Between Brotherhood and Destabilisation: The Republika Srpska as an Instrument of Serbian Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Serbian World), Destabilization, European Union (EU) Conditionality,

1. Introduction

The Republika Srpska (RS) is pivotal in understanding the dynamics of the Western Balkans. Being a constituent entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) yet maintaining close ties, with the Republic of Serbia it represents a zone of significant friction essentially symbolizing the Balkan powder keg. Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991-1992) the Yugoslav conflicts (1991-2001) and the ratification of the Dayton https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Destabilisation: The of Serbian Srpska (RS) as an instrument of regional influence, integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Using a engagement –formalized via the Agreement on Special through political obstruction, economic dependence, that Serbia’s policy is a potent destabilizing factor for the enabled by the EU’s weak conditionality and lack of consensus EU strategy, demanding Serbia’s full alignment with the (BiH), Serbia, Dayton Agreement (DPA), Srpski Svet Milorad Dodik, Regional Influence Strategy Agreement (DPA) in 1995 the DPA created a decentralized political framework in which BiH continues as a unified sovereign nation made up of two main political units: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska along, with the self-governing Brčko District. In this context the RS appears as a political body: although officially within the BiH state it effectively preserves near-sovereign ties with Serbia. Having stated this Serbia's role in influencing the institutional status of the Republika Srpska is a scholarly subject deserving examination. In recent times there has been a rise in political, economic and symbolic collaboration between the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and the head of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik (as well, as Ana Trišić-Babić serving as acting president of RS since October 18th). Although Serbia has officially pledged to uphold peace and stability in BiH (as a party to the DPA) its strong political and economic links with Republika Srpska provoke doubts about the autonomy of this entity and the durability of Bosnia’s sovereignty. This intricate relationship influences not only the interactions between Bosnia, Serbia and international actors such as the European Union (EU) but could also impact the delicate internal relations within the region. Analyzing these ties or dependencies provides insight into the dynamics and challenges. Hence the central research question driving this study is: to what degree does Serbia’s stance on the Republika Srpska function as a means to advance its influence strategy and what impact does it have on the stability and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The research will aim to achieve the following goals: Initially it seeks to investigate Serbia’s policy towards the Republika Srpska in the context of its broader objectives, in the Western Balkans. Secondly the analysis seeks to explore the effect of the economic cooperation between Belgrade and Banja Luka on the functioning of BiHs institutions. Thirdly a key goal is to determine the EUs role as an actor in shaping this relationship. Fourthly the research will assess whether Serbia's approach serves as a stabilizing or destabilizing factor, for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighboring region. This includes assessing whether the policy enhances Bosnia's effectiveness and integration or weakens its state-level institutions and encourages division. Ultimately the study aims to develop suggestions concerning possible approaches for EU policy, toward Serbia and BiH. This paper employs an explanatory method supplemented with aspects of normative analysis. It begins by outlining the existing institutional framework then proceeds to thoroughly analyze the underlying causes and subsequently evaluates the effect of this policy on the institutional stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Sarajevo–Banja Luka relationship and the EU accession process and diplomatic ties. Finally the study ends with a summary of the European Union’s approach to tackling this matter. The study builds its evidence entirely on a broad range of secondary sources. These consist of official government documents and reports as well as academic articles and analyses from think tanks. By drawing on such varied materials, the research gains a certain depth and reliability—something that’s quite important when you want to avoid relying on just one perspective.

2. Background Analysis

2.1 The Formation of the Federal State of Bosnia and Herzegovina To properly situate the analysis, it is necessary to first review the key historical evolutions shaping the identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. With the disintegration of the Yugoslav structures in the early 1990s, ethnic tensions also intensified in Bosnia and Herzegovina – a country characterized by a complex composition of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats. Between February and March 1992, the Bosnian parliament held a referendum on independence, which was boycotted by most Serbs. Earlier, on 9–10 November 1991, the Serb assembly had organized a plebiscite in Serb-majority areas, in which 96% voted in favour of remaining within the Yugoslav federation formed by Serbia and Montenegro. In the 1992 referendum, 99% of participating citizens voted for independence, and the Bosnian parliament proclaimed the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 7 April 1992, the Serb assembly in Banja Luka declared the separation of governmental ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Supported by Serbia and the Yugoslav People’s Army, Bosnian Serbs launched an armed campaign to establish their own state in territories inhabited by Serbs. The conflict (1992–1995) was marked by war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and massive civilian casualties. The primary goal of the Bosnian Serbs was to consolidate a coherent territory that could eventually be integrated into Serbia. The war ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. Annex four of the Agreement serves as the current Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognizing the Republika Srpska as one of the country’s two political and territorial entities, and defining the governmental functions and competences of both autonomous units. The inter-entity boundary lines were delineated in Annex two. The Dayton Agreement also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR/HR), tasked with ensuring compliance with the peace agreement and coordinating the activities of international organizations within the country. The High Representative is endowed with special so-called “Bonn Powers,” which authorize them to dismiss political officials from both entities if their actions are deemed to obstruct the peace implementation process. The complex political and institutional mosaic of BiH, characterized by a failure to build a genuinely multiethnic society, results in a fragile and unstable state, with some observers predicting eventual disintegration. It is essential to highlight the inability to establish a multiethnic nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina – especially considering the presence of a federation made up of mostly self-governing regions – which weakens the basis of statehood founded on the harmony of various ethnic communities. Based on the 2013 census one million ethnic Serbs live in Bosnia and Herzegovina with over 90% residing in Republika Srpska. This demographic fact plays a role in influencing Serbia’s foreign policy. The existence of an ethnic minority forces Serbia to stay actively involved in the domestic matters of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia cannot ignore occurrences in Republika Srpska since any rise in tensions there could threaten the stability of the Balkans – thereby influencing Serbia’s strategic goals, including its ambitions, for EU accession. As a result, Serbia finds itself in a position where it must carefully balance between supporting its compatriots in Republika Srpska and fulfilling its international obligations aimed at ensuring regional stability. 2.2 Autonomous Aspirations of the Republika Srpska The autonomous aspirations of the Republika Srpska have been particularly intensified under Milorad Dodik, who openly challenges the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is essential to examine Dodik’s political trajectory and influence, as he stands at the very core of Republika Srpska’s political identity. Dodik began his political career in the 1980s and assumed the position of RS Prime Minister in 1998. Since then, he has held multiple key offices, including RS President (2010–2018, 2022–2025) and the Serb member of the BiH Presidency. As the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) – the dominant political force in the Serb entity – he has been regarded as a controversial figure, mainly due to his persistent efforts to expand RS autonomy within the federation. He frequently disputes decisions made by BiH’s central authorities and the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, while repeatedly threatening the secession of Serb-majority territories – actions that have fuelled ongoing political and institutional tensions. In 2021, the RS parliament adopted a series of resolutions intended to withdraw powers from BiH’s central government in the areas of justice, defence, and security. These resolutions also called for halting the enforcement of national laws and directives that had been put in place by the Office of the High Representative. The authorities in Republika Srpska intended to set up their own institutions within six months. These were to include a military force, an intelligence service, and an anti-corruption office. These actions were justified by the RS leadership as a restoration of competencies allegedly usurped by the central government. However, the international community condemned the resolutions as unconstitutional, while the High Representative declared them illegal and contrary to the DPA. These resolutions, though never fully put into practice, reveal a lot about Dodik’s political style. It’s clear he’s been working to weaken the central institutions by setting up alternative centers of power, aiming to chip away at Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional framework. His approach seems to be about gradually shifting the country into something closer to a loose confederation, slowly diminishing its statehood. But it’s not just a political game, his actions have had real legal repercussions. Back in February 2025, a BiH court sentenced Dodik to a year in prison and barred him from holding public office for six years, all because he didn’t comply with rulings from the High Representative. In February 2025, Dodik was sentenced by a BiH court to one year in prison and six years of disqualification from holding public office for disobeying decisions issued by the High Representative. In response, the RS parliament passed laws banning the operation of BiH state institutions within the entity’s territory and adopted a “foreign agents law” targeting foreign-funded media. In April 2025, the state-level police agency attempted to arrest Dodik for activities sabotaging the constitutional order, but RS police forces intervened. Dodik declared that he did not recognize the jurisdiction of Bosnia’s central authorities. In reaction, High Representative Schmidt suspended funding for ruling parties in the RS, while the EU increased the presence of EUFOR peacekeeping troops in the region. After Dodik lost his position as president due to the ongoing charges and trial, his longtime advisor, Ana Trišić-Babić, has been acting as the RS president since October 18th. The presidential elections, planned for November 23rd, are essential for the future of the RS and BiH, as well as Serbia’s influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina. This evolving situation poses serious risks of renewed instability in the Western Balkans, with potential consequences for both regional security and Serbia’s broader interests.

3. Findings

3.1 Legal and Institutional Basis of Relations 3.1.1 Agreement on Special Parallel Relations The core of Serbia’s policy towards the Republika Srpska is institutionalized through the idea of Special Parallel Relations. The legal foundation for this cooperation is the Agreement on Special Parallel Relations, which was signed on February 28th, 1997, between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, and eventually updated in 2006. This agreement obtains its legitimacy from the DPA, which explicitly granted BiH's entities the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring countries, provided these relations remain consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The document commits both Serbia and the RS to fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of BiH. The Agreement on Special Parallel Relations establishes deep cooperation between Serbia and the Republika Srpska across multiple sectors. This relationship features political coordination through a joint Council, aiming for harmonized foreign policy stances. Economically, it promotes a “single market" approach, encouraging joint investments and infrastructure projects. Culturally, the focus is on social unification, notably by standardizing school curriculum in Serbian language and history, strengthened by shared Orthodox heritage. Despite Belgrade's official commitment to BiH sovereignty, its foreign policy explicitly prioritizes the 'preservation and prosperity' of the RS, viewing it as a 'historical achievement' of the Serbian people. Consequently, this special cooperation often functions as a foundation for integration between Serbia and the RS, effectively diminishing and sidelining BiH’s central authorities. Serbian officials publicly promote these special relations, frequently attending unconstitutional RS entity celebrations held on January 9th. 3.1.2 Srpski Svet This close relationship operates within a wider ideological and strategic frame known as the Serbian Doctrine of Regional Influence. Its most contemporary and controversial manifestation is the concept of Srpski Svet (Serbian World), publicly introduced around 2020 and frequently compared to the Russian concept of Ruski Mir (Russian World). The Srpski Svet project aims to create a political and cultural space that unites all Serbs, irrespective of state borders, thus supporting the view that, quoting Milorad Dodik, "Serbs today have two states. One is Serbia and the other is RS". Although supporters frame this primarily as a cultural and identity-based framework, analysts often interpret it as a modern expression of the historical "Greater Serbia" ambition, aimed at political and cultural unification of areas inhabited by ethnic Serbs in Southeast Europe. This doctrine is further interlaced with the goals of global multipolarization, challenging Western dominance and strengthening Russian influence in the region. In this context, Belgrade's support for the RS became a key instrument for pursuing its regional influence strategy, consolidating Serbian national power, and concurrently undermining the state unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 3.2 Instruments of Serbian Influence on the Republika Srpska 3.2.1 Political-Strategic Instruments The strategic cooperation between Serbia and the Republika Srpska is primarily manifested through coordinated political actions, the strategic use of veto power and institutional obstruction within BiH, and the insistent application of a specific ethno-nationalist discourse. A core element of the political cooperation is the frequent coordination and holding of joint sessions between the leaderships of Serbia and the RS. Vučić and Dodik have intensified their political cooperation. Serbia established a shared parliamentary forum with the RS entity and organized an ‘all-Serb assembly’ in Belgrade in June 2024, the declaration of which was endorsed by both the Serbian and RS assemblies. Furthermore, RS political elites systematically employ mechanisms to obstruct the functioning of BiH state institutions. The Republika Srpska leadership is keen to weaken central state institutions by consistently blocking decision-making processes in the BiH Presidency, the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, and the Council of Ministers. The current strategy focuses on systemic degradation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's central state authority. This effort involves blocking key appointments to vital institutions, such as the BiH Central Bank, and obstructing necessary governmental functions by preventing the BiH Presidency from utilizing the BiH Armed Forces for assistance in emergencies like firefighting. In addition, the policy explicitly aims to deny state institutions larger budgets to perpetually undermine the central state's strength. Lastly, in the realm of foreign policy, this strategy seeks to subvert the authority of the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs by instructing all BiH Ambassadors of Serb ethnicity to coordinate their activities solely with the Serb member of the BiH Presidency. This blockage stems from the formal requirement for consensus or specific voting procedures in collective institutions. Similarly, Dodik has used legislative manoeuvres in the RS National Assembly to attempt to undermine state authority, such as adopting laws rejecting the applicability of State-level legislation on RS territory and obliging RS authorities not to cooperate with BiH institutions. 3.2.2 Economic and Financial Instruments Serbia utilizes economic tools (primarily investments, infrastructure projects, and financial support) to increase the economic dependence of the RS on Belgrade and avoid BiH central institutions. Serbia has actively financed numerous infrastructure projects in the RS. Since 2014, Belgrade has invested over a billion euros in the Republika Srpska. Strategic investment happens in many areas. One of the most important is the energy sector, of strategic concern, often linked to Russian influence. Serbia announced joint initiatives, including investments in hydropower plants in 2018. Plans include the construction of three hydropower plants on the Drina River. These projects have led to constitutional disputes, as the BiH Constitutional Court has ruled that the exclusive competence to regulate State Property, including public goods like rivers, rests with the State of BiH. Another essential area is transport infrastructure – projects such as the planned construction of the Trebinje Airport, which, while potentially economically questionable, is seen as a strategic move to ensure the independence of RS air transport from BiH. Republika Srpska is also going to be gas and oil dependent on Serbia. The plan assumes the construction of a gas pipeline through the RS, connecting it directly to the Balkanski tok gas pipeline. This is intended to ensure cheaper gas and energy stability for the RS, reinforcing its reliance on Russian sources. Gazprom, controlled by Russia, accounts for 100% of the imported gas supply to BiH. Moreover, Serbia supports the RS budget and finances public institutions to create economic dependence. When Republika Srpska representatives initiated a blockade of state-level institutions, Dodik proposed that the RS government would assume salary payments for Serbs employed in BiH institutions, demonstrating an ability and intent to finance parallel structures. Furthermore, the RS authorities leverage this financial autonomy to resist cooperation; in 2022, the EU halted financing two projects valued at €600 million for the RS until SNSD ceased blocking BiH institutions. 3.2.3 Symbolic and Cultural Instruments Serbia and the RS apply various instruments to forge a shared identity and cultural space, intentionally diverging from the BiH state narrative. The authorities in the Republika Srpska are systematically working to harmonize their legislative and educational systems with those of Serbia to strengthen the Serb identity and attachment to the mother state. This effort involves the standardization of curricula, with plans for elementary students in both Serbia and the RS to study the same material for key subjects like Serbian language, history, and geography. Critics view this move as effectively disregarding the central state. Moreover, both the RS National Assembly and the Serbian Parliament simultaneously adopted similar laws focused on the protection and preservation of the Serbian language and the Cyrillic script, designating them as intangible cultural heritage and providing financial relief to entities using the script. However, this measure was challenged by the Bosniak and Croat caucuses as discriminatory. To further solidify unity, a new joint holiday, the Day of National Unity and Flag, was introduced on September 15th, although the EU has flagged this and other celebrations as problematic. At the time the media landscape was strategically used to spread pro-Serb and pro-Russian messages contesting Western influence and mainstream accounts of the conflict. This approach includes regulation of local media with the RS public broadcaster, RTRS frequently acting as a propaganda platform for Dodik and the ruling SNSD party.At the time the media landscape was strategically used to spread pro-Serb and pro-Russian messages contesting Western influence and mainstream accounts of the conflict. This approach includes regulation of local media with the RS public broadcaster, RTRS frequently acting as a propaganda platform for Dodik and the ruling SNSD party. This situation is further intensified by the impact of media websites, which regularly present RS policies in a positive light and frequently omit coverage of issues harmful to Serb politicians. Moreover Russian news organizations, such as Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan are actively present, in the area advancing stories that weaken the chances of EU integration. A significant part of this media and political discourse involves historical revisionism. Serbian political and media narratives frequently utilize historical events, like the NATO bombing campaign "Operation Deliberate Force" in 1995, to portray the North Atlantic Alliance as an aggressor. In Republika Srpska’s schools, history textbooks present a perspective different from those in the Federation of BiH, leading to divergent views on sensitive issues. Milorad Dodik, for example, now publicly denies the term "genocide" for the Srebrenica incident, calling it a "serious ploy." These strategies demonstrate a calculated effort by Serbia, in alignment with the RS leadership, to advance its influence within BiH, often at the expense of the stability and integrity of the central state institutions. 3.2.4 Discourse Analysis: Identification of Key Motifs The political rhetoric of Belgrade and Banja Luka is characterized by ethno-nationalist and conflicting communication. The discourse analysis reveals several key motifs used to consolidate power and advance separatist agendas. Dodik commits to promoting the idea of ethnic unity and indivisibility of the Serbian people in linguistic, national, and cultural terms. He openly expresses his desire for the RS to unite with the "motherland Serbia", viewing Serbs as having two states (as previously mentioned). Dodik often uses the discursive construction of "we" (Serbs) versus "them" (Bosniaks, Croats, the international community) to foster solidarity among his constituents. Vučić reinforces this narrative by stating that Serbs are "one and the same people" (not divided into Bosnian or Croatian Serbs). Secondly, Dodik constructs a narrative about victimhood and threat, portraying Serbs as oppressed people in BiH, entitled to self-determination. He uses the topos of threat, claiming that "attacks on RS’s rights," its institutions, and its holidays, often orchestrated by Bosniaks and the international community, endanger the Serb national identity. This nationalist strategy is a consolidation and antagonization tactic, propagating a vision of Serbs as victims unjustly accused by the rest of the world. Lastly, Dodik often delegitimizes the state of BiH and the High Representative. He describes Bosnia and Herzegovina as a "burden with no future" and a "failed state". He contests the legitimacy of High Representative, claiming that the role lacks a formal UN Security Council confirmation. This rejection aims to undermine the constitutional order of BiH. Russia consistently supports Dodik's stance.

4. Policy Recommendations

4.1 Assessments of EU Policy The trajectory of the Belgrade–Banja Luka relationship cannot be assessed outside the framework of the European Union's enlargement policy, which serves as the primary external stabilising mechanism for the Western Balkans. It is crucial to evaluate the efficiency of current EU mechanisms, especially conditionality, and to synthesize the overall impact of Serbian policy on the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU relies primarily on the Stabilization and Association Process and the prospect of eventual membership to force BiH and Serbia to adopt necessary reforms. However, this strategy has been criticized for yielding limited results in BiH, which remains the second least prepared candidate state (after Kosovo). Serbia has articulated European Union membership as its strategic goal, and the EU remains Serbia's main trade partner, largest source of foreign direct investment, and primary donor. This economic leverage provides the EU with significant conditional power. The core deficiency in applying conditionality towards Serbia pertains to its alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the strategic importance of full alignment, Serbia has not consistently adhered to EU restrictive measures against Russia. This persistent maintenance of close relations with Moscow raises serious concerns regarding Belgrade’s strategic orientation and undermines its credibility as an EU candidate. The Serbian government sometimes engages in a "double game," presenting a soft, peaceful stance in official dialogue with Sarajevo and Western diplomats (necessary for accession), while simultaneously reinforcing ties with the RS. Belgrade’s decision to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2019 was perceived as a political message to Brussels that Serbia possessed geopolitical and economic alternatives should the accession process fade. The EU has been explicitly urged to address Serbia's continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and failure to align with EU sanctions by potentially reconsidering the scope of financial assistance provided. Does EU Policy Inadvertently Legitimize the Strengthening of Relations at the Expense of BiH Statehood? The European traditional approach assumes that the prospect of membership is a sufficient incentive for local elites to implement politically costly reforms. However, the institutional complexity established by the Dayton Agreement, which grants wide autonomy to the RS, has allowed ethno-nationalist leaders like Milorad Dodik to exploit systemic weaknesses. The policy of the Republika Srpska leadership, particularly Dodik, is centred on opposing any reforms that promote centralization, perceiving them as threats to the entity's constitutional competences. By continuously blocking decision-making processes at the state level (e.g., key appointments or legislative initiatives), RS provides evidence for its narrative that BiH is a dysfunctional state, thereby strengthening its own case for greater independence or eventual secession. Crucially, the EU's lack of internal unity has handicapped its ability to respond effectively to Dodik's separatist actions. Despite repeated calls for targeted sanctions against Dodik (who has been sanctioned by the US and UK for corruption and destabilisation), consensus is routinely blocked by EU Member States, notably Hungary and Croatia. This absence of decisive action is interpreted by Dodik as a lack of serious commitment from the West to the preservation of the constitutional order in BiH. This failure to enforce red lines inadvertently reinforces the position of the ethno-nationalist elites, who continue to benefit personally and politically from the stalled reform process and the maintenance of political deadlock. Consequently, the EU’s soft diplomatic approach has been widely criticised, with calls for high-ranking EU officials to use clearer language or even to cease contacts with officials who actively undermine the constitutional order. 4.2 Synthesis of Impact Assessment: Stabilization vs. Destabilization Based on the evidence across political-strategic, economic-financial, and symbolic-cultural spheres, the policy of Serbia towards the Republika Srpska serves overwhelmingly as a destabilising factor for the statehood and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia utilizes the RS as an instrument of regional influence, pursuing a deliberate dual policy that undermines central institutions in Sarajevo. The RS political elite, supported by Belgrade’s political rhetoric, consistently obstructs decision-making and legislative progress, thereby validating the discourse of BiH as a “failed state.” This obstructiveness is a fundamental barrier to BiH’s EU accession process. Additionally, through coordinated discourse emphasizing ethnic unity, victimhood, and the concept of Srpski Svet, Belgrade and Banja Luka actively foster polarisation and separatist sentiments. This approach counters the reconciliation goals inherent in the Dayton Agreement. The region is also very vulnerable. The alignment between the RS and Serbia serves as a conduit for Russian influence in the region. Russia actively supports Dodik’s separatism and his denial of the High Representative’s legitimacy. This destabilization, often employing hybrid methods (disinformation, cyberattacks), directly undermines Euro-Atlantic integration efforts, particularly BiH’s aspiration for NATO membership, which the RS has formally opposed through its resolution on military neutrality. 4.3 Normative Recommendations for the EU To counteract the impact of the Belgrade–Banja Luka axis and ensure the stability of BiH the EU needs to adopt an updated, stricter and more coherent approach: The EU must promptly enhance conditionality. Insist on Serbia’s complete and unequivocal conformity with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the implementation of sanctions against Russia. Any ongoing refusal to comply should lead to a reassessment of financial support and accession talks concentrating exclusively on tangible advancements in key sectors such, as the rule of law. EU Member States need to agree on and implement sanctions against Milorad Dodik and other senior RS or Serbian officials providing political or material backing for separatist efforts, in BiH. Furthermore the EU ought to strengthen its approach of isolating political figures who deliberately weaken BiH’s constitutional cohesion. The EU needs to boost the funding allocated to combating threats and external disinformation, especially pro-Russian and anti-EU messages disseminated via media outlets active in Serbia and the RS. Serbia should be required to enforce regulatory actions targeting these foreign influence campaigns. Future changes in BiH need to concentrate on creating an accountable and impartial governance framework that completely aligns with European norms. The EU ought to work alongside entities (OHR, OSCE) to revise the approach to more accurately represent local conditions and maintain the coherence and durability of central government bodies. Given the risks of instability and hybrid threats, the EU should ensure the security presence and preparedness of EUFOR Althea. NATO and the EU should enhance cooperation to counter hybrid threats, including potentially sending Counter-Hybrid Support Teams (EU Rapid Hybrid Threat Response Teams) to BiH.

5. Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that Serbia’s policy towards the Republika Srpska operates primarily as a destabilising force for the statehood and constitutional integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis shows that Belgrade effectively employs the RS political leadership, particularly Milorad Dodik and the SNSD, as a central instrument of its regional influence strategy. While Serbia continues to rhetorically affirm its commitment to the Dayton Peace Agreement and BiH’s independence in line with its EU accession objectives, it simultaneously implements political, economic, and discursive tools that erode the authority of BiH’s state-level institutions. These destabilising dynamics manifest most clearly through sustained political obstruction in state-level decision-making, the cultivation of asymmetric economic dependence through strategic investments that evade Sarajevo, and the promotion of deeply polarising identity narratives. The stubborn persistence of this close relationship is made much easier because of several problems: the European Union’s system of conditionality (using the promise of membership to force reforms) is structurally weak, there's a serious lack of agreement among EU Member States about putting in place targeted sanctions, and finally, Russian influence is increasingly managing to penetrate and stick to local political groups in the region. Without a significant recalibration of the EU’s approach, Serbia and the RS leadership will remain motivated to continue practices that undermine BiH’s constitutional order and block its European trajectory. In order to address these patterns the EU must enforce conditionality uniformly including demanding Serbias complete compliance with the CFSP especially regarding sanctions on Russia and by overcoming internal disagreements that have so far inhibited the implementation of targeted actions against major destabilising agents. Enhancing EUFOR Althea and increasing capabilities to tackle threats would additionally bolster the Union’s reputation, as a security guarantor. Ultimately, safeguarding the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina requires a decisive and unified European response that combines political leverage, institutional coherence, and strategic persistence. Only through such an approach can the EU effectively restrain destabilising behaviour, support constitutional functionality, and uphold BiH’s prospects for a secure and genuinely European future.