Defending Security: Migration Crises in Poland and Finland through the Lens of Securitisation
Błażej MatułaJagiellonian University
Edited by Maximilian Hankins, IE University
Abstract
The article analyzes the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian and Finnish-Russian borders through the concept of securitization. It compares measures used by both countries to address migration challenges, including the closure of border crossings, the construction of physical fences, and the implementation of legal regulations.
The article seeks to answer the research question: How has the securitization of the migration crisis been framed and implemented differently in Poland and Finland during their respective border crises? The securitisation concept is analysed through the following elements: (a) securitizing actors, (b) existential threat, (c) extraordinary measures (d) referent objects. Moreover, the article includes a historical overview of the crises on the Polish-Belarusian and Finnish-Russian borders, as well as an analysis of the tools used by both countries in order to deal with the issue of instrumentalized migration. https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Crises in Poland Lens of Securitisation and Finnish-Russian borders through the concept of a chronological overview of events in both Poland and as an existential threat to national and European security. migration challenges, including three elements of crisis of physical fences, and the implementation of legal changes within national legislation that would involve level, aimed at cooperating with Middle Eastern and
Securitisation Securitisation, which is the main focus of this paper, can be presented by the following sequence of events. First, a securitising actor identifies a valued object and an existential threat to it. Next, the actor presents the threat to the public and seeks to influence them to accept extraordinary measures. A speech act of securitisation, which is the first building block of the above-mentioned definition, can be understood as the identification of some issue as a security threat and making a declaration, which can be done in manifold ways. Such a political move is made by a securitising actor that can be understood as a prominent politician or a top official. In order to be successful, a securitising actor needs to find a referent object. This building block of the definition involves various elements, including the state or nation, and, more precisely speaking, public safety or governance. It is worth mentioning that there is a difference between micro and universal referent objects. Micro involves small groups in society, and universal refers to more abstract issues such as human rights. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever point out mankind as a possible referent object - such a narrative was present during the Cold War, because of the nuclear bomb and the threat of its use. Despite this, the so-called “middle-scale limited collectives” are the most common. A referent object can be threatened by anything that poses a real, existential threat, such as terrorism, weapons, or any type of violence, but also problems of a different genesis, for example, migration. To protect the referent object, there is a need to use extraordinary measures, meaning all necessary tools that can help protect the threatened subjects. Ole Waever presents three necessary conditions under which extraordinary measures can be used. First, there must be a threat. Secondly, the threat must have signs of being existential. Thirdly, coping with the issue as a security issue must be more beneficial than dealing with it normally. It is crucial that the implementation of extraordinary measures provides a significant improvement to the current situation and genuinely protects the threatened value or subject. One of the most important elements of “securitisation” is that the audience has to accept and tolerate the chosen tool or policy. According to Thierry Balzacq, a securitising actor needs to put the audience at the centre of their issue in order to successfully persuade them. Balzacq mentions necessary elements that must be applied during securitisation, such as “the audience’s feelings, needs, interests, experience”. Moreover, he indicates that wide social groups who support securitising actors are the most favourable. As Balzacq says: “they need to maintain a social relationship with the target individual group”.
border The beginning of the crisis on the Poland-Belarus border can be analysed as a culmination of domestic problems in Belarus that were transferred to the international level. In 2020, Belarus held presidential elections, which were widely described across Europe and the world (apart from authoritarian states like Russia) as rigged. The response of the Belarusian society was massive protests that were brutally suppressed by the ruling President Alexander Lukashenko. International organisations such as the Council of Europe or United Nations strongly condemned Belarus’ brutal treatment of its own citizens. Another example of the decisive response from the international community to the situation in Belarus was the sanctions imposed by the European Union. Between October 2020 and June 2021, four packages of sanctions were imposed on Belarus, including both individual sanctions as well as a ban on importing refined oil products. In response to actions undertaken by the cohesive “West”, Belarus decided to launch a hybrid attack using migrants from the Middle East. The attack was directed mainly at two countries: Poland and Lithuania, which were the most active countries in supporting civil society and the political opposition in Belarus. It is necessary to mention that most of the migrants from the Middle East were transported from their own countries to Belarus with the help of Belarusian travel agencies, e.g., Centrkurort. The idea of Belarus was to deliver as many people as possible on the Polish-Belarusian border, so as to artificially create migration pressure, and in the long term, destabilize the situation in the region. As a response, Polish authorities decided not to allow these people to cross the border and consistently push them back to the Belarusian side. According to Anna Maria Dyner from the Polish Institute of International Affairs, “the crisis on the border of Belarus and EU and NATO countries can be divided into two phases. The first one was a relatively small-scale operation against Lithuania and Latvia [...] while the second, which was carried out from the beginning of August 2021, was aimed mainly at Poland”. Between April 2021 and July 2021, there was a rapid rise in the number of people who tried to cross the external EU border by the Easter Borders Route (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania), from 100 to 3000 per month. According to data provided by the Polish Border Guard, there were attempts to illegally cross the Polish-Belarusian border in 2020 (129), 2021 (39,697), 2022 (15,700), 2023 (26,000), 2024 (30,000). Due to environmental conditions on the border, such as swamps or forests, low temperatures during autumn and winter, as well as the lack of medical assistance from both sides of the border, by March 2024, 116 people died on the border that goes from Poland to Latvia. The first fatality of the crisis was a citizen of Iraq, who died in September 2021 on the Polish side.
border The case of the Finnish-Russian border from 2023 must be explained with reference to the events of 2015 and
applications, a huge surge in the number of applications in comparison to 2014, with just above 3,600. The influx of such a large group of people was caused by Russia, which created “the Arctic migration route through Murmansk to the Norwegian and Finnish border crossings in the far north, partly in response to Finland’s policy of limiting bilateral contact”. The people travelling through the route were mainly from the Middle East. The period between 2015 and 2016 can be described as “the largest asylum crisis in Finland’s post-war history”. Eight years later, Russia again used a similar tool against Finland. In 2023, the influx of people who applied for asylum was steadily rising, from 13 in September to 500 in the first half of November. The situation began in a different way than in Poland. People of Middle Eastern origin travelled from Russia to Finland using bikes. It is important to mention that these people did not have documents and were allowed by Russian border guards to enter the neighbouring country. It was suggested that smugglers sold bikes to those who wanted to get to Finland. According to the Finnish government: “approximately 1,300 people [were] seeking asylum [...] in 2023 and 2024”. Russia’s actions can easily be compared to those from 2015-2016. Migrants were again instrumentalised and used to exert pressure on another country. It is necessary to remember the context. In the case of Poland, there was the issue of bilateral relations between Poland and Belarus, and the firm stance of the EU against the Belarusian regime. The situation with Finland is similar, in that the country acted unanimously with the rest of European countries and condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, it also supported Kyiv in its defensive war. This was also not the first time that Finland disagreed with Russia’s international politics. Finnish support for Kyiv was also evident in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, after which the European Union adopted sanctions against Russia. Moreover, as a result of Russia’s aggressive politics, Finland joined NATO in April 2023. Hence, the migration pressure experienced in Finland in 2023 was likely a deliberate move by Russia rather than an accident or a logical consequence of any humanitarian or migration crisis.
In both countries, three categories of border crisis management appeared. The first involves the closure of the border crossings (with some exceptions), the second the creation of fences, and the third the implementation of legal regulations. On the Polish-Belarussian border, only two border crossings remained open: one for passenger traffic (Terespol-Brześć), and one for freight traffic (Koroszczyn – Kozłowicze). The most significant incident related to the closure of the border crossing occurred in the first year of the crisis, on November 9, when approximately 3000 migrants arrived in the vicinity of the Kuźnica border crossing. In contrast to the Polish case, Finland’s eastern border was entirely closed. Until November 2023, the last border crossing at Raja-Jooseppi was still open, but it was finally closed on December 15. Both countries invested in the physical barrier. The length of the Polish-Belarusian border is 418.24 km. The border fence stretches 187 km, measures 5.5 metres in height, and is supplemented with so-called concertina wire. Moreover, the physical barrier is supported by electronic equipment in the form of, e.g., cameras or detection cables. About 44% of the border with Belarus is protected by the fence. In contrast to this, only 15.4% of Finland’s eastern border is protected by a physical barrier. The Finnish border fence is longer in total length, measuring 200 kilometers, but it is also lower than the Polish one (only 3.5 meters high). As in Poland, the fence is equipped with electronic devices. The difference in the percentage of the border covered by a fence is due to the fact that Finland's Russian border is much longer than the Polish-Belarussian one, measuring 1,300 km. Another difference is that the Finnish plan is to cover the most critical parts of the border, but in the case of Poland, the fence is a continuous structure in Podlaskie Voivodeship. The third category of border crisis management is the implementation of legal regulations. The spectrum of laws implemented by the Finnish government was much narrower, as Finland had already taken action even before the events at the border occurred. In July 2022, under an amendment to the Border Guard Act, the government was enabled to make decisions on the closing of border crossings. This was to be motivated by considerations of “public order, national security, or public health”. Moreover, it was decided that applications for international protection could be concentrated at at least one border crossing point in a situation of a massive influx of people, or when such a situation was provoked by another state. Naturally, exceptions were allowed: “Exceptions to this can be made in individual cases, taking into account the rights of children, people with disabilities and other particularly vulnerable people”. Another important regulation implemented is the Act on Temporary Measures to Combat Instrumentalised Migration. The law has a preventive character, and enables the government to significantly “restrict the reception of applications for international protection in a limited area on Finland’s national border and in its immediate vicinity”. The legislation goes even further by enabling suspension of accepting applications for international protection, preventing migrants from entering Finland, and even removing those who manage to enter. It is necessary to remember that the legislation doesn’t suspend the right to asylum, and suspension is only an option in the worst-case scenario. “A decision to apply the act may be made for up to one month at a time”. So in fact, the act can be applied several times, but each application must follow a new procedure and cannot exceed one month. Finland also makes it possible to exempt children and vulnerable persons from the law, and to create places where applying for asylum would be possible. Finland’s laws that were implemented significantly differ from Polish ones. First of all, Poland had already legalised push-backs in 2021, at the beginning of the crisis on the border with Belarus. This occurred following an amendment to the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on the temporary suspension or restriction of border traffic at specific border crossing points. Due to this, migrants who illegally cross the border can be returned back by the border guard. Moreover, in the same year, another law was implemented, “The border guard is required to prepare a report for a person who has been detained for illegally crossing the border and issue an order for that person to leave Polish territory, which must then be carried out immediately”. For instance, in 2024, there were 3,183 cases of pushback on the Polish-Belarusian border – according to the report prepared by a social movement called Grupa Granica. In 2024, an Act was implemented to support the activities of soldiers and law enforcement officers. Thanks to this legislation, soldiers gained greater flexibility, including in the use of weapons, due to the exemption from criminal liability in certain cases. The most controversial law implemented by Poland was a temporary suspension of the right to asylum in March 2025 on the Polish-Belarusian border. Reasons for introducing such a law are similar to the case of Finland. There is also a reference to “instrumentalization, [...] real threat to the security of the state or society”. Suspension of the right to asylum doesn’t apply to, for example, pregnant women, so there are a few exceptions.Since March 2025, it has been prolonged to May, July, and September. Polish and Finnish legislation implemented due to the border crisis shows that both countries reacted decisively. The main difference comes down to the issue of the right to pushbacks and asylum. Poland fully legalised both solutions, but Finland only created legislation that enables the use of such tools in the case of an emergency. However, there is also the question of crossing borders and whether there is a possibility of applying for international protection. In the case of Poland, two border crossings are still open, which does not change a lot in the current legal system. Finland, by closing the entire border with Russia, created a situation where applying for international protection is practically impossible. According to the information obtained by Polityka, a Polish weekly, “after the border was closed, some people still tried to enter Finland through the ‘green border’, but these were isolated attempts [...] from February to October 2024 – only 8”. This leads to the conclusion that the situation of people who would like to cross the border and apply for international protection in case of Poland, as well as Finland, is practically equally bad. Even though Poland still keeps two border crossing points open, the law makes it extremely difficult to apply for international protection and to avoid being pushed back to the Belarusian side. Finland, on the other hand, tries to avoid controversy by adopting laws of a preventive nature, but at the same time does not enable people to enter the Schengen Area. Ultimately, it leads to similar consequences as those seen in the Polish case.
border policies Measures undertaken by Poland as well as Finland were met with strong backlash from Amnesty International. In the case of Poland, the legalization of push-backs in 2022 was criticized by the NGO. It also underlined the tragedy of people who were stuck on the border between Poland and Belarus. The situation was described as a “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” and referred to actions undertaken both by Polish and Belarusian border guards. The NGO also strongly criticized the suspension of the right to asylum in Poland and emphasized that it is unlawful and contrary to international law. Finland’s law was also criticized by Amnesty International. In 2024, the NGO described the Act on Temporary Measures to Combat Instrumentalised Migration as a “green light for violence and pushbacks at the border”. It is underlined that people’s lives would be put in danger, and that everything would take place in obvious contradiction to international law. Another wave of criticism fell on Poland and Finland from the UN Refugee Agency. For example, at the beginning of the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, Christine Goyer from the UNHCR urged Polish authorities to resolve the situation on the border and enable people in need to enter Poland, as well as to provide them with necessary assistance. The UNHCR also reacted decisively in 2025 in the case of the suspension of the right to asylum, reminding that the law implemented by Poland constitutes a breach of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The UNHCR also responded to the reform proposals in Finland. UNHCR’s Representation for the Nordic and Baltic Countries focused on the Act on Temporary Measures to Combat Instrumentalised Migration. Despite the fact that the law has only a preventive character, the UNHCR, in fact, proposed the complete withdrawal of the Finnish proposals. Reaction to the events on the Polish-Belarusian and Finnish-Russian borders, and to the tools adopted by both countries, also came from the European Union. The European Commission supports Poland and Finland in their defence against instrumentalised migration and clearly defines that the protection of the European Union’s external border should be at the centre of its interests. Support for Finland was expressed by Ursula von der Leyen in April 2024 during her visit to Finland. Poland was similarly supported when, in 2021, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs expressed symbolic support for Poland, showing solidarity regarding the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border. Moreover, despite the criticism over the suspension of the right to asylum by the Polish government, the European Commission justified this step. This is well illustrated by the words of Ursula von der Leyen from 2024: “We are clear that if such solutions are temporary and proportionate, as we have seen in the case of Finland and the Baltic states, then they operate within the legal framework”. Furthermore, the European Commission decided to support countries struggling with migration pressure from Russia and Belarus with a total of 170 million euros. However, due to the many controversies, the European Commission promised to examine the legislation in both countries. Taking everything above into account, in the context of the reception of the legal situation in Poland and Finland by international organisations, it can be stated that despite the controversies surrounding Polish and Finnish measures, there was still support from the European Union for countries fighting the migration crisis on the Bloc’s eastern borders.
Finnish-Russian border through the lens of securitisation The crisis on the Polish-Belarussian and Finnish-Russian border can be analysed by the use of the “securitisation” concept created by the Copenhagen School. The first element to be analysed is the referent object. What is it, and how can it be described in the context of the border crisis? In the case of Poland, the best answer is provided by the former Prime Minister of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki, who said: “Our goal is one. To maintain peace and security at the EU border and on NATO's eastern flank” and, “It is our duty to ensure the safety of our citizens and to protect the external border of the European Union and the Schengen Area”. In the same vein, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda said: “Poland had a duty to protect the European Union border”. Finland’s top officials speak in a similar tone, such as in November 2023, when Prime Minister Petteri Orpo commented on the situation on the Eastern border: “You can't be prepared in absolutely every possible way, if someone wants to cause confusion in Finnish society. That's why you should be prepared for the fact that anything can happen". One year later, during the European Parliament’s plenary session, Petteri Orpo fully explained his views on the crisis on the Finnish-Russian border: “Russia has weaponised migration to put pressure on Finland and the entire EU. [...] It will also become a question of numbers and a greater threat to national and European security. Security at the EU’s external borders is at the core of the EU’s existence. [...] We are doing this to protect the entire European Union. A hybrid attack on our border is a hybrid attack against the whole of Europe”. Similarly, the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, emphasized in 2023 that what is happening on the border is a matter of the entire European Union: “[...] the question is of EU borders, not only Polish, Finnish or national borders". In light of these quotes, it can be stated that the referent object is similarly described by Polish as well as Finland’s officials. Moreover, there is more than one referent object. In the case of Poland, there are elements such as the “safety of citizens”, “safety of national borders”, “safety of the external European Union border, but also NATO’s external flank”. With Finland, things mentioned include: “confusion in Finnish society” (which can be understood in terms of security, or social order), “national threat”, “European security”, “EU borders”, and “EU existence”. Both countries focus on security and refer to broader categories than just national ones. Therefore, since both states frame the threat in terms of supranational values, most notably the European Union, and Europeanise the nature of the challenge, the measures taken to secure their eastern borders become even easier to justify. Finland and Poland stress that their actions defend not only national interests but the security of the European Union as a whole. In both cases, the most significant securitising actors are the Prime Ministers and Presidents. However, the catalogue of actors may be successfully expanded to include figures such as border guard spokespersons or ministers of the interior. When it comes to an existential threat, which is a part of the “securitising” concept, Poland and Finland share common ground. For the former, the main threat is posed by the Belarusian authoritarian regime, which tries to destabilize the situation in the European Union, and for the latter, Russia. Another existential threat can be seen in migrants from the Middle East who try to illegally cross external European borders. In that case, Polish official representatives, regardless of whether from the United Right Government (2015-2023) or the 15 October Coalition (2023-until now), perceive migrants as a threat. This can be seen in a speech given during the press conference in 2024 by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who simply stated that “We will find ways so that even if the pact comes into force, we will protect Poland from the relocation mechanism” – in the context of the European Union’s migration pact. A year earlier, the then-Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki also spoke about migrants: “Demolished streets, looted shops, sexual assaults on women, fear of going out for an evening walk – this is the reality in many cities and suburbs across the EU”. In the case of Finland, the ruling coalition is perceived as anti-immigration. One of the decisions made by Orpo’s government was to reduce the number of people seeking asylum from slightly above 1000 to 500. An essential part of the “securitisation” concept is the extraordinary measures that were implemented by both Poland and Finland. The first example is the creation of the physical barrier. The second is the issue of the closure of borders. In the case of Finland, the border was entirely closed; in the case of Poland, only two border crossings are still open. Yet, as it was previously explained, Poland introduced and legalised push-backs, as well as temporary and territorially limited suspension of the right to asylum. On the other hand, Finland made it as difficult as possible to apply for asylum in the country. As a journalist from the weekly Polityka emphasizes, “in order to submit an application for protection, [potential applicants] must reach one of the Finnish ports, fly to one of the airports, or cross the border from Sweden”.
8.1 Cooperation with countries of origin A primary recommendation is that Poland and Finland should cooperate with countries of migrants that travel via the Belarusian and Russian migration route. This cooperation should be based on three elements: the first of which would involve the creation of legal instruments that would provide legal migration from these countries based on the visa system. The second one would be the creation of a system of deporting people whose asylum applications had been rejected to their home countries. The third one would be to provide financial and humanitarian support to those countries, to try and improve conditions there. This could be achieved by building hospitals, schools, or creating economic opportunities. 8.2 Cooperation with “third countries” In the case of not being able to deport migrants or asylum seekers to countries of their origin (e.g., because of the war), Poland and Finland should cooperate with so-called “third countries”, where these people could be sent, and where procedures such as asylum or visa applications could be processed. The agreement with the “third country” should involve building humanitarian camps, where Polish or Finnish language courses and cultural classes could be provided. 8.3 The creation of message channels Poland and Finland should also work to fight off propaganda that depicts travel to the Polish-Belarusian or Finnish-Russian border as safe, and ending with definite entry to the European Union. To achieve this, these countries should create information channels and use social media to reach the largest possible audiences from African and Middle Eastern countries. The goal is to target all those who would like to choose the Belarusian or Russian route, and discourage them from doing so by showing all the dangers that are waiting for them. It would also be beneficial to divert their attention towards choosing humanitarian camps, and the legal way of applying for visas in their country of origin. 8.4 The change of the current legislation Legislation in Poland and Finland differs, as demonstrated earlier in the paper. In the case of Poland, legislative reforms would need to involve nearly all legal acts since the beginning of 2021, from the legalization of pushbacks to the most recent measures, such as the territorially limited suspension of the right to asylum in
single designated border crossing point where asylum applications can be formally submitted and processed. This should be done after the establishment of channels of communication and agreements with countries of origin and third countries. When it comes to Finland, the change should concern in particular the Border Guard Act, which enabled the closing of crossing points in situations of a so-called “serious threat”. The Act should guarantee that at least one crossing point remains open for those who wish to apply for asylum. Finland should reverse its decision to close the entire border without leaving even one crossing point open, where asylum seekers can apply for international protection. Legislative reform in Finland should also deal with the Act on Temporary Measures to Combat Instrumentalised Migration. Despite the fact that it does not suspend the right to asylum but only provides a legal possibility to do so in the future, such a law cannot be accepted and treated as a humanitarian one.
The border crises in both countries differ in scale. Poland had to cope with a massive influx of people and respond quickly to the events of 2021. Moreover, Poland had never experienced migration pressure on such a scale before the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border. Despite implemented measures, Poland is still dealing with migration pressure, which has not decreased over the years. On the other hand, Finland had already faced a similar situation in 2015-2016 and reacted instantly to the beginning of migration pressure in 2023 on the Finnish-Russian border (which was less than the pressure on the Polish-Belarusian one). Furthermore, Finland had already started preparing for potential disruptions on the eastern border in 2022, having observed the events in Poland. Both countries experienced instrumentalized migration: Poland from the Belarusian side, and Finland from the Russian side. The tools implemented to address the issue were similar: construction of fences and closure of the border (partial in Poland, complete in Finland). However, the legislation differs. Finland created laws intended for emergency use, while Poland opted for much more controversial measures, such as the suspension of the right to asylum and legalized push-backs. Finland’s approach may appear more humanitarian on paper, but by closing the entire eastern border, it effectively prevented potential asylum seekers from applying for protection. Asylum can only be sought theoretically at seaports or airports, which is nearly impossible for people traveling from the Middle East or Africa through the “Russian” route. Both countries failed to respect human rights standards. Finland and Poland’s measures to address the migration crisis were heavily criticised by international organisations such as Amnesty International and the UN Refugee Agency, mainly for the unlawfulness of legislative acts they introduced. In contrast, the European Commission supported both countries in their efforts to counter instrumentalized migration, providing financial assistance and accepting the extraordinary measures they adopted. The European Commission also emphasizes that migration pressure on the European Union’s external borders is a challenge for the entire European Union, as it concerns collective security. Policy recommendations proposed for the Polish and Finnish governments aim to address both internal and external challenges. Internally, the goal should be to make national regulation lawful again and respect international regulations. Externally, Poland should work with countries of migrants’ origin, acting not only as humanitarian and development partners but also creating a legal migration framework. This should include strategic management of the messages delivered to potential migrants. Finally, cooperation with “third countries” could provide temporary centers for migrants entering Poland or for deported migrants. Poland and Finland are facing the instrumentalization of migration, though on different scales. Both states adopted extraordinary measures and clearly defined an existential threat. Despite criticism from international organisations, the European Commission supported their actions by legitimizing the securitization that took place. The recommendations proposed in this paper aim to address the existential threat, including national security, while also taking into account the fate of people who, for various reasons, decided to undertake the journey to the Polish-Belarusian and Finnish-Russian borders. Securitisation is a process that can easily lead to abuses in the field of law, especially when it comes to human rights. Therefore, it is necessary to approach the problem rationally and try to solve it using standard measures that follow international law.