Left in The Hallway: EU Enlargement Fatigue and the Western Balkans

1. Introduction

After the seventh enlargement round of the European Union in 2013, which saw the accession of Croatia, not a single country has succeeded in obtaining membership in over a decade. This is the longest period without a new https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Enlargement Fatigue and Balkan country, and remains the last state to ever enter the stakes have risen. The EU's willingness to integrate new and lengthy negotiation process. This declining willingness as the EU Enlargement Fatigue. At the heart of this whom applied for membership more than a decade ago. The and social reality. Taking into use secondary sources and the consequences of the enlargement fatigue in the Western enlargement for the EU amid an increasingly tense promise of accession grows increasingly distant, a political Third-state actors and nationalists have gained a foothold away from EU integration and reinforcing a continuous cycle of revitalising the enlargement process to ensure long-term accession in the EU’s history. Despite concentrated efforts from numerous states, the problem has persisted. This slowdown in political willingness to admit new members has been identified by scholars and policymakers as the European Union's enlargement fatigue. The main countries affected by the fatigue are the six states comprising the region of the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, often referred to as the Western Balkan Six (WB6). Despite promises of progress, the situation has changed only marginally in the span of over a decade. This paper therefore seeks to answer the following question: what are the political, economic and social consequences of the EU enlargement fatigue in the Western Balkans? How does the EU’s inability to grant accession stimulate euroscepticism and democratic backsliding in these countries? And what strategic risk does stagnation in the enlargement process pose for the EU amidst an increasingly tense geopolitical situation? It becomes evident that the enlargement fatigue has weakened incentives for democratic reforms, fuelled euroscepticism across the Balkans, and that the absence of EU pressure has created a vacuum being filled by nationalist rhetoric and authoritarian third-state actors seeking to gain a foothold on the continent. During unstable times, the EU cannot afford turbulence at its borders. The region is placed at the intersection of European, Russian and Chinese strategic competition, and represents a critical challenge to the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor. Full integration of the Western Balkans into the union emerges as the strongest safeguard against regional instability, as it will reduce the risk of conflict spillover by strengthening governance and the rule of law.

2. Background

2.1 Evolution of EU Enlargement At the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, stated that: "Europe's unification will not be complete until the Balkan countries are members of the Union”. This sentiment was later reinforced by current Commission President Ursula von der Leyen with her State of the Union address in 2022; “So I want the people of the Western Balkans to know (...) You are part of our family, your future is in our union, and our union is not complete without you.” Yet, after the accession of Croatia in 2013, not a single country has entered the union. This illustrates that enlargement has shifted from a consensus-driven normative project to a politically sensitive topic. Enlargement was long considered the EU’s most successful foreign-policy tool. From being a smaller collaboration tying the market together in a handful of countries in Western Europe, it expanded drastically, moving into the 21st century. After the final round in 2013, the EU encompasses a total of 27 European countries, from the east to the west, ensuring broad collaboration, governing common economic, social, and security policy. Enlargement has numerous benefits for both entering countries and countries already within the union. According to the EU, the objectives of enlargement are to foster peace and stability, improve quality of life, increase prosperity and opportunity, and to guide, support, and monitor changes. When it is in a country's ambition to integrate into the union, they have an incentive to pass progressive democratic reforms and strengthen the rule of law. The EU benefits from a stronger voice on the global stage, increased opportunities for citizens and businesses in the union, and a guarantee for long-term peace and stability through cooperation. Despite the proven benefit of enlargement, the EU is hesitant to integrate new members. The three-year interval between the fifth and sixth enlargement rounds led many to perceive the pace of EU expansion as too rapid. In particular, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 generated concern in many political circles, as the two states faced serious governance and institutional deficiencies.. In response, the EU established the Cooperation and Verification mechanism to monitor the countries’ progress in judicial and anti-corruption reforms. This mechanism was in action for 15 years before officially closing in 2023, implying that Bulgaria and Romania had many targets to reach before they would be able to conform to the European Union’s standards. The situation amplified the fear of enlargement and reinforced political caution towards future candidates. Another plausible explanation for the standstill is the increasing internal democratic backsliding in the union. European democracy as a whole is in decline, with an increasing number of authoritarian leaders undermining minority rights, the rule of law, and press freedom. After several breaches of EU law and values, the European Parliament was forced to enact Article 7 of the Lisbon treaty against Hungary and Prime Minister Orbn. Before its fall from power, the Polish Law and Justice party's juridical and institutional reform were also perceived as a cautionary case within the EU. The rise of illiberalism within the union served as a warning for the European Union regarding risks of admitting members with unstable political landscapes, high levels of corruption and low levels of institutional resilience, and fuelled the EU’s hesitation regarding granting accession to the WB6. The last major obstacle that has been discussed in relation to the enlargement fatigue is the EU institutions’ capacity to adapt to an ever-expanding union. There are several concerns that have been raised regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of a European Council or Commission with an increasing number of members. What would be the impact on the budget, when the countries that would accede following the enlargement would have a claim to and a need for EU funding? It is collectively understood that significant reform to EU institutions would be needed after a possible accession of the WB6. The answer to what those reforms will look like still has no clear answers. 2.2 Western Balkans in Focus The Western Balkans is a small region in South-Eastern Europe consisting of six countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. The region is characterised by a long history of conflict, tense relations, and political instability, factors that have played a significant role in the stagnation of its accession. Additionally, they constitute some of the least developed economies in Europe. At present, all the countries comprising the Western Balkans have applied for membership as well as opened accession negotiations, with the exception of the latter for Kosovo. The first country to apply was North Macedonia, which submitted its application in 2004 and acquired candidate status the following year. The country has had one of the most challenging trajectories towards EU integration, resulting from bilateral tensions. The start of accession negotiations was blocked for over a decade by Greece, with grounds in a dispute regarding the state's official name, resolved by the 2018 Prespa Agreement. However, the negotiations were further delayed as Bulgaria demanded recognition of Bulgarians as a national minority in North Macedonia. The negotiations officially began in 2022, and the country is currently on a steady path of reforms. Their prolonged stagnation exemplifies how bilateral disputes, in the context of the EU, can produce deep enlargement fatigue. Montenegro and Albania applied for membership in 2008 and 2009, respectively. While Montenegro opened accession negotiations in 2012, and Albania in 2022, they are, according to the 2025 Enlargement Report, the two countries furthest advanced in their accession process. They have maintained a steady pace of democratic and judicial reforms, and the report predicts that Montenegro is on track to achieve membership by the end of 2026 and Albania by the end of 2027. Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its application in 2016 and was granted membership status in 2022. Despite opening accession negotiations in 2024, the country's accession to the EU has, in practice, been paralysed by the political crisis in Republika Srpska. The final official candidate country in the Western Balkans is Serbia, which advanced an application in 2009. While having formally opened negotiations in 2014, there has been a noticeable lack of progress. One of the most pressing obstacles has been the wave of large-scale student-led anti-corruption protests, during which Serbian authorities were widely criticised for excessive use of force against protesters. This has led to massive polarisation, a cornered civil society and widespread distrust in Serbia, as well as raised questions about the country’s commitment to democratic standards. Secondly, Vučić's lean towards Moscow and cooperation with Vladimir Putin has resulted in Serbia not imposing sanctions on Russia in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine; thus, the country is far from aligned with the EU on foreign policy. The last major factor is Serbia's territorial dispute with Kosovo. The latest enlargement report clearly states that the integration of Serbia is heavily dependent on progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and normalisation of relations with its neighbouring state. The last of the Western Balkan countries to seek membership is the Republic of Kosovo. Although it applied for EU membership in 2022, and has upheld unwavering high public support for EU membership, it does not possess official candidate status. This is due to the fact that five of the 27 EU member-states have yet to recognise the country’s independence. The ongoing territorial dispute with Serbia is another important factor hindering its progress, as normalisation of relations and advancement in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue are essential for both Kosovo and Serbia's pathway to the EU. Despite this, Kosovo signed the Stabilisation and Association agreement with the EU in 2016, and is included in the official enlargement reports. 2.3 Key Challenges and External Pressures The room for standstill is shrinking as the geopolitical situation globally grows increasingly tense. Russia's invasion of Ukraine marked a drastic shift, calling on Europe to unite. In 2022, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status to show unity in the face of Russian aggression. In Ukraine's case, it was a token of solidarity. However, the case of Moldova was presumably to enforce the idea that the continent of Europe was united against Russian aggression. Factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war on Ukraine, and the heightened concerns about public opinion on enlargement have, in many ways, stalled the process for all countries seeking membership in the EU. This, in addition to democratic backsliding in the WB6, high prevalence of corruption, and shortcomings in passing all necessary reforms. Lastly, the EU’s lack of success in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue poses a structural brake in the accession of both Kosovo and Serbia. In the absence of full EU integration, foreign powers and nationalist rhetoric have gained a foothold in the Balkans, fuelling euroscepticism and upholding the loop of disillusionment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Public Opinion and Trust in EU-Enlargement The former Director General of the European Commission's General Directorate for External Relations stated in 2006 that “The pace and scale of enlargement is approaching the limit of what public opinion will accept”. The last accession took place in 2013, and since there has been a record-long standstill in enlargement. This aligns with new statistics on public opinion, signifying that four in ten Europeans are sceptical or absolutely opposed to further enlargement of the union. Approximately 40% report concerns about uncontrolled immigration, corruption, organised crime, and terrorism in the case of enlargement, and the only Western Balkan country with a support rate of over 50% in EU member states is Montenegro, barely passing the bar at 51%. Even though the average results show a slight positive inclination towards expansion with 56%, there is still significant opposition and scepticism, as well as protruding concerns about erosion of EU stability and safety. These attitudes construct an environment where EU leaders refrain from speaking too loudly about enlargement, reinforcing institutional ambivalence. Notwithstanding the overall results, the data show significant variation in response depending on the demographic. 70% of people with higher education report that they are overall in favour of enlargement. In contrast, only 40% of persons who ended their education before the age of 15 reply the same. There is a similar pattern amongst those who perceive themselves as well-informed. Respondents who state that they feel informed about enlargement are more likely to be in favour (75%) than those who do not feel adequately informed (49%). Since two-thirds of respondents perceive themselves as inadequately informed, they represent a significant portion of overall scepticism. The results reveal a clear pattern; respondents who have higher education are substantially more positive. In addition, the probability of being in favour of enlargement varies significantly with the age demographic targeted. Age, education level and information level appear as key factors to endorsement of expansion. 3.2 Socioeconomic Aspects Public support for an EU membership in the WB6 remains strong, yet there is an implication of declining faith. From 2016 to 2021, the number of people in favour of EU integration was gradually increasing, from only 39% believing that EU membership would be good for their country in 2016, to 62% in 2021. However, since 2022, it has been steadily declining. Only 54% replied that they believe a membership would contribute to an overall positive impact in 2024. When asked when they think their country would join the EU, 18% replied, “never”, with significant variation throughout the countries. In traditionally EU-positive countries such as Albania and Kosovo, the numbers are comparatively low, with 10% and 3% respectively, while in Serbia, as many as 35% percent replied that they believe their country will never integrate into the EU. The growing belief that EU accession will “never” happen contradicts the merit-based accession methodology and discourages investing in reform, leaving many countries in the Western Balkans with enlargement burnout. One of the pressing concerns regarding the stagnation in EU accession is the threat of brain drain. In the last decade, thousands of workers have left the Western Balkans to pursue economic stability in Western Europe. A Youth study from South-Eastern Europe shows that 61.7% of young people in the Western Balkans have a moderate to very strong desire to leave their country of residence. The lowest number of youth wanting to leave can be found in the country closest to EU membership: Montenegro, with 48.1%, while the highest number is found in North Macedonia: 73.5%. North Macedonia was the first WB6 country to apply for EU membership, but its path to accession has been significantly delayed by veto fatigue, a factor that might be represented in the statistics as a reflection of the EU burnout in the country. The vast majority of youth who report a desire to leave also disclose that the economy is the most pressing factor. As some of the smallest economies in Europe, many of their young citizens look across borders in hope of economic stability. Statistics show that in 2020, more than 1 in 5 people born in the region lived abroad. The brain drain predicates a consequential economic problem for the Western Balkans in the coming years. Additionally, 37% of businesses report that they suspect emigration and loss of skill as the reason why vacancies are not filled. As high-skilled workers leave to create value in different countries, the WB6's prospects of expanding their economies are undermined. In the neighbouring EU country of Croatia, the unemployment rate fell from 17.25% (2013) to 6.1% (2023) in the span of a decade after joining the European Union, while the average unemployment rate in the WB6, at the same time, was around a staggering 11%. The WB6 are a growing consumer base with increasing purchasing power, and the EU is already the region's biggest trading partner, accounting for 62% of the Western Balkans’ exports. Previous enlargement rounds have proved to be effective for the European economy, stimulating growth in GDP per capita for both new and old member states. Since the fifth enlargement in 2004 that granted membership to 10 countries, the EU economy has grown by 27%. The sixth enlargement round ensured that Romania and Bulgaria enjoyed a growth in GDP per capita by 4.6% and 1.6% between 2007 and 2019. Although there is a long road to full membership and total market integration, the opportunities for economic growth are already being utilised through initiatives such as the EU - Western Balkans Investment Forum, further strengthening the argument for economic gain. It is evident that there is a growing tendency in the Western Balkan public to view the EU through an economic lens. In the 2024 Balkan Barometer, 43% of the respondents believe EU membership would have a desirable effect on their economy. In addition, 35% place value on being able to freely work and/or study in the EU, while 82% believe regional cooperation would be economically beneficial. The WB6 contains some of the most challenged economies in Europe, and the desire to move beyond and pursue opportunities for economic growth is seemingly present. 3.3 Internal Dynamics in the WB6 The erosion of EU conditionality weakens incentives to pursue reform, leading to political elites mobilising voters through nationalist rhetoric and EU scepticism. EU-sceptic parties that blame difficulties on Western interference are gaining power and influence across the region, pushing the Western Balkans further away from EU integration. Following the 2024 parliamentary elections in North Macedonia, the Macedonian nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE secured victory by a historical margin. The party has a history of anti-Albanian, pro-Russian and anti-EU sentiments, but has later publicly abandoned the latter two and officially identifies as pro-EU. However, analysts speculate about their commitment to EU integration and highlight their opposition to the Prespa agreement, as the President refused to acknowledge the “North” in North Macedonia when managing internal affairs. The prevalence of such parties brings attention to a larger pattern where political leaders exploit EU indecision to portray themselves as the defender of national dignity, against unreliable and intrusive external forces. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats Party (SNSD), a Serb-nationalist, separatist, and pro-Russian party previously headed by Dodik, won the 2025 snap elections in Republika Srpska. The new president, Siniša Karan, has promised to continue Dodik's policy with “even greater force”. This party’s rhetoric is explicitly anti-EU, argues that integration threatens Serbian autonomy, and accuses the West of meddling in the country's internal affairs. Even though the Serbian government has continued to declare EU membership as a central strategic goal, the process has been halted severely in recent years. In the Serbia 2025 enlargement report, the EU expressed concerns about the failure to deal with disinformation and regarding anti-EU rhetoric from both Serbian media outlets and political officials. 3.4 Third State Actors: Brussels vs Moscow One of the most consequential external actors in the Western Balkans is Russia, whose power is rooted in cultural, religious, and political ties with large parts of the region. The influence of Russian propaganda is increasing in the face of the EU’s lack of action and engagement on the enlargement front, breaching the wall of supposed European unity, and it sends a signal about the importance of full integration. In the course of the WB6’s EU aspirations, the Kremlin has been a firm supporter of anti-EU and anti-NATO political parties across the region. Serbia's bilateral relations with Russia remain strong. Statistics from 2021 report that 95% of Serbs viewed Russia either as an important partner or close ally. Serbia has refused to implement sanctions on Russia in the aftermath of their aggression on Ukraine, and nearly 80% of Serbians oppose said sanctions. According to Russian authorities, Vučić has promised Russia that no Serbian ammunition was to end up in Ukraine. Russians still enjoy visa-free travel to Serbia, and are in many cases granted Serbian citizenship, posing a significant security threat to the EU, as Serbian passport holders can travel freely into the EU. The country's free trade agreement with China reveals underlying risks of its strategic alignment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia has acted as a steady supporter for separatist movements in Republika Srpska. The former president of the autonomous region, Milorad Dodik, was known for openly flaunting his ties to Moscow, advocating for Russian interests and is one of the Kremlin's best-known allies on the continent Although Russian influence in the remaining Balkan countries is declining as they turn more firmly to the West, there have still been instances of Russian interference and influence. Russia was strongly opposed to the Prespa Agreement that made substantial advancements in Macedonia's accession to the EU, and was accused by both Athens and Skopje of meddling in internal affairs. In Montenegro, Moscow has significant influence through the Orthodox Serbian Patriarchate, largely due to a significant Serbian minority population. In addition, Russian direct investments in Montenegro contributed to a substantial share of the country's GDP for many years, as much as 30% in 2016. Also in Kosovo, we see Kosovar Serb politicians and parties following Belgrade's line, which tends to align with Moscow. Furthermore, Russia is not the only country with growing influence in the Western Balkans. For China, the region is a convenient gateway to the EU, and Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region has been increasing by a notable margin in recent years. Chinese companies have invested in a variety of projects such as railways, highways, and airports through the Belt and Road Initiative. Other actors, such as the UAE and Turkey, have also attempted to get a foothold in the region. The UAE has signed investment deals in areas such as defence, agriculture and aviation with Serbia. UAE-based companies have invested billions in development projects in the country, a notable example of their process being the Belgrade Waterfront project, which has been subject to harsh criticism regarding corruption and an opaque process. Moreover, Turkey has sustained cultural and historical ties with the Western Balkans, exercising great soft power in the region, as well as investing greatly in infrastructure, especially in Muslim majority countries such as Bosnia and Albania.

4. Discussion of Findings

4.1 Declining Faith and Strategic Drift Toward Third-State Actors At the time being, the situation in the Western Balkans follows a pattern of self-reinforcing stagnation. The EU’s credibility is diminishing due to a lack of engagement and the persistent redefinition of accession benchmarks, which reinforces a declining trust in achieving EU membership among citizens in the WB6. When the citizens lose hope in EU integration, the sentiment of betrayal poses a risk of people turning away from the West and towards powers that do not align with Western interests, such as BRICS countries. In response, when people turn to other actors, the EU draws back, reinforcing the loop of disillusionment. In Republika Srpska, Dodik and the SNSD have successfully pushed the narrative that the EU favours Sarajevo over Banja Luka, and that EU integration would mean the end of aspirations for an independent Republika Srpska. By stirring nationalist and separatist sentiments, SNSD has managed to steer the entity of Republika Srpska further away from the EU, into Moscow's orbit. The result has been a deepening euroscepticism that jeopardises Bosnia and Herzegovina's reform and EU integration agenda on a federal level. In contrast to the anti-government protests in Georgia, there are few EU symbols to be found in the Serbian protests. In Serbia, the young and the students have for decades stood in the frontline against anti-democratic forces and looked to the EU for support and action. However, this had turned out to be unsuccessful time after time. The EU’s focus on normalisation of relations has led it to work with the Vučić administration in the hope of ensuring stability in the Balkans. However, this requires making important trade-offs. In the context of the anti-government protests in 2025, Serbian students were fighting for primarily European values and for progress in democratisation, but witnessed a hesitant and reluctant EU that failed to provide support, as its priorities were tied to the stability project. For many young Serbians, this fuelled the scepticism regarding the EU’s priorities in Serbia and its role as a normative actor. These sentiments are a substantial threat to the EU’s objectives with regard to enlargement, as well as its strategic interests. The findings reveal a broader mechanism where declining trust in the EU weakens conditionality, and instead powers domestic actors that benefit from the EU’s absence. When the EU fails to uphold a credible pathway to membership, the WB6 pays the costs. This is evident in the turn to actors aligned with alternative geopolitical centres, and the rise of nationalist and EU-friendly parties, often at the expense of EU-favouring, moderate coalitions. The increasing distrust therefore directly contributes to the reshaping of geopolitical orientation. Actors such as Russia and China exploit the EU’s ambiguity to gain a foothold and influence in the region, thereby undermining the EU’s direction. The structural vacuum allows these countries to insert influence at low cost, but high in effect.

Gaining a foothold in the Western Balkans would provide a gateway to the heart of Europe and completely discredit the EU’s strategic cohesion by creating an increasingly divided Europe. 4.2 Missed opportunities for economic growth As an increasing number of WB6 citizens rely on economic support from relatives in the Schengen Area, incentives for education and employment decline. High frequency of migration of skilled workers drains the region of resources and hinders the advancement of the region's productive capacity, effectively preventing sustainable economic growth. The large employment gap between neighbouring country Croatia and the WB6 demonstrates the economic opportunity cost of the enlargement fatigue and the importance of reviving the process. The economies in the WB6 require investment and growth. A Western Balkans expansion can contribute to bridging Europe's productivity gap with the global average. By opening up new markets and expanding the reach of existing EU businesses, it could be a significant expansion of depth and scale to the EU market. 4.3 Institutional Rigidity as a Cause of Stagnation Some scholars argue that when enlargement shifted from being an absolute necessity after the fifth enlargement round, to a context marked by reduced consensus, public opinion became a focal point, as EU politicians feared decreasing acceptance of future enlargements. The sixth and seventh enlargement rounds, resulting in the inclusion of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, sparked tension in Brussels. In many ways, the Union was importing struggle, corruption and weak economies that, by many, were considered not ready for accession. This intensified doubts regarding the accession process and shifted the structure from cohesive to vacillating and unreliable for member countries. The political landscape in the Western Balkans is being remodelled by the EU’s declining credibility. Even countries that are determined to agree on significant compromises, such as North Macedonia, have seen limited to no progress in their accession. The promise of progress after the name change was soon broken as Bulgaria used their veto to reprimand a bilateral issue, further damaging the EU’s credibility on enlargement by showcasing that the goalposts are constantly subject to change. This severely weakens the incentive and consensus to drive democratic institutional reform and pushes the Western Balkans further away from the European community. 4.4 What Does the Fatigue Mean for the EU’s Role The geopolitical tensions have escalated globally in recent years, and the EU has been put in a position of great importance. European cooperation and cohesion are becoming increasingly important in the face of a multipolar world order, where anti-democratic and authoritarian actors seek to gain a foothold in Europe. A failure to integrate such an important and vulnerable region erodes the EU’s role as a normative global actor.

5. Policy Recommendations

5.1 Recognition of Kosovo as a State and Candidate Country To ensure full integration of the WB6, it is a pending matter to grant Kosovo candidate status. In order for Kosovo to truly be considered as a candidate to the European Union, it needs to be recognised as an independent state by all EU member states. It is imperative that the EU takes an active role, calling upon Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Spain, and Slovakia to move forward in recognising the State of Kosovo as legitimate, and further move swiftly to grant Kosovo candidate status. It should also improve the process regarding the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia, underlining that normalisation is a precondition for accession to the EU. 5.2 Public Education about Enlargement Statistics from the Eurobarometer reveal alarming findings about public knowledge on EU enlargement. A gap of 26% between the attitudes of those who feel adequately informed and those who do not carry a heavy implication that much of the resistance is rooted in lack of knowledge, and indicates many people, if provided with the right information, would view enlargement differently. There needs to be transparency and civic awareness regarding enlargement policy and strategy, with a focus on the empirical evidence available from previous enlargement rounds. The positive effects of enlargement are not “common knowledge” for the majority of people and need to be emphasised through the EU’s resources, media and public communication to ensure the public can make educated decisions about their alignment. 5.3 Institutional Reform Unanimous voting has proven to be a severe paralysing factor for the enlargement process. Small-scale bilateral disputes that do not affect the overall performance of countries in implementing EU jurisdiction and values have stagnated the process for certain countries in the span of decades, such as with North Macedonia. The current system is insufficient, as it grants individual member states excessive powers and weakens the credibility of the enlargement process. It is necessary to change the voting criteria and implement qualified majority voting as the standard, to counteract the gridlock and undermine the influence of countries acting according to national interest.

In addition, the newest enlargement methodology emphasises giving a bigger role to the member states in correcting and monitoring the accession process, allowing them to contribute more systematically. However, it fails to give the European Parliament, the only democratically elected organ in the European Union, a definitive role, thus weakening the democratic legitimacy of EU enlargement. The enlargement process needs to be recalibrated by integrating a consequential role for the European Parliament, which is currently sidelined. Members of the European Parliament are democratically elected and can be held accountable more easily for situations like stagnation than other EU institutions. Single states having taken a larger part in the process pose the risk of national interest overshadowing the common interests of the European Union, as seen with Greece's and Bulgaria's veto on North Macedonia. Member state interference needs to be limited through strong independent oversight mechanisms and procedural safeguards. 5.4 Regional Cooperation The WB6, in the context of EU membership, are not solely individual states, but need to be viewed as an interconnected region. They have a complex history of ethno-religious conflict and border disputes, resulting in major unresolved post-conflict issues. Due to their physical proximity, the stability of the Western Balkans states, security, and economic integration are interconnected and need to be approached as such. There is a need for a significant acceleration of regional cooperation, as encouraged in the stabilisation and association agreements that the WB6 have made with the EU. This includes the serious enhancement of the speed of building cross-border infrastructure, such as railways, highways, shared water management infrastructure, electricity interconnectors, and the rollout of cross-border 5G networks. Good neighbourly relations have been laid out as a criterion for accession, in which the WB6 have considerable room for improvement. The EU does not want to import bilateral conflict, and as all the countries aspire to EU membership, they need to demonstrate the will to exercise coordinated reform and apply EU rules coherently. The perceived and practical risk of conflicts and disputes decreases significantly with regional cooperation, making the countries more interconnected and interdependent. This is demonstrated through processes such as the Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece, as well as the importance of the ongoing Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. 5.5 EU - WB6 Communication Strategy The rise of disinformation and eurosceptic rhetoric plays a significant role in shaping public opinion in the Balkans. This weakens the stance of EU-friendly parties and paves the way for the anti-Western narratives of nationalistic and EU-sceptic powers to gain and exercise power. It is crucial to implement an EU communication strategy targeting the WB6 on the path to enlargement. There is a need to provide transparency on the EU accession process, counter disinformation, and present tangible benefits of EU accession to the public. A communication strategy has the potential to be the first step in rebuilding trust and support among the population in the WB6. Acknowledgments A big thanks to my good friend Aleksandar Svetoslav Koychev for assisting me in developing ideas, editing, and providing meaningful feedback.