Europe's sprint and marathon away from Russian energy

1. Introduction

Energy is the basic foundation of industrial societies, yet it often appears in public debate only when interrupted by crisis. For many years, this was true in the European Union. This technologically advanced and climate-minded bloc nevertheless carried a major strategic weakness: a https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ away from on Russian fossil fuels, mainly pipeline gas. The striving for paper looks at how this situation developed, starting with Cold of Gazprom after 1991, and the political impact of the gas changed after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Olaf Scholz's government announcement of its Zeitenwende policy. In only a few months, European countries rushed to fill (LNG) terminals, which brought Russian pipeline imports Replacing Russian gas with American or Qatari LNG that real security requires a different and systematic approach: so countries cannot be isolated, and new solutions like that Russian LNG continued to enter the EU through ports Moscow is not complete. Lasting energy independence will clean energy as a strategic issue, not just a climate policy. will be the real challenge. heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels. Studies of EU energy security show that roughly 87% of crude oil, 70% of natural gas, and close to 40% of coal and nuclear inputs were sourced from abroad. Dependence alone is not unusual for advanced economies, but the issue was its dense concentration. Before the decisive rupture of 2022, Russia supplied an alarming average of 40% of the EU’s total imported gas, a figure that climbed even higher in key member states like Germany, Finland, and Italy. The political paradigm that sustained this relationship for so long was rooted in the neoliberal principle of two-sided interdependence: the belief that deep commercial ties between states, particularly in crucial sectors like energy, would create mutual dependence on partners. Proven to be highly effective in the post-WW2 Europe environment, many hoped that the potential cost of irrational conflict would discourage military actions and encourage peace. This hypothesis, often termed as Wandel durch Handel – change through trade – proved fatally flawed when confronted with the appearance of revisionist foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. Russian strategic doctrine explicitly elevated energy exports beyond mere commerce, establishing them as foundational instruments of state foreign policy. Revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons not only provided the necessary funding to sustain the Russian federal budget—in some years, accounting for almost 40% of federal revenue—but, crucially, they also purchased significant political influence and strategic leverage within European capitals. Russia relied on European revenue, Europe relied on Russian gas for immediate energy security, making the weaponization of supply a far greater threat to the importer than to the exporter. The turning point was not a slow negotiation but a violent geopolitical shock: the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. This act instantly invalidated decades of European policy and forced the EU to confront the consequences of its strategic negligence. It became clear that interdependence was dangerously asymmetric. Whether the European Union can permanently overcome its historic dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and what economic, geopolitical, and structural consequences this energy transition will produce on global and domestic scale, became the number one task for political figures of member states only after February 2022. This paper shows how Europe allowed such a situation to take place, what concrete measures were taken after 2022, and what results followed in the short term and asks a crucial question: How feasible is Europe’s long-term reduction of dependence on Russian oil and gas, and what are the geopolitical, economic, and energy-security implications of this transition? It argues that the swift response and “sprint away” from the Kremlin—cutting Russian pipeline gas, expanding LNG, and a coordinated approach—was surprisingly successful, but just as a temporary solution. Lasting security requires a structural change in domestic, zero-carbon energy and an integrated internal market. In other words, replacing Russian fossil fuels with other foreign suppliers will not solve the real issue. True strategic autonomy depends on creating a resilient European energy system that removes the geopolitical risks of fossil dependence altogether.

2. Background

The roots of Europe's dependency are neither accidental nor recent; they are embedded in the strategic choices made during the height of the Cold War and amplified by political expediency in the post-Soviet era. And what is more, it was the West approaching the Communist bloc, searching for better alternatives. The foundation of Eurasian energy integration can be traced back to the 1950s and to the visionary, yet controversial, figure of Enrico Mattei, the head of Italy's state-owned oil and gas company, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI). The primary geopolitical goal was to dismantle the monopoly cartel labelled as "Seven Sisters"—the Anglo-American-dominated major oil companies which controlled global oil supply, pricing, and distribution. To achieve this, Mattei aggressively courted non-traditional suppliers, including emerging MENA countries such as Egypt and Libya and more controversially, the Soviet Union. Mattei offered Soviet producers unprecedented terms, including higher profit shares and direct purchasing agreements, circumventing the Western cartel. It did not end up just profit margins – access to western technological superiority and resources paved the way for the construction of future projects like Druzhba and Bratstvo pipelines directly to the heart of Europe. This resulted in the first major, long-term oil and later natural gas supply contracts between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc: the "Red Gas" deal, met with fierce opposition from the United States. At that time, the deal was considered a diplomatic revolution: an American ally importing energy from an ideological rival and main adversary. The long-distance pipelines, such as Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline, were physical symptoms of a growing economic symbiosis overriding Cold War political division. Cheap Red gas was a powerful economic stimulant, but it simultaneously installed the deep, infrastructural lock-in that would later become a labyrinth almost impossible to escape from decades later. This decision prioritised short-term economic advantage and industrial competitiveness over strategic and long-term resilience. The early Italian adventure to the soviet bloc in pursuit of cartel-free business led to other extremes. 2.1 Dawn of 2000s The collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not halt the flow of hydrocarbons. For the newly formed Russian Federation, oil and gas exports were the most immediate and reliable source of hard currency. Throughout the turbulent 1990s, the energy sector transitioned from state control to oligarchic control, but this was rapidly reversed under Vladimir Putin. The political conflict with the richest oligarch Khodorkovsky and the subsequent victory of former KGB agents now in charge of the former superpower paved the way for a new vision for fallen Russia. The state-owned gas monopoly, Gazprom, and the oil giant Rosneft were systematically brought back under Kremlin control from the hands of oligarchs, merging commercial entities into crucial tools of state power. By the early 2000s, Russia had solidified its position as the world's largest exporter of natural gas and a major global player in oil and coal. Despite the fact that Russia produces only 3% of the world’s GDP and accounts for only 2% of the world’s population, it is the third largest producer and consumer of energy resources in the world after China and the US, providing 10% of world production and accounting for 5% of world energy consumption. Russia consistently ranks first for global gas exports, second for oil exports and third for coal exports. The economic statistics clearly illustrate the strategic reliance: according to data from the period, the energy complex was responsible for up to 40% of the federal budget, a staggering 65% of all export earnings, and commanded roughly a quarter of national investment. In the period from the beginning of the 2000s, Russia managed to increase its energy exports dramatically: from 2000 through 2005, exports grew by an unprecedented 56%, exceeding the total energy exports of the USSR, providing an incredible acceleration of the national economy and underpinning the country’s position on the international arena as an “energy superpower”. But as the global financial-economic crisis came in 2008, the growth in energy exports halted. This made the export of fossil fuels not merely an economic engine but the structural foundation of the Russian state, a phenomenon often referred to as a "petrostate”. Crucially, the dependence was mutual, though asymmetric. The flow of revenue was essential for Moscow, yet the global focus on climate change and renewable energy sources was already identified in Russia as a long-term strategic threat. As noted in analysis from the Skolkovo Energy Centre, global climate actions were forecast to reduce Russia's GDP growth significantly, leading to a projected decline in the energy sector's share of Russian GDP from 25% to just 14% by 2040. This economic existential threat intensified the Kremlin’s desire to weaponise its existing leverage, transforming trade into a potent political tool before the decarbonization transition could fully erode its power base. Europe received its first glimpses of warnings of Russian major international leverage during the gas transit disputes between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009. Politically framed as pricing disagreements and alleged theft, the root cause was the Kremlin’s growing frustration with Ukraine’s push towards a more pro-Western political trajectory following the Orange Revolution. Because the vast majority of Russian pipeline gas flowed to the EU through the territories of former socialist republics like Ukraine and Belarus, Russia’s decisions to cut off supply to Kyiv instantly impacted downstream EU member states, including Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Austria, leaving them facing severe supply shortages in mid-winter. The 2009 crisis was particularly harsh, leading to industrial shutdowns and genuine hardship, especially in southern continental Europe. Despite the clear strategic risk exposed by these events, the European response was one of remarkable institutional inertia and naivety. Leaders and heads of Western countries voiced the idea of the situation being a bilateral conflict rather than a structural mistake, effectively labelling Ukraine as an unreliable partner and staying truthful to dogmatic status quo bias—the deeply ingrained belief that commercial self-interest would prevent Russia from inflicting long-term economic damage on its primary European customers. And even with clear remarks of Putin such as “Collapse of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” or 2007 Berlin conference speech did not prompt the European collective to act, but rather quite the opposite - fuelling pro-Kremlin beneficial actions. Even after the Georgia events of 2008, Europe prioritized and supported infrastructural solutions that offered Russia alternative South/North transit routes, rather than securing the reverse flow capability and internal market integration that could have minimised and prevented future crises. This was a critical failure to come. The most consequential decision solidifying this dependence was the construction and political backing of the Nord Stream pipelines. First project, Nord Stream 1, completed in 2011, and the highly controversial Nord Stream 2, which sparked conflicts within inner European circles until its final cancellation. Gas infrastructure was designed to run directly under the Baltic Sea, linking Russia to Germany and bypassing traditional transit countries like Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic States – hostile enemies of the Kremlin regime. From a commercial and economic perspective, direct pipelines reduced transit fees, risks and prevented instability. However, the geopolitical implications were devastating, even long before the first pipes were laid down.

In 2006, Polish MoD Radosław Sikorski compared the first Nord Stream pipeline to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Eastern European states immediately and accurately warned that Nord Stream was a project of strategic division, enabling Russia to pressure Ukraine and others without immediate economic consequences for its main Western European customers. Germany became the principal political champion of these projects, driven by loyalty to the concept of Wandel durch Handel together with its accelerated domestic energy transition, the Energiewende. Germany’s long stance towards nuclear technology, rooted in nuclear tensions during the peak Cold War and the 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe, was catalysed by the 2011 Fukushima events. The decision to phase out nuclear power while reducing domestic carbon emissions in the power sector, inadvertently increased its structural reliance on the seemingly reliable, cheap natural gas as a necessary transition fuel—a move that was seen as domestically popular and yet paradoxical, leading to a strategic mistake on the level of strategic autonomy and energy security. Annexation of Crimea and the Girkin's initiation of the conflict in Donbas in 2014 was the first time since the 1990s Balkans wars that a European territory was forcibly seized, proving the long-ignored warnings from Eastern EU members about the Kremlin's expansive ambitions and willingness to employ military power. For the first time, energy security concerns were directly linked to a conventional war on Europe’s land, de facto destroying the whole concept of Wandel durch Handel doctrine. While EU policy documents, like the 2014 European Energy Security Strategy, acknowledged the "critical importance of a stable and abundant supply”, the post-crisis response failed to solve energy security. Policy documents were written, but lacked action. The support for the highly divisive Nord Stream 2 pipeline project remained, with construction continuing in the following years. Simultaneously, the events triggered diplomatic efforts, most notably involving German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande. These two leaders navigated the EU's political reaction. The response primarily involved formal condemnation, economic penalties, and the negotiation of the failed Minsk accords. Even when Europe adopted hard-hitting economic sanctions, estimated in 2018 to have cost Russia 6 % of its GDP, their implementation ensured that the design did not carve out gas and oil transactions in order to avoid economic pain due to the EU's dependency. As a result, the 2014 events did not result in a major U-turn in core energy policy towards Russia. For real change, 8 more years were needed. 2.2 The Breaking Point The start of the so-called SMO, in February 2022, did not just disrupt energy supply: it destroyed the political paradigm that had European strategy for over sixty years. The invasion only confirmed the long-held fears of Eastern EU members: Russia’s strategic goals superseded trade rationale. Russia, through incremental cuts, maintenance excuses, and the final shutdown of Nord Stream 1, intentionally began to use gas supply not merely as a lever, but as a weapon of mass economic disruption against the EU. The assumption that Russia's mutual economic exchange is necessary proved dangerously wrong, as the Kremlin demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice short-term revenue for long-term political coercion. The effect on supply was immediate and dramatic. EU gas market data for late 2022 and 2023 shows a monumental shift in supply dynamics: Total Russian pipeline imports to the EU dropped by 74% in the third quarter of 2022 alone. By 2023, Russian supplies had fallen from their pre-invasion levels of 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year to approximately 20-30 bcm, now accounting for less than 10% of total EU gas consumption. The 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which remains unresolved and has possible connections to the veterans of SBU, has permanently eliminated the potential for restoring the pre-war dependency structure. To counteract the collapse of pipeline inflows from the East, Europe initiated an unprecedented "sprint" to secure alternative supplies, primarily Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). LNG imports surged drastically, increasing by over 89% across the EU in 2022. The new primary suppliers quickly became the USA, Qatar, and increased pipeline flows from Norway and Algeria. The response required extraordinary political will and regulatory speed. Germany, the nation most vulnerable due to its historical lack of terminals, executed a near-miraculous infrastructural pivot. By 2021, Germany possessed zero operational LNG shore terminals, leaving its entire gas infrastructure dependent on pipelines, underlining its true commitment to the gas deal. Within months, it secured and operated multiple Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) in ports like Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbüttel. This rapid deployment added crucial regasification capacity. This shift also created a structural change in the flow of gas in the boundaries of the continent. Previously, gas flows were in an east-to-west direction; now, gas imported as LNG in terminals in Spain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands begins to flow west-to-east to solve the shortages in Central and Eastern European states. As network modelling confirms, the largest gas inflow into Germany in 2023 was not from a traditional pipeline partner but from Belgium, originating from Atlantic-side LNG terminals. This logistical reversal demonstrated the power of internal infrastructure and regulatory coordination when necessity demanded it. The second pillar of the emergency sprint was effective demand management and collective storage policy - supply diversification alone would not close the 100+ bcm gap left by Russia. The EU passed emergency regulations in 2022 mandating that all member states fill their gas storage facilities to a minimum of 80% before the winter heating season. This target was largely exceeded, with most countries reaching over 90% full capacity. This collective, mandatory action provided the essential physical buffer against supply shocks. Equally important was the effort of consumers – reduction of gas consumption. The EU successfully lowered overall gas demand by more than 20% during the critical periods of late 2022 and early 2023, achieved through a mix of industrial curtailment, fuel switching (e.g., back to oil or coal in the power sector as a temporary measure), and public awareness campaigns encouraging lower household heating use. The combination of new LNG imports, states taking responsibility and reduced consumption were steps that ensured Europe survived the winter without the blackouts or industrial collapse that many experts had predicted.

3. Analysis

While the "sprint" phase of Europe’s energy policy, together with the presence of more hawkish political figures, was a remarkable success in crisis management, it has showcased structural vulnerabilities that define the current stage—the transition into the long-term "marathon" of policy transformation. Another issue for the long-term “marathon” is the political economy behind EU energy policy. Decarbonisation often runs into national veto players, energy companies, and industrial groups that prefer the status quo. Since many energy decisions remain national, EU proposals can be slowed or watered down. This helps explain why the EU acted fast in the crisis but struggles to sustain deeper structural change in the long run. 3.1 LNG loopholes Despite the near-total cessation of Russian pipeline gas, a significant volume of Russian energy flows to the EU market via LNG. Major EU ports, especially in Spain, Belgium and France have continued to import LNG produced by the Russian company Novatek from the Siberian Yamal LNG. Project Yamal, which had a significant investment and transfer of technology from both France and China, has become the main actor and tool of Russian reach to the European energy market. From January to September 2023, volumes of Yamal LNG sent to Montoir-de-Bretagne (France) were 50% more than reported import figures due to transshipments to other countries. About 76% of the LNG from Yamal that has been transshipped at Montoir-de-Bretagne in 2023 is destined for non-EU countries, increasing significantly from about 50% in 2021. While France and Belgium continue allowing their LNG terminals to transship Russian LNG to other markets, Spain has increased its Russian LNG imports, jumping from a total of 4.99 bcm in 2022 to 5.21 bcm in the first nine months of 2023 making Russia the second-biggest exporter of LNG to Spain, after the U.S. While the volume is still a fraction compared to the former pipeline flow, it ensures Russia still earns significant revenue from the European energy market, undermining the moral and strategic purpose of the overall sanction regime. In June 2024, the EUs 14th sanction package adopted the transhipment ban, but companies with contracts signed before June 25, 2024, were given 9 months to adjust. With that being said, the end is coming here as well. Nearly four years into the Russo-Ukraine War, the EU spent 37,5 billion euros for the purchase of Russian LNG. The LNG ban marks a major escalation in Europe’s sanctions strategy. The regulation, agreed upon by the EU Council in October 2025, to cease all Russian gas imports, including LNG, will be executed by January 1,

2028. While new gas contracts will be banned from early

2026, existing long-term contracts can continue until the final deadline – 2028. 3.2 Bottlenecks The 2022 energy crisis revealed chronic underinvestment in EU cross-border energy infrastructure. The lack of pipeline capacity linking the Iberian Peninsula to the rest of Europe, despite Spain having almost one-third of the EU’s total LNG terminal capacity. The proposed MidCat pipeline project to connect Spain to France and Central Europe was abandoned before 2022 due to political disagreements and doubts about its necessity, highlighting "competing visions for Europe's future energy mix" and “deficiencies in efforts to accelerate the transition process and broaden the notion of energy security and resilience”. This failure means that a crucial emergency supply route from the West remains blocked. While LNG shore entry points exist, Europe cannot efficiently transport to the vulnerable Central and Eastern states. The marathon phase must prioritize overcoming these physical and political bottlenecks. Attempts to build an East-West Gas Corridor, along with connecting Italy’s southern pipeline routes into the wider European grid so gas can move freely across borders, are essential steps for real energy security. 3.3 Effect on industry Perhaps the most significant long-term weakness exposed with the change to LNG is the issue of industrial competitiveness. LNG is by definition more expensive than decades-old pipeline gas. European industries, particularly energy-intensive sectors like chemicals, steel, fertilisers, glass, and aluminium, have faced an acute crisis due to persistently high gas prices. With the development of global events, the supply of LNG is improving: global production grew by a staggering 9% yoy since July, largely driven by the US and Canada creating market easing. European gas prices often exceeded US Henry Hub prices by a factor of three or four throughout 2023. While price gap is concerning, the TTF prices were pushed down by 10% yoy to an average of $11/mmbtu. Less stringent storage obligations also provided downward pressure on gas prices. This transatlantic price differential has led to a shift of investment and production, with major chemical companies and manufacturers closing European plants or actively announcing shifts in production to the U.S., where the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) offers both cheap energy and significant green subsidies. 3.4 Ethical dilemma and human rights Another issue may arise from the new Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which requires large companies operating within the EU to identify and address the protection of human rights and environmental impacts. For foreign gas importers, whose adherence to human rights protections and a commitment to reducing planet-warming emissions is expected, and if not, substantial fines will be ordered. The U.S. and Qatar argue that the implementation of these rules could jeopardise existing and future investments, employment, and compliance with recent trade agreements. Europe is now at a crossroads - It may win the energy security battle, but as a consequence, it may lose its fundamental industrial base, by which the long-term result will be hugely compromised. The pursuit of a marathon must therefore simultaneously focus on decarbonization to achieve zero marginal fuel costs and at the same time policy alignment to provide competitive electricity pricing. The U.S. and Qatar welcomed the rise in European LNG demand, while suppliers like Algeria see both new opportunities and long-term uncertainty due to EU decarbonisation. China has strengthened its energy ties with Russia, reshaping global flows. These reactions show that Europe’s transition is not just about Europe itself, but sets a new paradigm for future development on a global level.

4. Findings

The text shows that the European Union’s rapid disengagement from Russian pipeline gas after February 2022 was operationally effective but structurally incomplete. The emergency “sprint” phase—characterised by LNG diversification, accelerated regasification capacity, mandatory storage targets, and demand reduction—successfully prevented systemic shortages and avoided the severe economic disruption widely anticipated at the outset of the war. In this sense, the EU proved capable of coordinated action under acute geopolitical pressure. At the same time, the findings reveal that replacing Russian pipeline gas with globally traded LNG has not eliminated Europe’s fundamental vulnerability but rather reshaped it. LNG imports have introduced higher and more volatile energy prices, intensified competition with Asian markets, and exposed European industry to persistent competitiveness risks, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Moreover, the continued import and transshipment of Russian LNG through selected EU ports has weakened the coherence of the sanctions regime and diluted the strategic objective of fully severing energy ties with the Kremlin. Infrastructure constraints remain a central and crucial structural weakness. The crisis exposed the limited capacity of cross-border interconnectors, constraining the efficient transfer of surplus LNG around the continent. These bottlenecks underscore that energy security in the EU remains uneven and that national energy systems are still insufficiently integrated. Finally, the findings indicate that Europe’s long-term energy security challenge is inseparable from its decarbonisation trajectory. Europe's weakness lies in its continuous dependence on fossil-based energy sources. As long as fossil fuels remain central, geopolitical exposure persists. The shift toward renewables, electrification, and hydrogen is therefore not only a climate imperative but a strategic necessity. Without a successful transition to independently and domestically produced, low-carbon energy and a genuinely integrated internal market, the EU risks exchanging one form of dependency for another rather than achieving lasting strategic autonomy.

5. Policy Recommendations

It is important to separate the short-term crisis measures from long-term climate policy. The rapid LNG build-out, Floating Storage Regasification Units (FSRUs), and storage rules solved immediate security concerns but created new dependencies. Structural policies as renewables, grids, and hydrogen—address the root of the problem but take far longer and require more coordination. Real strategic autonomy means more than swapping Russian gas for other suppliers. To avoid the Mattei scenario decades ago, the focus needs to be shifted from crisis management to systemic transformation. It depends on a long-term shift in how Europe produces and uses energy, based on decarbonisation, a more integrated internal market, and new technologies. The main policy tool for this is the REPowerEU Plan, launched in May

2022. Instead of gradual changes, it sets much more

ambitious goals. The EU raised its renewable energy target to 45% by 2030 and plans a huge rollout of solar power—over 300 GW by 2025 and nearly 600 GW by 2030. Hydrogen is part of the picture, with a goal of producing 10 million tonnes inside the EU and importing another 10 million tonnes by 2030. One of the most important, but often overlooked, parts of the plan is speeding up permits for wind and solar projects. REPowerEU creates special “go-to zones” where approvals are much faster, based on the idea that slow bureaucracy has become a security risk. To put it simply, the plan treats climate policy and energy security as the same challenge, both complementing each other and showcasing the vision of energy independence on which the EU embarked. With that being said, influence of EU policies are not bounded just by territories of member countries. Through its climate diplomacy, like the Paris Agreement, the EU has fuelled global efforts to cut fossil fuel consumption. For example, the support for renewable energy and energy efficiency in Algeria could help to curb Algerian domestic consumption, leaving more gas available for export to Europe. At the global level, growing use of renewable energy should, in theory, help to ease demand for fossil fuels and help to keep prices down. With all things considered, a crucial aspect of overcoming future energy volatility is the notion that the European market only works effectively if it acts as a unified bloc. The political lesson is that "energy islands" are unacceptable. The marathon phase must therefore focus on the structural infrastructure of the internal energy market. The need to present a united front to external energy suppliers (Gazprom) was behind a 2014 proposal by Poland’s then-prime minister Donald Tusk for joint EU gas purchases. In its energy union strategy, published the following year, the European Commission promised to look into this idea. The proposal has not since been implemented, with EU Member States preferring to negotiate gas supply contracts individually. Instead, since 2017 Member States are required to notify the European Commission of the intergovernmental agreements they conclude with non-EU countries on oil and gas supplies The Commission has the power to veto agreements that pose supply risks or are inconsistent with EU law. While the presence of veto power creates a degree of oversight, it has not solved the issue of the deeper integration originally envisioned. One proposed alternative was mandatory joint purchasing. By aggregating demand through an EU Energy Platform, Member States could act as a single buyer, negotiate lower prices, and avoid bidding against each other on global markets. Another frequently discussed measure was accelerated investment in interconnectors, particularly along the North–South corridor and now more importantly in the West-East direction, so that energy imported or produced in one region could be redirected easily and quickly to another during shortages. A further idea concerned shared storage, with countries that have the geographical capacity, such as the Netherlands or Austria, holding reserves on behalf of Member States with limited options. In search of potential options, EU members need to come to the conclusion that gas from the East is no longer a pertinent solution. The decades-long ambivalent relationship has collapsed. While the usage of nuclear technology still sparks controversy and division between states of the continent, other solutions may indeed be here around us already, or at least to some extent. Green hydrogen produced via electrolysis sourced from renewable power sources represents a viable, domestic, and non-fossil-fuel solution for the high-energy-demanding industry, difficult to electrify (steel, heavy transport, cement), currently reliant on gas. The ambition is to create a robust European Hydrogen Backbone, a pan-European network of pipelines - largely converted from existing natural gas infrastructure. The accelerated EHB vision shows that by 2030, five pan-European hydrogen supply and import corridors with almost 28,000 km of initial pipelines, cheap for transport, could link production hubs and create an additional supply of energy to the system, supplementing already potent intermittent energy sources. The technical challenges and high costs are immense, including the development of electrolysers, energy losses during conversion, and the logistics of the pipelines. The ~53,000 km envisaged backbone by 2040 requires an estimated total investment of €80-143 billion. While time and financial costs are evident, the security argument for hydrogen outweighs criticism: it is a fuel source that can be manufactured domestically, stored for long durations and eliminates geopolitical risk.

6. Conclusion

For a long time, Europe accepted cheap Russian gas as a normal part of economic life, believing that trade would help keep peace. Projects like Nord Stream, and Germany’s strong belief in neoliberal principles, locked Europe into a system that Russia later used for political pressure. The war in Ukraine finally forced Europe to admit that this approach had failed. The reaction in early stages of the war was surprisingly effective. Germany, which had no LNG terminals before the war, managed to build and lease several in record time. Gas started flowing west-to-east instead of the opposite direction. Still, the main part of the paper shows that Europe is not finished. Russian LNG kept entering through a few countries, the Iberian Peninsula remains poorly connected to the rest of the EU, and European industries now pay much more for energy than factories in the United States. But it is not just an economic conundrum – the rise of populist voices in the pews of national and supranational parliaments undermines the effort aiming for energy autonomy and European unity. Overregulated bureaucratic rigidity puts the EU between tight limits. The suspended hydraulic fracking methods in many member countries, atomic energy labelled as a transitional energy source and the newly found gas patches on the shores of Cyprus and Romania will only provide insufficient results. Controversially, both the Commission's Trade for All strategy and Article 21 of TEU advocate for the promotion of human rights and democracy even when negotiating trade terms with countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia or Azerbaijan. With that being said, the European vision for green energy undermines the willingness of long-standing exporters of fossil energy supplies. Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, it was not just Russia which felt betrayed by the goal of the main global players – other major fossil fuel providers stressed the issue of rapid changes in energy markets with potential long-term impact on their revenues. The whole situation is far more complex than just cutting the gas from the East. If Europe only swaps Russian gas for LNG from other exporters, it remains vulnerable. Real autonomy means producing more energy inside Europe and an integrated grid that prevents any region from being cut off. Policies like REPowerEU and the Hydrogen Backbone are an attempt to move in this direction. They are expensive, but they offer a system that does not rely on outside suppliers who might use energy as leverage. The main lesson is that energy cannot be separated from security. The emergency measures proved that Europe can act fast when it has no other choice. The next step is making those changes permanent. If that happens, the era of Russian energy dominance in Europe will finally come to an end—not because another supplier replaced the Kremlin, but because Europe no longer needs to depend on anyone at all.