From Promise to Peril: Social and Economic Fractures Fueling Democratic Decline and Populism on Both Sides of the Atlantic
Yassine AbadaIE University
Edited by Victoria Berg, IE University
Abstract
This article examines the rise of democratic backsliding at the hands of populist movements in both France and the United States of America, two advanced democracies long considered resilient enough to such threats. Far gone are the days when societies could unite almost unanimously against the far-right, like in the 2002 French elections. Nowadays, these ideologies are gaining serious ground. Through a comparative analysis, it uncovers how populist movements led by the Make America Great Again movement, led by Donald Trump, and the National Rally of Marine Le Pen are successfully exploiting institutional weaknesses and socioeconomic grievances to grow their power and erode, currently or in the near future, the democratic institutions of both countries. By analyzing economic and social factors, this article reveals how these vulnerabilities are the perfect ground for the growth of such movements.
After the dissolution of the United of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, many believed in the “end of history”, meaning that humanity faced an exhaustion of credible systems that would propose alternatives to Western Liberalism. While this ambitious assumption held for some time, it is now clear that liberal democracies are https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ and Economic Decline and the Atlantic the hands of populist movements in both France and the considered resilient enough to such threats. Far gone are the the far-right, like in the 2002 French elections. Nowadays, analysis, it uncovers how populist movements led by Trump, and the National Rally of Marine Le Pen are grievances to grow their power and erode, currently By analyzing economic and social factors, this article growth of such movements. under attack. The biggest challenge that some of the most stable democracies in the world face in recent times is democratic backsliding. Whereas history has shown us that many waves of authoritarianism have shaken and often destroyed democratic institutions through violent coups and military seizures of power, democratic backsliding occurs through a discontinuous series of actions, rather than a single fatal blow. Indeed, it is harder to feel and discern, as elected leaders, using a populist rhetoric, weaken checks and balances and their political opposition. When exposed to this phenomenon, many tend to think about Hungary or Poland, but this does not hold true. Indeed, some of the oldest and most stable, in fact, the oldest and most stable democracies of the world are dealing with this challenge. The United States of America, under the second presidency of Donald J. Trump, is experiencing all the traits of a democratic recession with high centralization of power and a clear undercut of checks and balances. The US is not the only country on this path; ironically, the country that served as a model for the American Revolution is also going through the same issues: France. While the US is fully experiencing this democratic backsliding, France is on the verge of it, as President Emmanuel Macron’s approval rating sits at a staggering 11% according to a study by the Verian Group, mentioned by Goury-Laffont. This unpopularity is the perfect ground for the growth of anti-system parties. Behind this slow erosion of democratic norms lies a common element among many states experiencing the same phenomenon: populism. In the US, populist movements, such as the Wolkenstein, Fabio. "What Is Democratic Backsliding?" Constellations 29, no. 1 (2022): 88–103. Cianetti, Licia, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley. "Rethinking 'Democratic Backsliding' in Central and Eastern Europe: Looking Beyond Hungary and Poland." East European Politics 34, no. 3 (2018): 243–256. Carrier, Martin A., and Thomas Carothers. "Trump's Assault on Democratic Institutions." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. Goury-Laffont, Alix. "Macron's Approval Rating Plummets to 11%." Politico, 2025. Make America Great Again movement, have exploited political alienation and economic hardship to mobilize in their favor large groups of people ready to trade democratic norms for a promised response to their grievances, and if nothing changes, this situation will soon apply to France, as the 2027 presidential elections are getting closer. Yet the puzzle remains: how do consolidated democracies with centuries of institutional development succumb to erosion? And what specific mechanisms allow populist actors to exploit economic grievances into institutional challenges?
Democratic backsliding represents a process of institutional regression distinct from both democratic breakdown and regime collapse. Bermeo defines it as "the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy" emphasizing the crucial role of elected leaders in initiating democratic decline rather than external actors or revolutionary movements. It differs from classic generalized institutional weakness; it is a deliberate, state-led strategy to concentrate power and restrict opposition, not merely the failure of institutions to function effectively. Democratic backsliding begins at the ballot box, as Levitsky and Ziblatt said. In very advanced cases of democratic regression, the persistence of democratic forms, such as elections, creates what scholars Bermeo, Nancy. "On Democratic Backsliding." Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 5–19. Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing, 2018. call “electoral authoritarianism”, systems that preserve a democratic facade, while actively working to dismantle the very processes that brought their leaders to power, disadvantaging opposition and concentrating power. One of the main characteristics of democratic backsliding is executive aggrandizement. It is the process by which elected officials systematically weaken the institutional checks and balances and constraints on their power. Laebens conceptualizes this as an attack against two kinds of accountability: horizontal accountability (the ability for state institutions, such as tribunals and parliament, to limit the actions of the executive) and vertical accountability (the ability of citizens and media to hold leaders accountable through elections and scrutiny). Simultaneously weakening these accountability mechanisms signals the intent to escape oversight and to accumulate unchecked power. The US has been experiencing significant executive aggrandizement under the second Trump administration. The strategy of the 47th American President and his cabinet is to establish Trump as a supreme figure of the executive and to make this executive excessively dominant in regard to the other branches of government. Indeed, one of the first actions the billionaire undertook after assuming office was to fire seventeen inspectors general from executive agencies, often replacing them with people who shared his ideology, considered as loyalists. Trump and his Justice Department even attacked some prosecutors who initiated legal actions against him. Taking a step back and analyzing the broader actions and implications of the President, a growing politicization of all aspects of the executive is noticeable. Indeed, the Trump administration prioritized appointing individuals with explicit support for the billionaire over specialists, resulting in key executive functions being held by political loyalists. This weakening of horizontal oversight came with a clear attack on the press and all components of civil society deemed to be opposing his rule. Indeed, many independent media outlets have been excluded from governmental spaces in retribution for criticisms. This ban is coupled with investigations and lawsuits against entities challenging the President and his administration, actions that led Paramount to pay 16 million dollars to settle a case against Trump. France may not be in a similar situation to the US, but it is clear that the Macron government has taken some actions that political scientists often link to weak illiberal democracies. Macron’s second term saw him lose his absolute majority at the National Assembly due to the unprecedented rise of the National Rally, going from merely 8 seats in 2017 to 89 five years later. The rise of the far-right is not the only factor that weakened the legislative power of the centrist bloc; the left-wing union led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon scored thirty-one percent of the votes, placing them as the main opposition force. All these elements combined forced Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne to bypass parliamentary debate to pass her government’s reforms. Indeed, to pass the highly unpopular pension reform and its social security bill, the French government restrained debates using Articles 49-3 and 47-1 more than 23 times. None of these articles is illegal, as they are clearly written in the French Constitution, yet what is legal is not automatically moral. As a matter of fact, the soul of democracy lies far beyond its laws and constitutions; it is found in the unspoken, implicit, and common understanding that power shall be exercised with restraint, and that the rules exist to serve the interests of the people democracy represents, not to be bent against them and their will. In this case, the rules were blatantly bent to pass highly unpopular partisan reforms that would never have passed with a regular vote. This led to months of protests that did not have the same effects as the Yellow Vest movement, as this time, no changes in governance were made as a response to the national mobilization. On the contrary, the protests were violently repressed to such an extent that Amnesty International condemned the actions of the French government, with some policemen armed with military-grade armament to face crowds of unarmed protesters. But every choice made sets an unstoppable motion, and no one can escape its consequences, as this constitutional hardball saw France's status downgraded from a full democracy to a flawed democracy. This dynamic is to be monitored closely; certainly, the current government has used legal constitutional procedures to advance its partisan interests without regard for the role of the National Assembly and debate, but the trend is likely to worsen if the National Rally comes to power in 2027. The RN’s political agenda for the 2024 legislative election reveals institutional hostility. First, its “national preference” policies would constitutionally enshrine discrimination against non-citizens regarding welfare accessibility, housing, and employment. This discrimination is unconstitutional, prohibited by major international treaties, and does not make sense economically, as foreigners finance the social security system, yet it aims to ban them from it. Second, these measures contradict France’s motto: “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”, as they challenge the principle of equality and the European human rights obligations. Finally, the party and above all its emblematic figure, Marine Le Pen, attacked the French justice system following her conviction for embezzlement. Le Pen and her allies used highly populist and anti-democratic language, claiming that "judges believe themselves superior to the sovereign people and their will" in convicting the party leader, who, along with her associates and her party, was found guilty of embezzling nearly 3 million euros. All these elements highly suggest that a rise to power of the National Rally would deepen France’s democratic backsliding. Behind this slow erosion of democratic norms lies a common element among many states experiencing the same phenomenon: populism. Defined by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser as "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people," it challenges the pluralist norms of a liberal democracy as we know them. This dichotomous vision of politics is very effective as it brings together groups of people from diverse backgrounds, often tired of "conventional" politics and attracted by the revolting speeches of charismatic leaders, offering them simple solutions to looming problems that are yet to be solved. Mudde and Kaltwasser explain that “in its most extreme interpretation of majoritarian democracy [populism], rejects any limitation to the expression of the general will, and this includes the constitutional protection of minorities and of the independence of key state institutions”. This is why populist leaders often attack the mechanisms of checks and balances, undermining the independence of the judiciary and the legislature and the freedom of speech and media, justifying these attacks as a means to delete all obstacles between the authentic people and efficient governance. While in the US, populists are already at the White House, France’s case is more complex. Many consider that France is the next great power to closely follow, as the 2027 presidential elections may bring an unprecedented shift to French politics. Already in 2017, France was considered the second most populist country in Europe, and this trend is not slowing down. The rise of populist narratives can be directly attributed to economic and social factors. Both nations are facing rising concerns in regard to media objectivity and independence. France's mainstream television and newspapers are bought by billionaires such as Vincent Bolloré and Pierre Edouard Stérin to promote their right-wing ideology. Indeed, many such media are constantly debating on themes such as immigration and Islam, exposing them in a bad light. A study on CNEWS, a very relevant television channel in 2024, has shown that the channel’s on-screen banners show that these themes appeared on 328 to 334 days of the year, effectively creating polarization and promoting the RN. Moreover, polling data often overestimate the share of the Rassemblement National while underestimating the left: for instance, in a June 2024 poll, IFOP gave the RN 35 % of first-round vote intentions, versus only 25 % for a left-wing coalition. Yet, in the actual legislative results, the left won 50 seats more than the RN.
This analysis segment will try to identify the root causes of the rise of populism, and by extension, the democratic backsliding experienced in both countries. This part will focus on measurable social and economic factors to assess the origins of this phenomenon. 3.1 Social Analysis The social component plays an important role in explaining the rise of populism, threatening democracies, even the most stable ones. Western societies have been evolving and changing at a rapid pace, and French sociologist Émile Durkheim explained that such changes create a sense of normlessness, where people become lost within a society, losing their bearings and feeling disconnected from their society and culture. In both countries, sudden mutations resulting from globalization, deindustrialization, and the erosion of community have contributed to the creation of this normlessness. In this regard, less than half of young Americans under 30, for example, feel a sense of community, and only 17% feel deep social connections. Moreover, studies have shown that increased loneliness and social isolation lead to higher rates Durkheim, Émile. The Division of Labor in Society. Translated by George Simpson. New York: Free Press, 1893. of extremism, with socially isolated individuals being 10.6% more likely to hold extreme points of view and 17.5% more aggressive. In this context, populist movements emerge as emotional and political responses to this growing social void. They offer individuals a sense of belonging, identity, and purpose that modern societies often fail to provide. The United States has reached unprecedented levels of political polarization, which eventually led to Donald Trump winning the presidency twice. The “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement illustrates how populist leaders can channel and use social frustration and cultural insecurity as tools to reach their political means. As noted by Cassese and Barnes, Graham et al., and Lajevardi and Abrajano, the MAGA agenda “privileges a return to traditional values, renewed support for gender hierarchies, and the repulsion and exclusion of outsiders.” This nostalgia for an imagined past is deeply tied to Durkheim’s concept of anomie: in times of rapid social change, individuals seek moral stability and belonging by clinging to familiar norms and identities. These radical and often racist promises have seduced young male voters, proving that those who feel lost often try to cling to policies that promise them the return of a clear and defined social order. In France, the dynamic is similar, as 71% of French people believe that the national social connection is bad, a figure that rose by 7 percentage points in a single year. We can notice that, while the national perception of social cohesion is getting worse, the popularity of the National Rally is rising. This situation reflects a calculated strategy that combines economic protectionism, cultural nationalism, and anti-immigration rhetoric tailored to exploit youth anxieties. Polling data from the 2024 European elections revealed that approximately 39 percent of voters aged 18-24 supported Marine Le Pen, with the party securing over 31 percent of the overall vote, making the RN the largest single party among young voters. The RN's social program focuses on the doctrine of "national preference" (préférence nationale), a concept aiming to explicitly prioritize French citizens over foreign nationals in access to welfare benefits, social housing, and employment. The party's 2024 legislative program proposed restricting family allowances, housing benefits, and the RSA (minimum income for job seekers) to French citizens or conditioning access on five years of legal residency and significant employment history. These “chauvinist” policies resonate clearly with young voters, inflamed by these promises to restore France to its former glory as a world power. It is interesting to note that both parties, whether in France or the United States, base their campaigns on the image of a glorious past; one these young people have never experienced, as an ideal to strive for. This ideal transcends generations and, according to these parties, has been marred by mass immigration and the loss of each country's culture. Consequently, lost in the vast void created by the drastic changes in their societies, these young people, and not only they, believe in this project and see themselves as its builders. And this is all the more worrying given that more and more people would be willing to trade their democratic freedom for state authority, a symbol of this demand for guidance. More than a simple desire for guidance, the rise of populist parties and their anti-democratic practices is explained by a distrust and rejection of the democratic institutions of the countries concerned. This decline represents more than dissatisfaction with particular policies or leaders; it constitutes a fundamental delegitimation of institutional capacity and independence. It creates the conditions where populist actors can plausibly argue that existing democratic structures are corrupt and require radical transformation or dismantlement. The statistical evidence reveals a clear collapse in citizen confidence across both democracies. In the United States, trust in the federal government has plummeted to near five-decade lows: only 38 percent of Americans trust the government to handle domestic problems, while 45 percent express confidence in its capacity to manage international affairs. When disaggregated by branch, trust stands at 32 percent for Congress, 49 percent for the judicial branch, and lower still for executive institutions. Most alarming, this decline has accelerated dramatically in recent years as overall government trust fell from 46.5 percent in 2020 to merely 30.93 percent by 2025. France presents an even starker portrait of institutional collapse. According to Sciences Po's CEVIPOF research organization, as of January 2025, 74% of French citizens have no confidence in the presidency, an increase of 7 percentage points within a single year. Equally alarming, 86% have no confidence in French political parties, while 74% express no trust in the National Assembly. These figures are already alarming, but they take on a whole new dimension when compared to other functioning democracies. While overall trust in government reaches 30% in the United States and 44% in France, these figures exceed 75% for democracies such as Finland (75%) and Switzerland (82%), demonstrating a genuine disenchantment. Moreover, a critical element of this collapse in institutional trust is that it is clear that support for democratic institutions has become partisan support, conditional on whoever has a majority in each body. This polarization suggests that institutional trust no longer reflects objective assessments of institutional performance but rather serves as an extension of partisan loyalty. This trend is dangerous for democracy because it undermines the basic principle that institutions should be respected regardless of partisan outcomes. When trust becomes conditional on partisan advantage, citizens are more likely to reject legitimate decisions made by these institutions whenever their preferred party is not in control. A good example of this is the widespread indignation expressed by many political actors in reaction to the ineligibility of Marine Le Pen as a consequence of her trial for embezzlement. Left-wing populist parties such as La France Insoumise declared they would rather beat their political opponents in the ballot box rather than through the courts, which minimizes judicial decision-making and the role of justice. This institutional trust crisis is linked to widespread perception that political elites are fundamentally disconnected from citizen concerns and engaged in systematic corruption. Ipsos's global research identifies what it terms "broken-system sentiment", the belief that the political system is irreparably dysfunctional and controlled by self-serving elites. In France, this elite-grassroots disconnection is particularly felt, as political scientists research documents what they term the "elite-grassroots divide in anticorruption activism," where NGOs and policy elites become disconnected from citizen movements, leading citizens to view both establishment elites and professional reformers as part of a corrupt system. When political leaders fail to deliver promised reforms, as occurred after France's multiple governmental collapses in 2024-2025, "citizens who took to the streets grow cynical about democracy itself," making them "more receptive to the appeal of authoritarian populists." In the United States, this disconnection manifests through different mechanisms but produces similar outcomes. Trump's repeated attacks on "the swamp" and portrayal of federal institutions as tools of elite conspiracy resonated with millions of citizens who perceive Washington as a corrupt system serving wealthy interests at their expense. All these elements combined represent the ideal ground for the rise of anti-democratic thoughts. As Mudde and Kaltwasser argue, populism flourishes when citizens believe "ordinary people" are excluded from power and elites have captured institutions for their own personal benefit. The data presented here suggest these conditions are not merely present but profoundly entrenched in both France and the United States. Furthermore, the relationship between institutional trust and populism is bidirectional, as a distrust of institutions fuels populist narratives, and populist narratives continually attack the institutions, which creates a vicious cycle. Breaking this spiral requires not merely restoring citizen confidence but also addressing the legitimate social grievances and elite disconnection that fuel the dissatisfaction, which has yet to be done. 3.2 Economic Analysis It is true that social factors represent an important part of the search for the causes of this democratic backsliding, but it is necessary to specify that, beyond simple social Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. discontent, there are also economic reasons, largely justifying this social unease and this discomfort with democracy that both countries are experiencing. The economic foundations of democratic backsliding in France and the United States differ substantially, yet both produce similar political consequences: widespread economic anxiety, erosion of middle-class security, and receptiveness to populist movements promising to restore economic justice through nationalist remedies. To understand these economic factors, it is important to examine inequality, employment precarity, deindustrialization, and the role of globalization shocks in producing the conditions necessary for populism to flourish. The United States presents stark income inequality, which has grown significantly in recent years. The Gini Coefficient, used to measure inequality using a scale from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (absolute inequality), shows that the US stands at a score of 0.41. It is one of the highest rates of inequality among wealthy democracies, as other countries such as Canada or the Netherlands stand at lower rates, respectively 0.29 and 0.25. Moreover, the evolution of this coefficient is negative, as between 2002 and 2025, the American Gini Coefficient went from a value of 0.35 to 0.41, suggesting that inequality grew, despite the general growth of the economy. More importantly, this inequality is not the result of poverty in absolute terms, it is rather the consequence of diverging growths of salaries between college-educated and non-college-educated individuals. Since 2002, productivity in the workplace has risen by 42%, World Population Review. "Gini Coefficient by Country 2025." while real salaries (salaries adjusted to inflation) have only increased by 18%. This means that American workers perceive less than half of their gains in productivity. This difference suggests a systemic problem in the redistribution of wealth in the American economy, where capital is highly favored in regard to work. This stagnation in wages is even more noticeable among non-college-educated workers, who represent a considerable part of the American workforce (70%). Ultimately, these economic realities have had critical political consequences, as Donald Trump and his Make America Great Again movement seized this opportunity. This clear inequality was mainly understood through the lens of deindustrialization and globalization. These two elements have devastated industrial regions where individuals highly relied on industry for their incomes. Research on the 2016 American election found that "non-white voters' exposure to deindustrialization led to higher support for the Democrats in 2016, while white voters exposed to deindustrialization turned to the Republicans to support Trump," revealing how "identity politics and economic dislocations interact in producing support for populism." These highly impacted communities lacked narratives to explain their economic hardship and the consequence of this was to fall into the simplistic MAGA discourse that offered them sense and Artus, Patrick. "France or the US: Which model is preferable?" Le Monde, November 18, 2024. Artus, Patrick. "France or the US: Which model is preferable?" Le Monde, November 18, 2024. Rodrik, Dani. 2020. Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism. NBER Working Paper No. 27526. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. clarity in regard to their distress. Trump insisted that trade deals negotiated by corrupt Washington elites, immigration flooding labor markets with cheap workers, and a political system captured by special interests conspired to destroy American manufacturing. Trump's promise to "renegotiate" trade deals, enforce immigration restrictions, and target the "deep state" offered emotional satisfaction and clear scapegoats to blame, even if the policies proposed would likely prove economically ineffective. These difficult economic situations are the perfect ground for the development of populism as the research literature on the topic is quite unambiguous. Indeed, a study published by the Cambridge University Press argued that "All thirty-six studies report a robust causal link between economic insecurity and populism. Several studies report a strong effect. A recurring effect is that economic shocks and economic insecurity explain around one-third of recent surges in populism." The same study states that "higher economic security through redistribution dampens voters' enthusiasm for populism" suggesting that countries with robust social safety nets and redistribution mechanisms should exhibit lower populism. The case of France is quite paradoxical. By most standard inequality measures, France is substantially more egalitarian than the United States. Indeed, the post-redistribution Gini coefficient is 0.29 compared to Scheiring, Gábor, Manuel Serrano‐Alarcón, Alexandru Moise, Courtney McNamara, and David Stuckler. “The Populist Backlash Against Globalization: A Meta-Analysis of the Causal Evidence.” British Journal of Political Science, published online 22 February 2024. 0.39 in America, poverty rates are 15 percent compared to 25 percent, and France's welfare system provides unemployment insurance, healthcare, housing support, and pension security far exceeding American guarantees. Following the conclusions of the previous study, we would expect that in a country where redistribution of wealth is far higher, and If redistribution dampens populism, France would exhibit lower populist support than the United States. Yet the National Rally has achieved substantially higher electoral share (31 percent in the 2024 European elections) than any single party in the country. The explanation lies in France's employment crisis. Despite possessing generous welfare benefits, France suffers from low labor force participation and high structural unemployment in comparison with other wealthy democracies. As a matter of fact, the employment rate for 15-64 year-olds is 68 percent in France compared to 72 percent in the United States, and youth unemployment is reaching 25%. These figures contrast deeply with the saying of Emmanuel Macron, who stated in 2018 that he would only have to cross the street to find a job. This seemingly innocuous comment generated a lot of discussion and was heavily criticized, with many seeing it as an attempt to place the blame solely on job seekers without addressing the root cause of the problem: the shortage of jobs. Indeed, according to Hadrien Clouet, only 1% of job vacancies were unfilled at that time, which proves that the problem does not so much stem from job seekers. This World Population Review. "Gini Coefficient by Country 2025." Artus, Patrick. "France or the US: Which model is preferable?" Le Monde, November 18, 2024. creates a vicious cycle, where the generous safety nets, financed by taxes and high social contributions, can discourage employment, mostly for low-skilled workers because working often yields only modest financial gains compared to receiving benefits. Lower employment rates then widen income inequality before redistribution, since people who are unemployed or inactive are counted in overall income statistics. To compensate, the government must increase welfare spending and taxation to maintain the same level of redistribution. As a consequence, this creates a higher fiscal burden on workers and employers and makes employment less attractive. As Olivier Klein explains, "the more redistribution rises, the heavier the tax and social contribution burden becomes, weighing on business competitiveness and reducing work attractiveness. This mechanism, in turn, feeds a structurally low employment rate". While the American situation shows us deep and clear inequality in wages, the case of France is more subtle as the problem is not visible inequality but invisible exclusion where young people are unable to enter labor markets despite (or because of) generous welfare provisions; older workers are pushed into retirement with low pensions, and low-skilled workers face chronically weak employment prospects. This unemployment crisis has pushed the French youth towards the National Rally, gaining the support of nearly 40% of them. The RN offers a clear, visible and politically convenient scapegoat, the same one often used in Klein, Olivier. "Income Inequality: France Trapped by Treating Symptoms Rather Than Causes." September 22, 2025. European far-right rhetorics: immigrants and the European Union. Foreign workers receive welfare and housing before French nationals, while the EU prevents France from protecting its labor and economic market. It is now clear that economic factors have a decisive role in the surge of populism and democratic backsliding. Both France and the US meet the conditions to create a ground for the rise of anti-democratic parties, with political actors such as Trump and Bardella successfully mobilizing these grievances, contrasting with mainstream parties and politicians that have failed to deliver convincing solutions.
The analysis above presents that the rise to power of populist actors, openly causing democratic backsliding in each country, stems from interconnected institutional vulnerabilities, profound loss of public trust in democratic institutions, and populist movements successfully mobilizing both economic grievances and social alienation. If nothing is done, the threat is not only electoral or political, but liberal democracy can be at risk. However, this trajectory is not inevitable, as strategic institutional reforms, genuine efforts to include the civil populations in politics, and targeted socioeconomic reforms can reverse this momentum that the far-right is enjoying. The goal of these reforms is not to prevent those parties from reaching power, as this would be anti-democratic, but rather to ensure that strong horizontal oversight and accountability are exercised on them during their terms, avoiding further democratic erosion or a weakening of democratic institutions.
4.1.1 Rule of Law Both France and the US require legal procedures and protections that would prevent executive interference with the judicial system and the aggrandizement of their power. In the US, Congress should strengthen federal judiciary independence by pushing for legislation promoting transparency in appointment procedures, protection for judges and lawyers from political retaliation, and the prevention of executive abuse of pardons for political prosecutions. 4.1.2 Parliamentary Empowerment France should rethink and recalibrate its Fifth Republic toward stronger legislative authority, particularly through restricting executive use of Article 49.3 that permits governments to bypass parliamentary debate. The United States Congress requires institutional reforms restoring its oversight capacity to allow the creation of procedural barriers preventing presidents from directing prosecutions against political opponents.
Both nations require comprehensive anti-disinformation strategies protecting journalistic freedom while preventing state or corporate capture of media institutions. To achieve a fairer media landscape, both nations could fund investigative journalism while increasing the protection for journalists against harassment or political retaliation. Regulation of social media algorithms is also important to avoid the creation of echo chambers and the rise of polarizing content. The aim is not to police speech, but rather to give citizens access to credible information sources.
Innovative mechanisms including citizen assemblies, deliberative polling, and participatory budgeting can rebuild public trust in democratic institutions by enabling direct participation in governance decisions. These mechanisms prove particularly effective when structured to include socioeconomically diverse participants and to ensure that deliberative outcomes influence policy. Such measures would give their legitimacy back to democratic institutions, strengthening them. 4.2 Addressing socioeconomic grievances 4.2.1 Addressing income inequality and reforming labor markets In the United States, progressive taxation on capital gains and wealth and stronger labor unions would help contain inequalities and create solid safety nets for American workers, especially low-skilled workers. In France, the high taxation often discourages employers from hiring, making it hard for young workers to enter the labor market. A comprehensive reform shifting the focus from protecting existing jobs to facilitating the creation of new ones, by giving employers fiscal incentives to do so, would greatly reduce youth unemployment. 4.2.2 Addressing geographical inequalities Geographic inequalities between regions are the main drivers of populism, as far-right parties often score their best results in deindustrialized, rural, and poor regions. Strategic public investment in infrastructure projects and business incentives can reduce the feeling of abandonment that fuels anti-establishment sentiment.
Many workers are facing technological advances with fear that, one day, their jobs could be automated. Both countries should strengthen access to lifelong education and skills development, making retraining affordable and accessible, especially for workers in at-risk industries. These programs would include digital literacy, language skills, and communication, to allow for career mobility and adaptation.
Building democratic legitimacy requires populations feeling a genuine sense of security and social mobility. The American government should expand social safety nets by ensuring an expansion of Medicaid and offering affordable housing and robust unemployment support. France, while having strong safety nets already, could simplify the procedures to make it easier to access. 5. Conclusion The specter of democratic backsliding in France and the United States signals that no democracy, however established, is immune to erosion from within. As this analysis has shown, the convergence of institutional weakness, declining trust, populist exploitation of grievances, and economic exclusion has created fertile ground for anti-pluralist movements. In the US, unprecedented executive aggrandizement and the politicization of checks and balances reflect a core vulnerability, while in France, the normalization and mainstreaming of the National Rally present a parallel threat, one that could soon become reality if institutional safeguards and democratic norms are not firmly protected. While the United States is currently experiencing this democratic backsliding, France could be soon to follow if nothing changes. Yet this democratic malaise is neither natural nor inevitable, as history has shown us that democracies that act early by strengthening the independence of their institutions, by enforcing horizontal and vertical accountability, while directly addressing the socioeconomic grievances of their populations, can reverse this democratic decline. The responsibility is not solely in the hands of policymakers, as civil society, educators, and the media have a crucial role to play in reinforcing democratic values, ensuring accountability, and not acknowledging anti-democratic measures and parties. The lesson we learn from both countries is that technocratic fixes, while necessary, are insufficient on their own, as the ground of this backsliding is built upon sentiments, feelings, and resentment, elements that no objective technocratic reforms can entirely heal. Preventing further erosion requires a renewal of the social contract binding the people with their leader: one that promises and delivers meaningful inclusion in policymaking, economic life, and social mobility, one that refuses to allow fear or nostalgia for despotic times. France and the United States are capable of reinventing their democracies, not solely defending them. Like a butterfly emerging from its cocoon, or a moose renewing its antlers, adaptability is the greatest virtue, and both nations must draw inspiration from nature's adaptability to maintain the freedom of their populations under the aegis of the democracy for which so many have fought.