Myanmar's Civil War: ASEAN's Institutional Paralysis and Inability to Protect

1. Introduction

On February 1st, 2021, Myanmar saw its newly democratically elected government removed by a military coup. Conducted by the official military branch of Myanmar, namely the Tatmadaw, which had been holding onto power since 1990, this coup deeply changed and https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Institutional Protect off Myanmar’s civil war, which has escalated into one of In the midst of widespread atrocities, mass displacement, international response has been marked by limited action Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its ongoing civil war. This article highlights that ASEAN’s framework: non-interference, consensus-based quiet diplomacy. These principles, and most notably region’s stability, but have instead obstructed collective action diverging national interests further exacerbate inaction, with or resisting stronger measures crafted to halt Myanmar’s civil and political incentives, this article argues that ASEAN’s institutional framework fostering inaction. The findings the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, the of qualified majority voting, further formalisation of between national and regional interests, to better align Responsibility to Protect, institutional reform affected Myanmar and its neighbours, the former diving into an ongoing civil war. Currently, more than 6,000 civilians have been killed by the military alone, and 52,750 were killed overall between January 2021 and May 2024. Over 3.5 million people have been displaced, nearly 20 million civilians are in need of humanitarian assistance, and mass human rights abuses were reported. It is estimated that over 2,600 non-state armed groups have been created in Myanmar since the coup in 2021, the largest amongst them being the People’s Defense Force (PDF), the armed-wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), a coalition created by ousted government members, with the stated goal of “extinguishing military dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic union”. In 2024, it was estimated that the PDF counted in its ranks 65,000 volunteers across the country, with 20 percent equipped with military grade weapons, and 40 percent with homemade weapons. Despite the NUG’s and the PDF’s coordinated efforts with several ethnic armed groups, the military upkeeps its technological advantage thanks to its receiving of military aid from Russia and China, who have supported the junta due to economic interests, as Myanmar contains important resources such as minerals, oil, gas, provides a deep-sea port access, and is a supporter of Belt Road Initiative infrastructures. In this picture of systematic violence, undemocratic power grab, and humanitarian threat, the international community’s response to this drastic and alarming situation has been limited and insufficient to address the scale of the crisis. On one hand, the UN Security Council (UNSC) called for an arms embargo on Myanmar, but only a nonbinding resolution was passed in the General Assembly, with 119 member states voting in favour and 36 abstentions, including Russia and China. Russia, China, India, Singapore, Thailand, and Israel continue to have arms deals with Myanmar’s military. Regionally, ASEAN has attempted to respond by developing the “Five Points Consensus” in collaboration with Myanmar’s military leader, a framework which highlights five points aimed at facilitating a peaceful resolution. However, this plan was never implemented in any meaningful capacity and remained largely symbolic. This lack of concrete actions by the international community raises serious questions regarding its functioning and calls for a necessary analysis of institutional constraints and underlying political motivations. While this research briefly mentions the institutional issues encountered at the UNSC, it will mainly focus on the institutional blocks and diverging interests within ASEAN. The discussion above thus culminates in the central question this study aims to address: How do institutional blocks and internal fragmentation within ASEAN foster inaction regarding Myanmar's civil war? This paper argues that the international community’s failure to respond to Myanmar’s civil war is primarily the result of institutional frameworks blocking action-taking and political fragmentation between members, which perpetuates inaction in the face of blatant human rights violations and democratic backsliding. In response to this pressing institutional issue, this paper calls for the reform of international governmental organisations’ (IGO) frameworks, and more specifically ASEAN’s.

2. Background

To effectively understand the political landscape of Myanmar, it is crucial to look back at its history and observe what has shaped the country, culminating in the military coup on February 1st, 2021. From 1824 to 1948, Myanmar, formally known as Burma, found itself under British colonial rule, an era which deeply impacted Burmese society’s inner workings and political agenda. The main reason behind this long-lasting impact of British colonial rule lies in their creation of ethnic classifications which did not exist beforehand, thus formally dividing the population into separate ethnic groups However, this classification lacked factual grounding, using language and territory as criterion of ethnic belonging, ultimately leading to inconsistent classification, with, for instance, the ethnic designation “Kachin”, which regrouped individuals who were not linguistically, ethnically, or racially related.

In total, eight official ethnic classifications were created and persist to this day: Bamar – the ethnic majority who represented 68% of the population in 2016 – Chin (2.5%), Kachin (1.5%), Karen (7%), Kayah (1.83%), Mon (2%), Rakhine (4%), and Shan (9%). Within these eight official ethnicities lie religious differences, with Theravada Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism all being a part of the Burmese population. In addition to creating nonexistent ethnic classifications, the British also granted preferential treatment to certain ethnicities, fueling tensions between the groups that still persist to this day and remain a focus point in political activities in the country. It is in this unstable and tense context that Myanmar gained its independence from Great Britain on January 4th, 1948. This opened the door to years of political turmoil, with the first military coup in 1962, establishing a military controlled one-party system, namely the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). In 1988, a wave of intense anti-government protests took over the country and was met with violent suppression from the military government. In the midst of this nationwide political crisis, a new military body, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), succeeded in ousting the BSPP government and taking its place. Only two years later in 1990, the first multiparty elections were held in 30 years, with the historical opposition of the BSPP, the National League for Democracy (NLD), winning by a landslide. However, the military junta SLORC, previously in power, refused to let the NLD gain full control of the government and attempted to grasp onto its political power. In 1997, SLORC renamed itself as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and enshrined military rule in the 2008 Burmese constitution. Additionally, the SPDC managed to gain strategic power over various ministries and 25% of parliamentary seats, effectively granting it veto power in the lower house. In 2010, new parliamentary elections were held; however, prior to the elections, the SPDC managed to pass election reforms, invalidating the results of the 1990 elections, and forbidding individuals serving a prison sentence or those married to a foreigner to run for office. This officially disqualified Aung San Suu Kyi – the NLD leader running for president – as she had been married to a British citizen and under house arrest since 1989 for her pro-democracy activism and stark opposition to military rule. As a result of the SPDC’s contestation of the NLD’s 1990 victory and Aung San Suu Kyi’s disqualification, the NLD boycotted the 2010 elections. In this politically fragmented context, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won in 2010. Five years later, in 2015, parliamentary elections were newly held, with the NLD being part of the political race. Due to the aforementioned election laws of 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi could only be the unofficial leader of the party, but eventually became the de facto head of government as State Counsellor after the NLD’s victory. Despite this victory, the NLD was forced to enter a power sharing agreement with the military, the former forming the government and the latter retaining control over strategic areas, such as security policy and certain executive ministries. The political agenda of this new administration was clear: stopping insurgencies throughout the country. This priority manifested itself through systematic violence against Myanmar’s Muslim populations, the Rohingya ethnic minority, which worsened after the Rohingya militant attacks of October 2016 and August 2017. The Burmese military violently repressed the militants, leading to around 6,700 deaths only between August and September 2017, and causing 700,000 people to flee to Bangladesh. This widespread and systematic violence attracted international backlash against the NLD government, with the UN Human Rights Commissioner coining the situation in the region as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”. It is in this widespread context of deep-rooted ethnic tensions, political backlash, and international condemnation that the 2020 elections took place, where the NLD won for the second time in a row. However, the military categorically contested the results and on February 1st, 2021, the military junta carried out a coup, seized power, and the leader of the military, General Min Aung Hlaing, declared a one-year state of emergency. Protests immediately erupted throughout the country and were met with violent repression from the military junta, which imposed curfews to quell popular movements. Additionally, political opponents were imprisoned, including high-profile individuals such as Aung San Suu Kyi, plunging Myanmar into a civil war. Rapidly, anti-government coalitions – both armed and unarmed – emerged, with the most notable being the PDF, the armed branch of the exiled government, the NUG. Between January 2021 and May 2024, it is estimated that 52,750 people were killed in the Burmese civil war, over 3.5 million people have been displaced, nearly 20 million civilians are in need of humanitarian assistance, and severe human rights abuses have been reported, such as unlawful attacks, torture, arbitrary arrests, and unfair trials. In response to the extremely alarming conflict, Western states have unilaterally condemned the military coup and ongoing human rights abuses. For instance, the US imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar and New Zealand suspended high-level contracts with the country. Nonetheless, these states also struggle to take meaningful multilateral action with major IGOs such as the UN, which has only been able to pass a non-binding resolution urging the end of violence in Myanmar and the release of arbitrarily detained prisoners. Regionally, ASEAN has taken an even further cautious approach, “encouraging the pursuance of dialogue”, while members display a clear fragmentation regarding the situation, with Thailand referring to it as “internal affairs”, and the Philippines as “an internal matter that we will not meddle with”. As of today, the strongest action taken by ASEAN on the matter has been the development of the “Five Points Consensus” in collaboration with Myanmar’s military leader, which outlines five points aimed at facilitating a peaceful resolution, which include an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties. However, this plan was never successfully implemented – which ASEAN members have recognised themselves – raising serious questions regarding ASEAN’s political weight in the region, or lack thereof.

3. Analysis and Discussion of Findings

This underwhelming reaction from ASEAN and its members indicates a lack of cohesion within the coalition and reflects a troubling reality for humanitarian concerns. ASEAN’s decision to refrain from intervening in any form in Myanmar’s civil war especially comes as a surprise when Article 1.8 of its Charter states the following as one of its core purposes: “To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges.”. One would also assume a pressing need for the regional IGO to remedy the conflict, as members such as Thailand and Malaysia have respectively received 138,200 and 189,700 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar. This important influx represents considerable pressure for countries that may not have the economic means and social services required to welcome such large numbers of people. Despite this acute matter, ASEAN remains passive and has not taken effective action to put an end to Myanmar’s civil war. To fix this institutional issue within ASEAN through internal reforms or external actors, one must understand where this lack of cooperation and initiative stems from. Two main reasons can be pointed out: the principle of non-interference and members’ diverging national interests. The principle of non-interference between member states has been the pillar of ASEAN since its creation in 1967 and the reason given for the success of nations’ internal building in previous decades. This principle implies that member states shall refrain from interfering in the internal political, security, and social affairs of one another. However, this principle enshrined in international law poses a significant problem within ASEAN, due to its application through the “ASEAN Way”, a diplomatic approach based on four principles: quiet diplomacy, non-use of force, decision making through consensus, and non-interference. The principle of quiet diplomacy signifies that members act mostly privately to avoid public backlash and criticism, which in turn manifests itself into a lack of public condemnation and minimised pressure on neighbouring states. In the case of Myanmar, despite mass killings, airstrikes on civilians, and a large-scale humanitarian crisis, ASEAN still often avoids directly naming the military junta publicly, and perseveres with the use of extremely vague language when addressing the situation. For instance, the ASEAN expressed “deep concern over the conflict and dire humanitarian situation in the country” and “denounced the continued acts of violence in Myanmar against civilians, public facilities, and civilian infrastructure”, without ever citing the Tatmadaw as the main perpetrator, or even mentioning the coup. In addition to the private nature of state interactions, ASEAN places an emphasis on informality, with reliance on personal relationships between leaders, few binding agreements, voluntary commitments, thus advocating a minimal bureaucracy. This signifies that agreements and commitments between members are only very rarely enforced and remain unmonitored, a political atmosphere where states feel no obligation – moral, legal, or institutional – beyond their national interests to take meaningful action, even when the victim is not only a neighbour, but a political ally. This lack of legal enforcement is observable with the aforementioned Five Point Consensus, a non-binding agreement relying on Myanmar’s military junta’s good faith and compliance for its implementation. Furthermore, consensus-based decision-making essentially translates into veto power for all members, which prevents power imbalances in decision-making but also allows every state – including ones under military rule or authoritarian regimes – to stop stronger measures from passing. Regarding Myanmar, there is a clear pattern regarding which ASEAN states have been willing to attempt increasing the strengths of measures, highlighting the political division between members. Furtherdemocratically-developed states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have all called for a change in approach regarding Myanmar, with Indonesia and the Philippines advocating for a strong implementation and a new approach of the Five-Point Consensus, and Malaysia publicly defining the actions of the military junta as “atrocities”. Singapore, despite being a de facto one-party state, is part of a broader trend of maritime states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, that support the prospect of further isolating the Tatmadaw. On the other hand, ASEAN members such as Thailand, whose political system is heavily influenced by its military, Laos, a one-party system with harsh restrictions on civil liberties, and Cambodia, which displays a de facto one-party system, have all been extremely cautious regarding Myanmar’s civil war, continually engaged with the junta, and resisted stronger measures proposed by other members. This internal division, combined with the “ASEAN Way” and most notably the principle of non-interference, has left ASEAN as a passive spectator of Myanmar’s civil war and humanitarian crisis, despite the volition of a few members to communicate a firmer stance and take stronger actions.

4. Policy Recommendations

4.1 The Responsibility to Protect To remedy this deep-rooted institutional issue allowing the ongoing atrocities in the region, ASEAN must reform its framework if it wants to place itself as an impactful player in the international arena. While non-interference is one of the pillars of international law, this principle does not equate to complete inaction in the face of mass atrocity, hence why ASEAN should adopt the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. This norm adopted by the UN in 2005, seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Since the beginning of Myanmar’s civil war in 2021, widespread and systematic attacks amounting to crimes against humanity such as extrajudicial killings, mass arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and persecution of political opponents and civilians have been documented. The military has also repeatedly used airstrikes and carried out attacks in populated areas such as civilian buildings, schools, and religious buildings, which have been denounced by multiple NGOs as war crimes that must be investigated as such. These atrocities continue to take place while an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity against the Rohingya Muslim minority has been issued against Senior General Aung Hlaing, head of the Myanmar military regime, by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2024. If ASEAN were to follow R2P, the documentation of such crimes and the arrest warrant of the head of Myanmar’s military regime would allow the organisation to take action and deploy all necessary tools and means to protect human rights and democracy, two elements cited as core purposes in ASEAN’s Charter. This legal context appears increasingly pressing for Myanmar and ASEAN’s decisions as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled in 2022 its jurisdiction to hear the Gambia v. Myanmar case, which was brought by the former to the ICJ, accusing the ladder of failing to fulfill its obligation to prevent and punish acts of genocide against the Rohingya Muslim minority. When ruling its jurisdiction, the ICJ required Myanmar to take measures to prevent genocide and preserve evidence related to the case. In this context, where the ICJ is investigating an ASEAN member state for genocide and crimes against humanity while war crimes are actively being documented, ASEAN has the duty to adopt the R2P doctrine and deploy all necessary means to stop atrocities. This includes but is not limited to: economic sanctions, arms embargo, public statements explicitly mentioning the junta, funding and training of armed and unarmed democratic groups, entering diplomatic talks with states funding the Tatmadaw, etc. As an IGO championing regional peace, security, stability, and democracy among its core purposes, it is clear that its current functioning through the ASEAN Way falls short of meeting the stated goals. By adopting the R2P doctrine, ASEAN will stand a better chance of fulfilling its stated purposes and protecting regional interests. 4.2 The implementation of R2P, a reform dependent on voting rights and ASEAN’s voting system When discussing potential institutional reforms, the question of implementation is addressed with far more difficulty than its normative dimension. Regarding the implementation of R2P in ASEAN, an obvious deadlock appears, as Myanmar and the military junta at its head would under no circumstance agree to such a measure to be implemented, as it implies an imminent intervention against the junta. With Myanmar’s agreement missing, the institutional reform could not be adopted, due to ASEAN’s consensus-based decision making model. However, ASEAN has been excluding Myanmar’s military government from assisting to high-level meetings and only accepts non-political representatives to be present, a clear rejection of the exercise of political power by the junta. In practical terms, this means that without political power, new laws and measures could be passed without the Burmese government’s consent. However, directly proposing the R2P as a new measure would have an incredibly low chance of success due to the important implications of this doctrine and the aforementioned differing interests of member states. Accordingly, an initial institutional adjustment may be warranted, namely, formally suspending Myanmar’s voting rights, which would mark the beginning of ASEAN’s institutional reform. When proposed, this suspension could not be justified by the authoritarian nature of Myanmar’s regime but by certain actions it has undertaken during the last four years. Using authoritarianism as a justification for the suspension of voting rights would undoubtedly push away authoritarian-leaning ASEAN states from voting in favour, as they would want to protect domestic power and regional voting rights. Therefore, the gravity of the atrocity crimes committed by the Tatmadaw shall be used to justify the suspension of Myanmar’s voting rights. This includes but is not limited to: mass killings, airstrikes on civilians, and genocide. Limiting the grounds for suspension to atrocity crimes increases the likelihood that states will support this measure by reducing the perceived risk that authoritarian governments might themselves face suspension in the future – particularly compared to broader justifications such as an “anti-democratic seizing of power”. However, even if the suspension of Myanmar’s voting rights were to be adopted, certain ASEAN countries may still view the R2P doctrine as a form of interference in the internal affairs of a member state. This impossibility to come to an agreement on such pressing topics highlights the necessity for a broader voting system reform for the ASEAN to fulfill its stated goals. While consensus-based decision-making is viable when used for less contentious matters such as economic agreements, it has failed to effectively address urgent and sensitive issues, such as Myanmar’s civil war and humanitarian crisis. The failure of the implementation of the Five Point Consensus due to its non-binding nature and lack of enforcement mechanisms embodies the inadequacies of consensus to solve armed conflicts and large-scale human rights violations. In order to solve this deep-rooted issue, consensus-based decision-making must be replaced by qualified majority voting for decisions relating to topics such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, and crimes against humanity. As to not completely disrupt and change ASEAN’s values, consensus-based decision-making could be kept for routine and uncontentious matters. By implementing qualified majority voting and momentarily suspending Myanmar’s voting rights, ASEAN would unequivocally move towards an institutional framework facilitating the implementation of the R2P, where intervention in Myanmar would be further feasible. 4.3 Quiet diplomacy, a barrier to effective decision-making While the R2P and qualified majority voting would enhance ASEAN’s ability to intervene, other facets of the ASEAN Way must be reassessed such as the informal nature of meetings and quiet diplomacy. Keeping cultural differences in mind when drafting institutional reforms is crucial, however, it can be argued that certain adjustments shall be made in the interest of efficiency while respecting cultural norms and customs. Culturally, the concepts of quiet diplomacy and private informal meetings stem from the desire to avoid publicly humiliating another party and vice versa. However, this approach displays many flaws efficiency-wise, and fosters inaction in the region. While informal meetings could be maintained regarding further procedural and routine matters – allowing leaders to express themselves freely outside of the public eye – pressing issues such as Myanmar’s civil war shall be formalised and publicly communicated on. This would not only be done in a matter of transparency, but also as a means to showcase the gravity with which the situation is being taken and analysed by ASEAN. Moreover, the ASEAN lists the “upholding of the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States” as a foundational principle. Therefore, the selective application of quiet diplomacy, a reform of the voting system, and the adoption of the R2P doctrine would allow it to better fulfill this duty and self-defined principle. Lastly, it must be acknowledged that the implementation of the R2P doctrine would entail the punctual priming of regional interests over national ones, as they may not always align, especially in such contentious settings. Choosing to protect the region and its inhabitants implies that states such as Thailand or Cambodia will have to concede their national interests of protecting anti-democratic states in favour of regional stability and the protection of human rights. In the long-term, the adoption of R2P may also pressure authoritarian ASEAN governments and military groups to not follow the tracks of Myanmar and remain cautious when making decisions that could be interpreted as sufficient to trigger the doctrine.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, Myanmar’s descent into civil war and humanitarian crisis exposes ASEAN’s profound institutional limitations when confronted with mass atrocities and democratic collapse. Despite the clear need for collective action, ASEAN has remained largely ineffective, constrained by quiet diplomacy, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, and most notably, non-interference. These principles have produced paralysis amongst members, allowing them to act in accordance with strategic and authoritarian sympathies to override regional responsibilities, an observable reality through the cases of Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. Interactions between a flawed institutional framework and political self-interest has resulted in an environment in which even the most egregious crimes fail to generate an appropriate response. This paper argues that ASEAN’s inaction is not a coincidence, but rather the predictable outcome of its institutional framework. Addressing Myanmar’s civil war and humanitarian crisis – and preventing future failures – calls for a reform within the regional organisation. Adopting the R2P doctrine, suspending Myanmar’s voting rights, introducing qualified majority voting, increasing formal meetings, and recalibrating the balance between national and regional interests are necessary changes if ASEAN wants to become a powerful actor capable of confronting crises in its own region. Ultimately, Myanmar’s civil war is not only a test of regional stability and cohesion, but a reflection of institutional flaws and the urgent need for reform. Only through such reforms can ASEAN effectively uphold the very principles it claims to champion and protect, and meaningfully contribute to the ending of the ongoing suffering in Myanmar. List of Figure Figure 1: Political violence in Myanmar, page 5.