the Eastern Mediterranean The illegitimate infringements of these zones maintain a constant tension within the region. A reunification of the Cypriot island will be an attempt to regain control from interfering states. The upcoming Cyprus EU Council presidency in 2026 will be a crucial moment for the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider EU, in defence, energy security and economic development. As reunification talks resume, new conflicts will arise and new opportunities will present themselves in due course.