Criminal Enterprise or Diplomatic Currency? Captagon and Syria's Pursuit of International Reintegration
Sasha Raed KarzonIE University
Edited by Carolina Innez Ferreira, IE University
Abstract
The 2025 anti-narcotics campaign in Syria brings on a critical shift in the development of the country as it transitions from a post-authoritarian regime to a post-conflict reconstruction government. This paper examines the transformation of drug policy in Syria.
reintegration
The collapse of the Assad regime in December of 2024 offset an intensely profound transformation in the political, institutional, and security architecture of the state of Syria. Traditionally being epitomized by the entrenched authoritarianism and militarized patronage networks, Syria https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Currency? of International shift in the development of the country as it transitions government. Traditionally embedded in terms of Syria currently has to face the increasing pressure of the and guarantee security under the stewardship of the This paper will examine the transformation of drug policy in embedded in the Assad-era patronage and coercive state the regionalization and reintegration by other countries. The on policy research institutions, international media outlets of the Syrian anti-narcotics strategy of 2025. the neighboring states and the western world, as well as the policy stance of Syria. The article argues that Captagon keep Syria alive to being one of the key ways by which it and fulfills its post-conflict obligations. regional security, foreign policy, international entered the year 2025 with a brand-new transitional administration under President Ahmad-Al Sharaa that was to reassert domestic sovereignty, reestablish the regional legitimacy, and renegotiate regional legitimacy as well as its position in the international system. One of the most symbolically significant features of this shift is the policy of the state regarding the control over narcotics, in particular, the production of an amphetamine-like substance known internationally as Captagon, which served in the past as an illicit economic stimulus and instrument of geopolitical pressure under the Bashar al-Assad regime. Throughout the 2010’s and early 2020’s, the drug evolved into one of the region;s most destabilizing illicit trades, often dubbed as the “poor man’s cocaine” due to its similar effects and affordability. Assad regime era military divisions, intelligence branches, and affiliated militias developed a vertically integrated production and trafficking system, transforming Syria into the world’s epicenter and capital of Captagon manufacturing and distributing. The entirety of this illicit economy provided billions of dollars in revenue amid brutal sanctions and intense economic collapse, but at the same time, produced severely consequential regional spillovers which include; Jordanian Border Violence, Saudi Arabian public health crises, and rapidly escalating GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) frustration over Syria’s perceived shielding over Captagon trafficking networks. The drug hence exacerbated regional security discourse. In the face of this, the Syrian transitional government led by President Ahmad Al-Sharaa has launched a sweeping anti-narcotics campaign framed as a cornerstone of institutional reforms and diplomatic reorientation. This campaign has been transformed into an early litmus test of whether Syria can truly become a credible state actor fully capable of controlling transnational threats and fulfilling its regional security expectations. For Syria’s neighboring states, measurable and valid progress has become the central condition for normalization in relations and reconstruction funding. This paper argues that Syria’s 2025 anti-narcotics policies represents a strategic redefinition of the illicit Captagon economy, from an instrument of regime endurance and funding to a mechanism of diplomatic legitimacy, positioning narco-control as a principal pathway for Syria’s re-integration into regional and international political structures.
2.1 History and Evolution of Captagon Captagon's origins start out in Germany in 1961, as a brand-name legal prescription medication spread to many neighboring countries. It contained an amphetamine called fenethylline that was utilized in the treatment of hyperactivity, narcolepsy, and depression. Soon after its release, it was banned worldwide in the 1980s due to its abuse potential and deadly side-effects. After the ban of Captagon, southeastern European countries, especially Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the former cluster of Serbia-Montenegro became major producers of illicit drugs, where it was then smuggled to Arabian peninsula markets. During the years to come, Hezbollah in Lebanon continued to deepen its engagement in the production of Captagon pills with an acute emphasis on the Bekaa area. After the Hezbollah-Israel war of 2006, it was reported that the group used Iranian reconstruction aid as a pretext to be able to obtain merchandised gear in order to manufacture counterfeit/fake Captagon pills, Hezbollah in Lebanon was generally regarded as the predominant producer of the drug in the middle east as they were smuggling it from Syria to Turkey with the aid of the Assad regime. After the eruption of the civil war in 2011, the involvement of Syria in the Captagon trade was transformed from a transit nation to the main producer, especially after the recovery of major southern provinces of Daraa and Suweidah by the Syrian government, which were prime locations for smuggling routes. More than being closer to borders than rural Syrian territory and therefore geographically advantageous, the Southern region in its entirety became the international center of Captagon that witnessed the inextricable involvement of the Syrian Army, foreign militias, and Iranian supported groups which include Hezbollah. 2.2 Assad-Era Militarization of the Captagon trade Under the Assad regime, the captagon trade became embedded within the State’s coercive apparatus. Numerous investigations have revealed that elite military units, most famously the Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army during the Assad regime, operated trafficking and production routes, while other army intelligence units provided security, protection, and logistical support. It was notably one of the most prominent military organs during the Assad regime, officially led by Maher Al-Assad, the younger brother of President Bashar Al-Assad. The revenue coming in from Captagon became key for the regime’s survival amid brutal sanctions, economic collapse, and continuous territorial fragmentation. The evolution of Captagon to a political currency begins to show when the Gulf states began accusing Damascus of utilizing drugs as leverage for the negotiation of political concessions.
3.1 Syria’s 2025 Anti-Narcotics Campaign The transitional government of Syria launched highly visible enforcement measures in early 2025, the most notable being:
Damascus, Homs, Latakia, and Dar’aa;
operation;
regional and United Nations narcotics frameworks. These measures are presented within Syria as testimonies of institutional renewal and abroad as indicators of Syria’s state responsibility. All of these aspects within the anti-narcotics campaign serve simultaneously as enforcement measures, and curated political messages to demonstrate a break from the Assad regime’s political economy. Publicly targeting individuals who were previously under the protection of military and intelligence structure is a symbolic disavowal by the government of the organized criminal networks that were embedded within the framework of the former regime’s upkeep. The 2025 anti-narcotics campaign reveals how the transitional state uses high-visibility enforcement to negotiate external legitimacy while rebuilding its authority internally. The campaign shows the government’s attempt to restore the state capacity from the illicit economy that had effectively taken the place of formal governance during the civil war. This made narcotics enforcement a criteria in the rubric of assessing whether the new administration could reassert coercive control over entrenched networks. At the same time, the program has a disproportionate effect on Syria’s diplomatic re-alignment: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and others have tied normalization, reconstruction aid, and border collaboration to measurable gains in Captagon suppression. Hence, transforming the war on drugs into the most direct channel of credibility restoration and re-integrating into regional politics. On the other hand, this makes it difficult to assume that the Assad-era economy will be broken clean as a relic of the past. Though the arrests of former-regime linked traffickers is a sign of an institutional break, many trafficking networks are still resilient and adaptive according to investigative reports. This begs the question: Is Syria destroying structural criminal economies or reassigning them under a new political government? Instead of weakening the argument, this contradiction bolsters the main thesis: the anti-narcotics policy of the country is used as the substantive enforcement, in addition to the performance of diplomatic missions, so that Captagon shifts from a purely criminal business to a diplomatic currency that grounds the country in its post-conflict reintegration. 3.2 Prominent International Diplomatic Reactions 3.2.1- Jordan Jordan’s stance is one of cautious engagement. Amman has long accused Syrian actors of encouraging and condoning the flows of trafficking. It now has enjoyed the benefits of the campaign such as border coordination, intelligence-sharing, and joint security operations in the aftermath of these allegations. However, the fact that Jordan simultaneously maintained independent air-strikes on smuggling centres highlights long-standing trust issues. The two-track policy is an indicator that even if Aamman is aware of the possible advantage of collaboration, it is still unwilling to rely solely on Syrian enforcement due to their lopsided institutional history. 3.2.2- Saudi Arabia and Gulf States Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have had a more transactional posture in the face of the campaigns, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Both of them have associated normalisation with quantifiable advancement in narcotics control. Diplomatic missions are partially open, but on conditions that Syria must show a consistent decrease in volumes of trafficking, high-level criminals, and organize regionally in the implementation of such. This conditionality amplifies the political baggage that Captagon has earned in the course of influencing Syria-Gulf relations, further indicating the extent of which the illegal drug business had hindered diplomatic reconciliation. 3.2.3- Western Actors The campaign is perceived through the lens of sanction law and regional stability by western actors, specifically the United States. The development of anti-narcotics activities is regarded as a prerequisite to lifting sanctions and re-engagement with Syrian institutions under the U.S. Captagon act which was a sanctions-accountability framework . European states are not directly affected by the Captagon flow, but still view narcotics enforcement as a measure of state accountability and institutional reform. Overall, both regional and international responses illustrate how drug policy has transformed into a factor determining diplomatic behavior. Syria’s relationships with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and the Western World are no longer determined by conflict relations or geopolitical orientations, but are now contingent upon the credibility of anti-narcotics campaigns. This congruence between external motivations and domestic policy bolsters the main point of Captagon as a tool of negotiating legitimacy, security cooperation, and reintegration internationally. Regional actors assess the policy on measurable outputs, such as intelligence-sharing, seizures, and arrests rather than rhetoric. This reveals the extent to which the enforcement of this campaign has become embedded into Syrian diplomatic expectations. 3.3 Security Cooperations and implications on the International World implications on the international world The 2025 anti-narcotics campaign in Syria has opened up new vistas of security cooperation, transforming relations with regional and international players. The examples of joint operations with Iraq along the Albu Kamal-Qaim border and the renewed involvement in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security consultations are examples of growing readiness to coordinate against the common enemy of Captagon trafficking. The re-emergence of Syrian participation in larger regional frameworks is the first step towards reintegration into wider regional frameworks. Western states have also shown interest in technical collaboration in fields like border surveillance, data management, and interdiction, implying that narcotics enforcement has become a channel through which broader security-sector discourse is developing. Through the theoretical perspectives of commitment signalling legitimacy theory, these developments can be seen as an example of transitional states trying to restore credibility through expensive, observable measures, which in Syria’s case are high-profile arrests and raids seizing pills, all visible displays of conformity to regional expectations. This trend is indicative of larger processes of post-conflict reconstruction, where governments seek to display more visible policy efforts to demonstrate administrative capacity, control over territory, and institutional renewal. Through its interaction with regional and Western security players, Syria not only interferes with trafficking networks, but fulfills compliance with regional norms, sending an emerging image of a responsible post-conflict state. However, these kinds of openings come with their own disadvantages, where external pressures can lead Syria to prioritize these regional efforts in place of domestic demands. Moreover, an enforcement-intensive policy could overshadow necessary reforms such as economic diversity, judicial empowerment, and governance transformation, all of which are crucial to reduce the inertia of illicit economies. Overall, the anti-narcotics campaign reveals how Captagon has become a platform to rebuild security associations, renegotiate regional affiliation, and reconstruct Syrian state identity. All of which highlights its primary role as a criminal product, but also as a hallmark of post-conflict Syrian foreign policy.
The case study of the 2025 campaign against narcotics in Syria shows that there is a series of conceptual patterns which may explain how Captagon has transformed into an illicit economy to the instrument of post-conflict statecraft. 4.1 Drugs Policy Diplomatic Signaling. The initial significant conclusion is that the war on narcotics has been turned into an indicator of diplomatic efforts. The staged raids, TV-esque seizures of pills and arrests are not only targeted at the citizens of Syria but manufactured to be consumed by foreigners, especially targeted towards Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf. This finding is consistent with the body of scholarship that focuses on the application of policy performance in ensuring legitimacy and negotiating international belonging by post-conflict states. Thus the campaign is not just aimed at decreasing the flow of narcotics, the campaign is supposed to show that Syria is a responsible state, able to fit the expectations of the regions and the world. 4.2 Institutional Reform vs. Symbolic Transformation. The second finding is related to the conflict between the actual institutional change and illusions of change. The creation of anti-narcotics directorates, harmonization with UN models, and the detention of high-profile traffickers are signs of having serious approaches to rebuilding the state power. But still the perpetuation of the trafficking network reported by investigative reporters may indicate that there exists deeper structural and political-economic obstacles. Syria seems to adopt a mixed strategy, i.e. a mixture of tangible actions and strategic diplomatic signaling needed to reintegrate themselves diplomatically. 4.3 Captagon as a Post-Conflict Governance Issue. The third conclusion draws attention to the fact that Captagon poses a structural challenge to the government. The trafficking of Assadian times was integrated into the military and the intelligence systems. These networks cannot be broken down by just policing but also by reconstructing institutional capacity and provision of economic alternatives to the border areas. This is an indication of a wider post-conflict predicament: criminal economies tend to outlive the political regimes that spawned them, thereby making the task of transitioning difficult. 4.4 Domestic Policy as a Determinant of International Policy. The fourth discovery is the extent to which the policy of Syria is influenced by regional and international actors. Normalization and reconstruction aid is conditional upon anti-narcotics achievements in the GCC, Jordan and Western governments. Therefore, the anti-narcotics campaign of 2025 is more about the expectations out there rather than national priorities. The pressure of the region has successfully turned the Captagon control into the leading metric of the international credibility of Syria. 4.5 Captagon and Politics of Legitimacy The last conclusion is that Captagon has turned into a symbolical platform of fighting with legitimacy. The transitional government creates a time break between the corruption under Assad by attacking ex-regime-affiliated traffickers and implementing new legal and institutional systems. This way drug policy is being used to provide a new political identity, the one that will identify state sovereignty with rule of law, security, and collaboration. Captagon is thus a platform on which Syria gives its performance to post-conflict legitimacy.
Drawing on the analysis, various policy recommendations were proposed to increase the credibility, efficacy, and the overall diplomatic utility of Syria’s anti-narcotics campaign 5.1 Establishment of a Third-Party Monitor For Verification To increase credibility, it is recommended that Syria invite UNODC or another neutral body to participate in the monitoring enforcement. The independent verification would heavily reduce skepticism from regional neighbors and partners, and overall ensures a transparent reporting on arrests, operations, seizures, captures, and prosecutions. 5.2 Strengthen Cross-Border Intelligence and Joint Enforcement It is recommended that Syria begin formalizing intelligence sharing channels with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Gulf states due to the large regional scale of the Captagon trade. The intelligence sharing channels could take form in: Mixed Border patrols, data-sharing protocols, as well as liaison officers which are embedded in the neighboring countries’ anti-narcotics units. To further boost state cooperation in carrying out this campaign anti-narcotics policy, informative joint training programs between neighboring countries and potentially with the DEA would boost the anti-captagon efforts tremendously. This would increase collaboration internationally and allow other states to view firsthand the anti-narcotics efforts of the state, as well as beneficial for the state to increase the efficacy and success rates of their seizure operations. 5.3 Increase Welfare and Education in Bordering Regions Increasing welfare and educational opportunities in the regions within Syria closest to its borders would heavily reduce the Captagon trade. Numerous communities on Syria’s border depend on the trade and smuggling networks for economic survival . Without the establishment of an alternative livelihood, many communities would not feel an incentive to let go of the ropes of the trade, and enforcement alone would not be sufficient in reducing trafficking. Seizures, captures and other anti-smuggling operations in these areas should be followed with economic packages, scholarships and quotas in universities to include these marginalized communities who have had no choice but to become a part of the trade, reconstruction initiatives, and employment schemes.
The anti-narcotics campaign in Syria of 2025 is a significant area in which post-conflict governance, regional politics, and international legitimacy meet. Since the state is deeply involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, the transitional government led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa seeks to re-brand drug policy as an ode to the renewal of institutions as well as re-entry into both regional and national political institutions. Even though the implementation is still uneven, the campaign has had significant diplomatic momentum. It has opened cooperation avenues with Jordan, the Gulf States and Western players hence sending a signal that they are willing to harmonise the security concerns of Syria with the current regional standards. The results below show that Captagon has shifted its nature of having been a criminal economy based on authoritarian survival to a medium of diplomatic interaction and post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, the reintegration of Syria to the international system in the long-term will depend on how successful the policies aimed at combating narcotics will be. They must succeed in shifting Syria from performative anti-narcotics measures toward institutionalized policy change. Should these reforms materialize, the fight against captagon in Syria can not only alleviate the damage in the region, but also lay the groundwork of the newly-formed foreign-policy identity of the country.