The Dual Erosion: Press Freedom and Civic Space in Democratic Backsliding

Defining the scope of analysis

The perception that democracies worldwide are experiencing backsliding is now ubiquitous among laypersons and scholars alike. Evidence supporting this view emerges daily, painting an increasingly grim picture.

Claims of a large-scale wave of democratic backsliding rest on empirical observations of relatively small changes in key indicators. However, “minor differences even in a few countries can translate to consequential differences in the lives of billions of people.”^[1]

Diagnosing backsliding is often only possibleonce the point of no return has been surpassed. Its symptoms are rarely sufficient on their own, and only acquire conclusive significance when they all manifest.

Today, an additional challenge is the absence of a distinct point of rupture, that marks a “before” and “after” in the history of these democracies. Instead, attacks are carried out against the fundamental principles that characterize democracies (such as free and fair elections, freedom of speech and assembly, and due process), making it harder for the underlying patterns to stick out. This is how the erosion of democracies at the hands of the few goes unnoticed by most.

Vigilance is essential,and contemporary society can boast an unprecedented array of tools to successfully counter this threat.

Any attempt at defining democratic backsliding, without taking the time to define democracy first, is futile.

Aristotle was one of the first to offer a systemic view of democracy as the rule by the people, as opposed to control by the few.

Then came Rousseau, whose analysis of direct democracy ultimately led him to conclude that “true democracy tends to destabilize into anarchy, it is an unsuitable form of government for human beings.”^[2] John Stuart Mill considered that “democracy forces decision-makers to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy.”^[3] These early definitions are still relevant today, especially when read as mutually-reinforcing, complementary components of a broader definition: none is exhaustive when read individually.

In fact, no matter how nuanced, no definition has ever been deemed a generally accepted definition for democracy as a notion and a form of government.

While this remains true, it is necessary to outline a tentative, context-specific definition for this article, namely, one that treats changes in press freedom not merely as consequences of democratic backsliding but as catalysts in their own right.

James Druckman considers that, among all the possible propositions, the most fitting for our purposes is the one advanced by Robert Dahl in 1971, which characterizes pure democracy as an unattainable ideal.^[4]

Dahl suggests that, since direct democracy is not achievable, the closest empirical representation we can observe is “polyarchy”, which is “not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities.”^[5]

The most important features in Dahl’s definition of democracy are participation and contestation. Contestation refers to the extent to which a given political system enables citizens to form (political) preferences without undue interference, which they may share freely with peers. They may also have said preferences taken into consideration by powerholders. On the other hand, participation refers to how much of the population is eligible to participate in the political process as previously described.^[6]

Having identified a conceptualization for democracy for the purposes of the analysis, democratic backsliding can now be defined.

Democratic backsliding can be described as the “hollowing out of democratic institutions, processes, practices, and/or norms.”^[7] Thus, for democratic backsliding to occur, there must be a democracy. This is not an irrelevant consideration, obvious though it may seem.

There are contrasting opinions as to whether democratic backsliding is truly occurring, on a global scale, to the extent scholars allege it is occurring: some argue that findings are biased due to the reliance on context-specific measures and data that cannot truly explain systemic changes on a global scale, thereby over- or underestimating the actual significance of observed changes.^[8]

Despite the scholarly disagreement, recent years have seen concerns about even long-standing democracies, with the United States as a striking example.^[9]

The main criticism is that claims of backsliding are hard to verify because the criteria used are subjective and prone to bias.^[10]

The difficulty in identifying a single authoritative definition of democracy further complicates the analysis of its erosion: doubts range from whether one should consider a thick or thin definition of democracy to which are the characteristics that an appropriate sample should display for any findings to be relevant.^[11]

Data analysis

A data-driven approach is likely to offer the most rigorous analysis to address our query, though it is self-evident that if the data, too, is biased the resulting inferenceswill be inaccurate in the same way as conjectures based on subjective criteria and observations would be.

Several studies confirm that between 2012 and 2021 the number of liberal democracies decreased from 42 to 34, with such a reduction affecting 36% of the world’s population.^[12] This change also entails that “the number of people that have democratic rights has recently plummeted: between 2016 and 2024, this number fell from 3.9 billion to 2.3 billion people. Similarly, the number of people living in liberal democracies fell from 1.2 billion in 2012 to 1 billion a decade later.”^[13]

2.1 The V-dem report on the state of democracy

Data from the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) index, a widely used measure of democracy quality, shows that the number of democratic countries has dropped significantly, to the point that autocracies (91) now outnumber democracies (88), while countries undergoing autocratization (45) outnumber those undergoing democratization (19).^[14]

The 2025 edition of the yearly V-Dem Report on the State of Democracy in the world is unsurprisingly titled “25 years of Autocratization”, and it unequivocally affirms that “the global democratic decline deepens, regardless of how we slice the data and whichever measure we use.”^[15]

Even accounting for bias, error, and other types of miscalculation, the arguments and the data presented seem to shift the focus of the debate from whether backsliding exists to its extent and potential trajectory in the near future.

It has been suggested that the lack of consensus among scholars as to whether observed patterns of backsliding should be a reason for concern may be due to the changing nature of the phenomenon, insofar as “leaders may be strategically shifting to more subtle means of backsliding that are more difficult to detect with objective measures.”^[16]

Democracy is also difficult to operationalize, and yet its existence cannot be denied. By the same token, it would be unconscionable to dismiss any claims of a large-scale wave of backsliding simply because we have yet to identify a proper way to measure it. Rather, we may be using the wrong indicators, or outdated ones that are no longer fit to capture the evolving traits of backsliding in its current nuances.

2.2. The freedom of expression and press freedom in the USA

The V-Dem report also reveals that freedom of expression has been facing an alarming decline for the past decade, and in 2024 it was the single indicator that registered the steepest worsening.^[17]

The erosion of the freedom of expression inevitably includes and impairs journalistic freedoms, resulting in an increase of attacks on journalists, censorship and polarization of media, with the above worsening during key phases of the electoral cycle.

Indeed, restrictions of press freedom often accompany shifts toward authoritarian governance, and the United States provides a useful case, having experienced dramatic changes in press freedom under recent administrations, where the press was a primary target.

Data shows that press freedom has worsened during the first Trump administration, saw only marginal improvements under Biden, and had largely declined again by the second Trump Administration, with the RSF World Press Freedom Index placed the United States in the 45^th place in 2023; it fell to the 57^th place in 2025.

Under the Biden Administration, the then-Attorney General Merrick Garland introduced policies set to better regulate the “obtaining information from, or records of, members of the news media acting within the scope of newsgathering is prohibited except under limited, specified circumstances.”^[18]

Such a measure prevents prosecutors from compelling journalists to cooperate in leak investigations by surrendering their materials, enabling professionals to operate without the looming threat of strategic subpoenas and undue interference.

The Trump Administration repealed the policies in April 2025, reversing nearly three years of protections. Ironically, the memo issued by Attorney General Pam Bondi, acknowledged that “without question, it is a bedrock principle that a free and independent press is vital to the functioning of our democracy. The Department of Justice will defend that principle, despite the lack of independence of certain members of the legacy news media.”^[19]

It is then further clarified that the DOJ will endeavor to limit the use of previously-inadmissible materials protected by the Garland policies, citing “enhanced approval and advance-notice procedures” as strategies that will be implemented to continue offering some procedural protections.^[20]

Now, a year into the second Trump Administration, several troubling incidents cast doubts as to whether journalists and professionals of the media sectors are truly given the protections that the craft requires. Outspoken hosts face retaliation and suspensions.^[21] Advocacy groups file lawsuits against the government for violations of constitutional protections.^[22] Federal agencies and non-profit organizations are defunded and dismantled.

In the wake of these developments, the American press is confronting its own vulnerabilities: “our free press sits atop an increasingly fragile edifice. This edifice is supported by a number of legal and nonlegal pillars [...]. Each of these supports, however, has weakened substantially in recent years.”^[23]

When the government questions the legitimacy of the press, the media either starts to lose traction altogether or reluctantly adjusts its tone, language, and coverage, hoping to navigate decisions that could threaten its survival. This is evidenced by an increase of self-censorship among journalists in at least 32 countries, also documented in the V-Dem 2025 Democracy Report.^[24]

Though the situation is concerning, democracy in the United States has not completely backslid. It is, however, beginning to display signs of partial democratic decay.

These processes hardly ever happen overnight, even after a single trigger; they result from small, often seemingly trivial changes that accumulate over time.

When rights are restricted for seemingly arbitrary reasons and fundamental freedoms are denied, it is crucial to be aware of what legal safeguards are in place and the extent to which they entitle their beneficiaries to protection from wrongdoing.

The legal framework in the US

In the United States, the protections afforded to journalists and other professionals of the media sector stem from a complex, multi-level legal framework that includes constitutional, federal, and state statutory provisions and case law. Nevertheless, the overall body of guarantees and privileges is lacking at best: instead of offering complementarity, their fragmented structure creates ambiguity and undermines effectiveness.

At the constitutional level, the First Amendment enshrines the freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Supreme Court, in clarifying the scope of the Amendment, has concluded that “speakers are protected against all government agencies and officials: federal, state, and local, and legislative, executive, or judicial. [...] The First Amendment restrains only the government. The Supreme Court has interpreted “speech” and “press” broadly as covering not only talking, writing, and printing, but also broadcasting, using the Internet, and other forms of expression.”^[25]

Thanks to the First Amendment, the government cannot impose content-based sanctions, save for a selected list of cases where free speech needs to be balanced with other competing interests.^[26]

Aside from the First Amendment, there are limited protections at the federal level designed specifically to protect journalists and most of them stem from landmark cases and judicial interpretation of adjacent provisions.

For instance, in New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), the Supreme Court famously held that “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”, barring the government from blocking a priori the publication of classified information.^[27]

Other important precedents include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), which established “the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct”, unless “actual malice” is proved.^[28]

In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), the Supreme Court clarified that public officials may not “recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him”, unless “the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement was made ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’^[29]”

At the state-level, shield laws may be enacted to “facilitate the news gathering process by excusing journalists from disclosing confidential sources or information obtained from these sources.”^[30] However, states have the authority to establish the scope of the protection, the only requirement being that it is not in contravention to the First Amendment, rendering the overall framework fragmented and uneven.

The state of Wyoming is the only US State not to have any provisions, statutory or otherwise, providing for such protections, thereby constituting an undesirable gap in the legal framework regulating the privileges and protections for the press.^[31]

4. What happened at the Pentagon?

The resilience of press freedom in the U.S. has been tested recently by the Department of Defense’s review of access conditions for the press corps, which led the majority of correspondents to relinquish their credentials, thereby losing all access to the Pentagon.

Riley Martinez, a national security reporter at the Yomiuri Shimbun and former Pentagon correspondent for the same outlet, shared a first-hand account of the implications of the newly established access rules issued by the Department of Defense.

Martinez shared that long before the new contracts were rolled out in October, the press had already registered a broad shift: under the Biden administration, press corps were briefed three times a week, in addition to informal and virtual briefings in response to significant developments. In the nine months that Martinez covered the second Trump administrations, press corps were briefed three times in total.

“They started chipping away at our access in the building. In order to be part of the Pentagon Press Corps, and to report from the Pentagon, you have to go through a pretty rigorous screening. Within the building, we had a lot of access. 
Then they slowly started to chip away at that. 
And so, by the time October came, our physical access within the building had already been severely restricted and we were basically relegated to this one press wing, which is where our offices were and where the briefing room was.”^[32]

Martinez remarked that, as is customary, they were expecting change in the wake of the transition between administrations, but they had not anticipated such an abrupt decision: “In October, they rolled out a new contract that the press corps had to sign in order to get our badges to enter the building renewed, and they redrafted one of the stipulations that was in the original contract, that all of us pretty much said we cannot sign. We were basically asked to make sure we had explicit permission from the Department [of Defense] to publish information. Pretty much all credible journalists were unable to sign the contract, which meant that we do not have regular access to the building.”^[33]

The Pentagon incident has prompted much debate about what such a measure might entail for media plurality and government accountability moving forward: “It is still being determined whether this is legal or not. 
The way that I come at it is just that it is very troubling. Because you have to have a government that values free speech and acts like they value free speech and that currently does not seem to be the case. To have the accountability of the press corps, physically, inside the building was a source of pride for the Department, but now that no longer exists.”^[34]

Another point of discussion was the link between the rise of alternative media and the circumvention of intermediaries from the news sector. When asked about whether alternative media posed a precipitating threat fostering democratic backsliding, Martinez remained constructive: “I don't think it necessarily has to. 
I view alternative media by and large as somewhat of a positive thing,
but I think it's incumbent on people to want to get their news from credible sources.”^[35]

Once the legacy resident press corps left the Pentagon, access was primarily reallocated to alternative media, TikTokers, conservative influencers, and the like. Martinez underlines that digital platforms ensure access to political information that has previously only been reserved for legacy media organizations. “I think that there's a benefit to this new age that we have entered of social media giving access to politicians that only would have been reserved for the New York Times in the past, or CBS, so I think there is some benefit in that, however, what happens is the the burden of credibility and fact-checking is no longer there.”^[36]

The importance of media literacy is a recurring theme in Martinez’s testimony: “As an audience, you have to want the information you consume to be credible.”^[37]

According to the News Literacy Project, a recent survey found that 94% of teenagers would welcome the addition of media literacy education in schools.^[38] Implementing similar initiatives may prove difficult due to a number of challenges, and while the National Association for Media Literacy Education emphasizes that “media literacy education is not partisan,” the politicization of education remains hard to overcome.^[39]

5. Policy Considerations

The lack of a cohesive codification of legal protections for journalists allowed the ongoing drift towards authoritarian governance to exploit the gaps in the current legal framework, significantly impairing the ability of the press to operate under the basic assumptions it is expected to rely on.

This article demonstrates the need for federal shield-laws to be implemented, to strengthen the framework outlined above. An option would be reintroducing the Protect Reporters from Exploitative State Spying (PRESS) Act, which, despite receiving unanimous support in the House of Representatives, failed to reach a vote in the Senate.^[40]

The extraordinary outcome in the House and the underlying bipartisan support prompted the then-Senate majority leader Ron Wyder to submit a unanimous consent (UC) request, which enables the Senate to approve acts through a streamlined procedure that “supplants the standing rules of the Senate”.^[41] For a UC request to succeed, no Senators must object.

In this case a UC request was submitted to dispense with debate and enter directly into voting procedure, but it failed due to the objection of Sen. Tom Cotton, who cited “national security concerns” as a justification for his objection.^[42]

It must be noted, however, that the failure of a UC agreement does not imply the failure of the bill the Senate seeks to vote on: it merely means that the chamber reverts to default procedures. Thus, Sen. Cotton’s objection did not singlehandedly determine the failure of the PRESS Act. Notwithstanding the wide approval it secured, the Bill was tabled and never re-examined, only to expire at the end of the 118^th Congress.

It would also be advisable to reconsider the new Department of Defense rules for access issued by Secretary Hegseth to encourage plurality of media and foster enhanced transparency.

While it is unlikely to happen under the Trump Administration, responsible for its recent downsizing, a full reinstatement of the US Agency for Global Media to its maximum operational capacity would bolster the role of independent federal agencies.