Abstract
This paper explores the background of Georgia's EU path over the years, illustrating the specifics of actions undertaken by the Georgians to tighten cooperation with Europe in decades following the fall of the USSR, as well as democratic backsliding and increasingly authoritarian policies.
In May, 2009, George W. Bush gave a memorable speech in Freedom Square in Tbilisi. He referred to Georgia as “a beacon of liberty for this region and the world”, praising the heritage of the Rose Revolution and acknowledging Washington’s respect for Georgia’s desire to integrate with the institutions of Europe. Just 15 years later, the pace of this pro-Western and pro-European path drastically changed. After a series of violations of democratic values, the rule of law and https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ generational dream or a over the years, by illustrating the specifics of actions with Europe in decades following the fall of the USSR, as policies of the government that led to the slowdown of the of the accession process in 2024 and the EU’s reaction. environment and findings of the European Commission’s Georgia’s future prospects of EU membership. European standards by Georgian authorities, Tbilisi announces a suspension of negotiation talks with the EU - a decision that leads crowds of Georgians to the streets to protest. This paper explores stages of Georgia’s attempts to integrate with the EU over the years and a shift in its policy from pro-EU enthusiasm to stagnation and quasi-authoritarian tendencies. It also highlights an important aspect of contrast between a public sentiment and a political climate that creates an impasse and raises the question of Georgia’s readiness to join the Western structures, or even the plausibility of Tbilisi ever returning on the path of European integration.
years 2.1 Early EU Cooperation The first forms of cooperation between Georgia and the EU could already be observed in the early years following Georgia’s declaration of independence. Although for a long time this cooperation was mainly humanitarian and technical in nature, over time - due to the country’s clear accession aspirations - it gradually became more intensive. The first important milestone on Georgia’s path to European integration was the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU in Luxembourg in April 1996. This agreement aimed to define the principles forming the basis of the EU’s internal and external policies, as well as those of its partner countries. Although the PCA did not explicitly refer to the criteria required for EU membership, it was the first document to foresee a continuous process of harmonization with EU standards. In 2003, the EU began developing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which Georgia joined in
the Rose Revolution - society’s peaceful and civic reaction to the electoral fraud, which represented Georgia's commitment to democratic values and pro-Western aspirations. The non-violent nature of this uprising had influenced other post-Soviet republics and led to the eruption of analogous revolutions in Ukraine (Orange Revolution) and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution), which increased Georgia’s significance in the region. 2.2 Post-Rose Revolution Era The leader of the revolution and soon-to-be-elected president Mikheil Saakashvili entered Georgian politics with a vision of pro-Western transformation of the entire South Caucasus. He perceived Georgia as a potential leader of the region - a bridge between Europe and still-developing post-Soviet republics. As he took the office Saakashvili clashed with far from idyllic reality - a state troubled with fundamental issues and dysfunctions in both social and political life. However, his administration managed to turn the situation around. As the American Enterprise Institute reports, in the years of 2005-2008 the Georgians recorded a real GDP growth of 8.5%. It allowed Georgia not only to achieve and empower an actual development, but also to present itself to the international community as a serious, promising partner and flourishing economy. There were, however, some actions taken by Saakashvili and his allies that aroused justified doubts among external observers - especially in the matters of domestic politics, such as replacement of government officials in a quite semi-authoritarian manner. New elites wanted to prove their efficiency through mass, legally-questionable anti-corruption trials, which were criticized by the EU. Georgia’s relations with this organization were one of the main aspects of Saakashvili’s foreign policy. In order to warm up those relations, he appointed French-Georgian politician and former French ambassador to Tbilisi Salome Zurabshvili for the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This decision brought Georgia worldwide attention, however, its significance in building deeper connections with the EU remains questionable. Although Georgia was included in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union’s approach towards the entire Caucasus and Central Asia region remained rather cautious. This was influenced by the fact that the EU had just completed its largest enlargement in history (in 2004), and accession treaties with Bulgaria and Romania had already been signed. Given the region’s questionable stability, Georgia’s interests often fundamentally differed from those of the EU, especially regarding relations with the Russian Federation. While Georgians - remaining under constant pressure from Russian-supported separatist movements and facing Putin’s clear opposition to westernization - pushed to break all remaining dependencies on their northern neighbor, the EU (led by France and Germany) pursued normalization of relations with Russia and wanted even deeper constructive cooperation with Moscow. In the February 2006 issue of the Chaillot Paper, published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and titled Why Georgia Matters, one reads: “The EU should actively engage Russia in Georgia.”.
Discussions about Georgia’s aspirations for Western integration were often framed within the context of Brussels-Moscow dialogue. This approach would have indirect consequences for the international community in
with Ukraine) was denied the Membership Action Plan, largely out of fear of irritating Russia. A few months later, on August 8, Russian tanks entered Georgian territory from the South Ossetian side after week-long shellings of Georgian villages. Still, President Saakashvili’s decision to return fire – based on intelligence about Russian troops nearing Tskhinvali – is widely regarded as the start of the full-scale conflict. Russia justified its actions by defending “Russian citizens” in South Ossetia, though these “Russian citizens” in question were Ossetians who had been granted Russian passports to artificially create a diaspora. This Moscow’s course of action was seen as legally questionable and threatening to Georgian territorial integrity. There is speculation whether Saakashvili made the only decision available or fell victim to a Kremlin provocation. The legitimacy of Georgia’s actions is a subject of debate. Western allies had warned Saakashvili against escalation, yet preserving territorial integrity was central to his political agenda. The 2008 war was a pivotal moment for the country's ambitions toward the EU. The well-known Tagliavini Report indicated that - although preceded by numerous provocations - it was the Georgian shelling of the South Ossetian capital that initiated the full-scale conflict. However, the report also mentioned many Russian actions that had contributed to growing tensions in the region over the years. What was crucial for the Georgians was the condemnation of the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Consistently, the Kremlin’s recognition of the independence of these territories was deemed illegal by the authors of the report.
The war with Russia accelerated the process of Georgia’s inclusion in the Eastern Partnership - one of the flagship initiatives of European foreign policy, launched by Sweden and Poland. The most important benefits for Georgia from this cooperation were visa-free travel to Europe and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Georgia joined the Partnership in May 2009, and a few months later, it withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was a firm stepping out of the role of Russia’s “near abroad” and strengthening pro-Western aspirations. Georgia started to become an increasingly likely candidate for full EU membership. Georgia’s integration process culminated in the signing of the Association Agreement in 2014. In the EU accession framework, this type of agreement is, in practice, a prelude to full membership. Finally, on December 14, 2023, Georgia was granted the long-awaited status of a candidate country. This decision was welcomed with great enthusiasm in Tbilisi. Members of the Georgian parliament waved EU flags and played the EU's anthem at the opening of the parliamentary session. Thousands of Georgians gathered in the capital to celebrate, demonstrating their dedication to westernization and European values. This first such relevant step towards full EU accession was a fulfillment of a dream sparked in the events of November 2003. Along with Georgia’s candidate country status, the EU also opened membership talks with Ukraine and Moldova. The pace of this process is directly linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In doing so, the EU aimed to demonstrate its support for the pro-Western aspirations of those countries, while attempting to keep them outside of Russia’s sphere of influence.
Although appropriate steps towards EU membership had been taken over the years and the aspiration of joining the organization remained alive in the consciousness of Georgian society, the country’s foreign policy course began to shift after the Georgian Dream party came to power. Bidzina Ivanishvili - the founder of the abovementioned party - is a well-known Georgian businessman who conducts most of his business in Russia. Prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections, when he announced the creation of the Georgian Dream political party, he claimed to support reducing tensions with Moscow while also pursuing European integration, close relations with the United States and potential NATO membership. The Georgian Dream was not initially perceived as pro-Russian and authoritarian. However, over time the party’s rhetoric gradually started taking a turn towards Moscow’s interests and authoritarianism, which raised concerns in Brussels regarding Georgia’s pro-European and generally pro-Western direction. Georgia’s turn to Russia-like autocracy had become more and more apparent over the years, in both domestic and foreign policy spheres. Bidzina Ivanishvili has successfully politicised relations between his party and the Georgian Orthodox Church, using the prominent position that this institution holds in Georgian society. For years the Georgian Dream had conducted a negative campaign against Mikheil Saakashvili, who is now serving more than 12 years in prison on questionable charges of abuse of power and embezzlement, after his conviction in 2021. By the end of 2024 the Georgian parliament passed an appalling anti-LGBTQ+ law that, among others, mandates censorship of any depictions of LGBTQ+ people in the media. All these changes are serious violations not only of the EU’s standards, but also essential human rights and the rule of law. In terms of foreign policy this shift became the most apparent after the breakout of Russia’s full-scale invasion on Ukraine, when Georgia did not participate in Western sanctions imposed on Moscow. In October 2024, parliamentary elections were held, which - according to results published by the Georgian Central Election Commission - were won by Georgian Dream. The opposition and sitting President Salome Zurabishvili (in office since 2018) rejected the results, accusing the ruling party (also Georgian Dream) of electoral fraud and allowing Russian interference - although the latter was not confirmed by any independent report. Concerns about the transparency of the electoral process were also raised by external observers, including a joint monitoring mission of OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the European Parliament. Particularly the collection and counting of votes were found democratically doubtful. The European Parliament condemned Georgian Dream in its resolution from February 13, 2025, stating that it “does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, which was neither free nor fair, was held in violation of democratic norms and standards, and did not reflect the will of the people of Georgia; underlines that the extensive electoral fraud has undermined the integrity of the election process, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result and eroded public trust, both domestically and internationally, in any new government”. A key turning point in the shift of Georgia’s foreign policy orientation back towards Moscow, especially in the context of EU membership, came in 2024 with the adoption of the "Transparency of Foreign Influence" law (commonly referred to as the “foreign agents law”). This law requires the registration of entities such as media outlets and NGOs that receive at least 20% of their funding from foreign sources. The opposition argues that the law was modeled after a similar act passed a decade earlier in Russia. It mainly targets independent media and civil society organizations, which consistently expose Georgian Dream and its government for violating the law and reversing the westernization process, notably by failing to implement reforms recommended by the EU. Soon after passing the foreign agents law, the European Commission concluded that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s pro-European path. In response to EU criticism, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced on November 28, 2024, the suspension of EU accession talks until 2028. During this time, the country will also refuse to accept any EU funds, to which Kobakhidze referred to as “alms” and “means of blackmail”. Not only this decision escalated the conflict between Tbilisi and the West, but also led to deepening divisions in domestic political life. After previously mentioned democratically-questionable parliamentary elections in 2024 most of the opposition MPs refused to take their seats, and pro-European president Salome Zourabischvili has not recognized the new Georgian Dream government, considering herself as the sole legitimate representative of power in Georgia. In a statement published on December 10, 2024, the European External Action Service (EEAS) declared: “The people of Georgia are standing up for their democratic and European aspirations, facing brutal and unlawful police violence while exercising their right to freedom of expression. [...] The European Union stands in solidarity with the people of Georgia and their democratic and European aspirations”. Georgia’s drift away from cooperation with the EU is undoubtedly to Russia’s advantage. The Kremlin perceives the Georgian Dream government policies as a chance of restoring its influence in the region. As previously mentioned, Ivanishvili’s business ties to Russia are strong, which rationalises his party’s agenda of normalization of the Tbilisi-Moscow dialogue. Although numerous sanctions have been imposed on Ivanishvili on the grounds of favoring Russia and undermining Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic interest, none of these accusations have been firmly proven.
The society of Georgia has proved its devotion to pro-Western path on numerous occasions - especially the events of the Rose Revolution represented the desire to end with Soviet past and semi-colonial dependencies on Russia. It was an unprecedented event in the territory of the former USSR, that set Georgia on a path of dynamic reforms. Its main fundamentals were bold aspirations to join the multidimensional cooperation with the Western states especially with NATO and the EU.
The 2008 war was the critical moment in Georgian foreign policy. In response to Russian aggression Tbilisi severed diplomatic relations with Moscow. The events of August 2008 led to an acceleration of the EU integration process and a general increase of Western orientation’s importance. This policy found its confirmation in the public opinion. As Caucasus Research Resource Center reports, the support for EU membership in 2009 stood at 79%. Examining the support for EU membership over time one can observe a trend of increase in approval in times of domestic political crises and violations of democratic standards in Georgia. After years of high support rates, a decrease can be noticed in the initial years following Georgian Dream’s rise to power. According to CRRC, in 2015, support dropped as low as 42%. However, it started to significantly rise after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As indicated by the International Republican Institute’s research, the approval of EU membership and pro-European policy peaked at 75% of full support and 14% of moderate support in March 2023, concurrently with the beginning of protests against the foreign agents law and just a few months before acquiring the candidate country status. - In the same research, it was shown that among supporters of joining the EU, 65% would fully maintain their support even if it meant cutting trade relations with Russia. In Annual Survey 2024 conducted by EU NEIGHBOURS East from November 2024, 81% of Georgians declare trust for the European Union - which is more than for any other international institution - and 60% have a positive image of the organisation. This research also indicates that the Georgians are relatively well aware of the functioning of the EU and its activity within the Georgian state. This undoubtedly strong pro-European mood was soon met with previously mentioned critical decision made by the Prime Minister Kobakhidze - halting the accession process on November 28.
Georgian society expressed its opposition to the pro-Russian and anti-EU policies through mass protests. These demonstrations were mostly spontaneous, organized from the grassroots level without significant leadership or initiative from the political opposition. This almost instinctive gesture of Georgian civil society showed that Georgians desire a pro-Western path and a strong Georgia as a part of the genuine structures of the international community, rather than within the Russian sphere of influence. Many of the demonstrations were brutally suppressed, including on the morning of November 29, 2024, when water cannons were used against protesters. Special forces were allegedly reported to have added chemicals to the water, as demonstrators complained of facial and bodily burns. In contrast to the moving civic engagement of the Georgian people, we see a completely disorganized and inactive pro-Western opposition. Following the October 2024 parliamentary elections, opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold initiated a de facto boycott - either by renouncing their seats or declaring the newly elected government illegitimate and refusing to participate in parliament's proceedings. As a result, they deprived themselves of the already almost illusory ability to influence the legislative process in the country - without proposing any further plan of action. The most prominent and engaged politician of pro-Western Georgian opposition remains President Salome Zourabichvili. She was the one to call on the EU after the 2024 parliament elections to step up and defend its values, emphasizing in her address to MEPs the determination and courage of the Georgian people, as well as the peaceful character of the protests, that are meant to bring “the European future back”. Although her presidential term officially ended on December 29, 2024, she refused to leave office, claiming her successor Mikheil Kavelashvili was chosen illegitimately by the Electoral College, with great support of Georgian Dream. In the European Parliament's resolution from February, 2025 was stated, that Salome Zourabchvili is still recognised by the EU as “the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people”. Although her presidential term officially ended on December 29, 2024, she refused to leave office, claiming her successor Mikheil Kavelashvili was chosen illegitimately by the Electoral College, with great support of Georgian Dream. In the European Parliament's resolution from February, 2025 was stated, that Salome Zourabchvili is still recognised by the EU as “the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people”.
prospects of Georgia’s accession
On November 4, 2025 the European Commission’s enlargement reports were published. The document dedicated to Georgia focuses on the fundamentals of the accession process that underpin its candidate status and presents appropriate recommendations, but also condemns Georgia’s shift away from the European aspirations. In November 2024 the Georgian government announced the 2025–2028 foreign policy programme “Only with peace, dignity and prosperity towards Europe”. Although this agenda formally reaffirms the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, Kobakhidze’s administration continues to violate EU standards and does not seek any actual progress in fulfilling Brussel’s recommendations. This programme also presents a noticeable shift in Georgia’s foreign policy priorities, for example by paying special attention to relations with China, emphasizing the “special importance” of this partnership or adapting Russia-alike regulations. This realignment in Georgia’s international strategies poses a relevant threat to the EU’s position in the region, as well as to its reputation as a beneficial partner and an attractive structure of intergovernmental cooperation. As previously mentioned, in November, 2024 Georgia’s EU accession process reached a halt. This decision contrasts with both public pro-EU sentiment and constitutional commitments to pursue full EU integration, which was outlined by the authors of the enlargement report. The Georgian authorities have not reported progress on fulfilling the nine steps outlined by the European Commission, while simultaneously claiming EU integration as a priority and promoting anti-EU rhetoric, to which authors of the report refer to as “Russian-type disinformation”. Institutional structures for EU coordination formally remain in place, including within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament. The report explores a wide variety of issues and areas of state activities, such as public administration, judiciary system, fundamental rights, market economy, sustainable connectivity etc. Of particular concern is - identified by the Commission - repressive environment for Civil Society Organisation, largely caused by the foreign agents law. In addition, many human rights defenders and civil society activists have been increasingly subject to acts of intimidation, threats and physical assaults. The Georgian authorities also effectively abolished civic participation and the system of checks and balances. Political and economic dialogue between the EU and Georgia in the reported period have been mostly halted, for example the Association Council EU-Georgia last met in February 2024, the Association Committee in Trade Configuration in December 2023, and the Association Committee in July 2023. The Parliamentary Association Committee last met in June 2023. EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement, which had accrued to the people of Georgia since 2017, was also partially suspended in January, 2025. This change is particularly significant, as it has a real and direct impact on the citizens of Georgia and is a serious consequence and a clear sign of the cooling of relations between the EU and Georgia. As previously mentioned, when Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced halting of the integration process, he also declared the decision to refuse EU funding until
bilateral funds directly benefiting the Georgian authorities, that included budget support, technical assistance and NIP investments grants. The EU’s support through the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021-2023 totalled 62.75 million euro. The adoption of the 2024 EPF assistance measure 82 has been suspended as a result of the deteriorating situation observed in the country in 2024. As reported in the document, no new EPF assistance was provided to Georgia in 2025. The European Union Ambassador to Georgia, Paweł Herczyński, has referred to the EU enlargement report as “last wake-up call” for Georgia to return to the European path. In the European Commission’s 2025 enlargement report was reminded that in last year’s document, the Commission already warned that unless Georgia addresses key reforms, the Commission would not be in a position to consider opening negotiation talks. The condition of Georgia’s democracy and its devotion to implementing EU’s standards has not improved since, seriously affecting Tbilisi-Brussel dialogue.
The biggest supporters of Georgia’s European integration within the EU’s member states are ones with shared Cold War history - Poland, Lithuania and especially Baltic States. They point out the security aspects of potential Georgian accession, the necessity of distancing the country from Russia’s sphere of influence and deepening cooperation in the Black Sea region. Among the sceptics, such as France or Netherlands, there are justified doubts concerning weaknesses of Georgia’s democracy and the unsatisfactory pace of implementing governance reforms. For the EU, Georgia holds strategic value in various areas. Georgia is central to the Middle Corridor - a transport route that links Europe with Central Asia and China. Another key asset of the Caucasus region is energy diversification. Thereby, Georgia is perceived as a potential energy exporter through the Black Sea Green Energy Corridor. Undoubtedly, Georgia does represent value to the EU. However, in the light of numerous challenges within the Union, potentially more important EU’s foreign policy orientations in the matter of enlargement (for example Moldova) and lack of satisfactory progress in Tbilisi-Brussel relations, the EU’s approach towards Georgia might significantly shift over time to far less welcoming.
It is unclear how to interpret true social moods and political preferences in Georgia these days. As previously mentioned, demonstrations against anti-EU policy and democratic backsliding have reached an unprecedented scale, and continue even a year after 2024 parliamentary elections and adaptation of controversial foreign agents law. The spark of protests was reignited after recent local elections that were held in an atmosphere of opposition’s boycott. Despite active civic protests, the Georgian Dream party continues to secure electoral victories and consolidate power. However, taking into account the quasi-authoritarian political environment, research on support rates or even election results is not reliable. It is partially caused by widespread voter indecision. According to the National Democratic Institute’s report from October-November, 2023, 47% of respondents stated that no political party is particularly “close” to them, 6% chose the “don’t know” option, and 13% refused to answer. As the authors of the report conclude: “Declared support for individual parties is so low that they cannot be taken as a guide to the outcome of future elections”. This atmosphere of electoral stagnation could have been noticed during local elections in October 2025, since the voter turnout was relatively low - just under 41%. Resignation, caused by deteriorating condition of Georgia’s democracy, combined with lack of leadership in pro-western opposition does not prognose a bright future for Georgia’s process of westernization. This contrast raises doubts about the perspectives on Georgia’s future European integration, setting the state somewhere between pro-Russian drift and a dream of EU membership.
The victories of Georgian Dream in 2024 parliament elections and 2025 local elections, alongside with this party’s increasingly authoritarian rule and shift in foreign policy priorities are progressively distancing the country from the prospect of joining the European Union, standing in contradiction to the constitutional obligation of pursuing EU membership. After consolidating its position, Georgian Dream has undertaken specific, democratically–questionable measures to eliminate its political opponents, by setting up a special parliamentary commission for this purpose. The aim is undoubtedly to ban opposition parties, especially the United National Movement. These actions, as they are entirely in conflict with the rule of law, can only lead to even greater deterioration in Georgia’s relations with the EU. As stated by the Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos in April, 2025, although the EU will continue on supporting Georgian people’s European aspirations and their pursuit of democracy, the return to the EU accession path is fully in the hands of the country’s authorities. In the context of future developments, taking into account the political environment in the country, the most concerning would be a sharp decline in trust towards the EU in Georgian society, especially among the youth, as it is their civic attitude that serves as a counterbalance to the government's anti-EU rhetoric. Further erosion of democratic values and constant disregard for EU’s recommendations would eventually lead to Union’s detachment. As a result, Tbilisi would likely strengthen ties with Russia and China, since the significance of these players has already increased in the country. For the EU, it would mean weakening its position in the Caucasus region. In the same way as Turkey, which has held candidate country status for 26 years now, and whose negotiations reached an impasse in 2018, Georgia’s candidacy may soon become purely theoretical.
Having considered abovementioned issues, one can conclude that relations between Tbilisi and Brussels have reached a deadlock. Georgia’s situation leaves no illusions — the only solution for returning to the path of European integration is to resume implementing EU recommendations and adhering to the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law. Foremost, the authorities must seize all the actions undermining the democratic values of political pluralism, with the objective of eliminating the pro-Western opposition and free media. These actions are directly connected with violations of human rights. Immediate steps in this area must be taken including the release of political prisoners and the repeal of controversial foreign agents law. To ensure its legitimate mandate, the Georgian Dream should ensure the presence of external observers during elections, since valid concerns regarding the fairness of the process were raised after previously mentioned local elections in October this year. Taking these measures will, however, only partially restore a fundament of democracy and rule of law. To fully return to the path of European integration, Georgia must start applying EU recommendations more broadly and genuinely align its structures with EU standards. These requirements, stated by the Union include an implementation of a holistic juridical reform, ensuring the institutional independence and impartiality of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy and de-oligarchization. These are just a few of recommendations, whose fulfilment would make it possible for Georgia to eventually become a member of the European Union. There is, however, doubt regarding the government’s genuine will to pursue this membership.
For decades Georgians have been expressing their willingness to integrate with the EU. Now, Georgia’s westernization is dramatically slowing. In the light of the pro-Russian orientation of the ruling party, prospects of returning to a pro-EU path are increasingly doubtful. Without greater involvement from an organized political opposition and international observers, the mass protests sweeping through the streets of Tbilisi may ultimately become just another noble, patriotic, but ultimately ineffective chapter in Georgian modern history. Despite years of swift reforms, progress in integration, and strong public support, Georgia’s chances of joining the European Union in the foreseeable future are minimal.
