The Return of Spheres of Influence: U.S.–China–Russia Rivalry and the Future of the Liberal International Order

Multipolarity, China–Russia Relations, Geopolitical Transformation

1. Introduction

In recent years, the notion of spheres of influence, which had gradually receded following the end of the Cold War, has newly emerged as a key element of the https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Influence: and the Future of the of influence and assessing whether their return indicates a To what extent does the re-emergence of spheres of influence the use of a comparative analysis, the paper examines Russia’s Taiwan, and the geopolitical expansion of China’s Belt and a theoretical framework that employs the realist, thus supported by sources driven from Western and argument states that the liberal international order is not characteristic of the key findings is their multifaceted of traditional power politics, while at the same time been lost for a long time; Beijing’s involvement inTaiwan coercion with economic integration; the Belt and Road statecraft can generate influence without disregarding global of spheres of influence in the political environment, but than replacing the liberal international order, they drive the power networks, competing normative visions, and Great Power Competition, Economic Statecraft, international geopolitical order. In his article “Understanding Spheres of Influence in International Politics” scholar Van Jackson refers to the term as “a hierarchical structure, the construction and maintenance of which results from a practice involving two specific features: some amount of control over a given territory or polity by a foreign/outside actor” and “exclusion of other external actors from exercising that same kind of control over the same space.” While the post-1945 order has been characterised by the promotion of free markets, democratic values, multilateralism, and the diffusion of liberal norms, with the United States of America as the hegemon actor, recent global events suggest that these universalist aspirations are undergoing a significant reconfiguration. China’s military pressure on Taiwan, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the massive growth of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are indicators of a growing trend of “regionalized power projection and selective ordering.” The growth of Russia’s and China’s expansionist measures, along with the USA’s retrenchment, are now significantly challenging the normative and structural coherence of an order whose aim was to transcend traditional great-power politics. If, on one hand, Western policymakers blame Russia and China for the erosion of the liberal political order, non-Western critics like Barry Buzan instead consider it a “long overdue response to Western dominance”. This clash of visions is incredibly significant, as it exposes a deeper crisis in global governance. This is explained by the theory that international cooperation is currently characterized by a division in power blocs not driven by ideological similarities, but by institutional alternatives and economic interdependence. Key examples of this are the cases of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In this regard, this paper answers the question: To what extent does the return of spheres of influence signify the end of the liberal international order? Its central argument supports the claim that the liberal order is not collapsing entirely but is instead undergoing a selective transformation. This viewpoint is grounded in the premise that the dynamics of power politics defy linear or dichotomous classification; instead, they operate within a complex, multilayered system shaped by intersecting political, economic, and normative dimensions. There are three main mechanisms responsible for the power dynamics transformation: (1) economic statecraft and coercion, whose clear examples are the mechanisms of trade and investment; (2) military and security coercion, with the premise that territorial sovereignty is a nation’s primary security concern; (3) legitimizing narratives that explain non-Western civilizations’ efforts of order rooted in sovereignty and cultural autonomy. In order to answer the research question, the methodology of this paper provides a comparative analysis of three case studies, backed up by academic literature, policy documents, government reports, and think tank analyses derived from both Western and non-Western perspectives in order to enhance balance. The three pivotal cases of interest are: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to represent territorial coercion; China’s multi-domain pressure on Taiwan, referring to security coercion; China’s BRI in the South China Sea region, regarding economic statecraft.

2. Background Analysis

The concept of “spheres of influence” was first used by scholars at the end of the 19th century to refer to the legal and political implications of European colonialism in Asia and Africa. The term then gained substantive notoriety during the Cold War to describe the bipolar division of the world between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, with each of the superpowers strategies being driven by the objective of maintaining control over their respective blocs. However, the termination of the conflict at the end of the 20th century left scholars largely divided on the future of international order. On one hand, many anticipated that this event would entail a shift from sphere-of-influence hierarchical structure to a more universal and rule-based order, backed by the promotion of liberal norms and the unprecedented triumph of market capitalism. On the other, others, such as John Mearsheimer (2014) and G. John Ikenberry (2020) largely contended this idea, with their claim being that “the disappearance of great-power rivalry was always more illusory than real.” Despite being in agreement over the real durability of a liberal international order, Mearsheimer and Ikenberry present contrasting opinions on the significance of spheres of influence. The former argues that spheres of influence are an enduring feature of international anarchy, while the latter states that the re-emergence of this concept does not signify a collapse in order but simply a transformation of the terms under which global governance operates. Following the end of World War II, enthusiasts of the liberal international economic order sought to promote multilateralism as a tool to shift away from the idea of great-power conflict, with the claim that embedding states in institutions that made them economically dependent on one another would mitigate the risks of falling back into the blocs-of-power trap. In 1944, the Bretton Woods System founded the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with the objective of stabilizing currencies and aid in post-war reconstruction in Europe. Additionally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later to become the World Trade Organization) was also signed in 1947 by 23 countries to promote free trade through the reduction of trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas, and boost post-war economic growth. Political institutions like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and later the European Economic Community combined efforts to anchor peace and prosperity through shared rules and cooperative mechanisms. As argued by Chatham House (2025) and the Brookings Institution (2024), the strengths of the post-war order lay in two key pillars: economic interdependence, which, as mentioned previously, would make eventual conflicts more costly; and institutional legitimacy, which gave smaller countries the possibility of competing in the international political spectrum. However, the narrative of an inclusive international economic order soon revealed itself to be just a limited effort—hierarchies persisted, and the Global South remained marginalized. Clear signs that the post-Cold War order was going to face a dramatic change started rising in the 2010s and 2020s, with the reintroduction of elements that reminisced about the concept of spheres of influence. The US can be regarded as the primary driver of this shift, due to the White House’s retrenchment and policy inconsistency. The fragile continuity of the policies promoted by US presidents in the 21st century left a hegemonic gap that countries like China and Russia were able to quickly fill. In the case of President Donald Trump’s first mandate (2016-2020), he mainly focused on unilateralism. His criticism over multilateral organizations such as the Iran Nuclear Deal or the Trans-Pacific Partnership led to the United States’ withdrawal from these initiatives. His unilateral approach was further highlighted when he demanded an increase in defense spending, threatening a reduced amount of U.S. support towards NATO allies. He believed that bilateral negotiations gave the United States greater leverage. If this approach could have had several positive outcomes for the country’s global dominance, the outstanding inconsistency of President Joe Biden’s (2020-2024) policy choices in regard to President Trump’s ones highlighted great divisions within the US as well as weakened the perception of reliability that US allies had of the country. In fact, many referred to President Biden’s mandate as one of “selective coalition building”, which could not have been more different from President Trump’s approach. The second actor responsible for this change is China, and this is reflected in the country’s use of economic statecraft, mainly through the implementation of the BRI. The latter, also known as the “One Belt One Road”, is one of the most successful economic projects that the country has launched in the last century. As demonstrated by data from the Green Finance and Development Center (2025), the evolution of the BRI in the last decade has generated massive development opportunities as well as making continents such as Europe, Asia, and Africa largely dependent on it. Scholars from Taylor & Francis Online (2023) have argued that this mechanism allows Beijing “to convert financial leverage into political influence without overt confrontation.” Thirdly, Russia’s territorial revisionism and regional coercion also represent a key player in this scenario. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, followed by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has increasingly raised the tensions with NATO members, whose claim is that these aggressive attacks represent a breach of state sovereignty and post-Cold War non-intervention norms. President Putin’s actions align with classical geopolitics, where power is exercised through military dominance and territorial control. Additionally, scholar Mearsheimer (2024) maintains that such behavior derives from a realist perspective, in which great powers are willing to give up international stability and cooperation to achieve territorial hegemony. Finally, an additional actor in this situation is the rise of multipolar institutional alternatives such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). While not openly revisionist, these forums utilize multilateralism to approach global governance in a way that challenges traditional Western-led institutions. All together, these four forces have largely transformed the liberal international order, using economic interdependence as an instrument of leverage. The result is an order that is neither fully liberal nor overtly anarchic, but a hybrid configuration of overlapping networks of power. In this context, understanding the evolution and persistence of spheres of influence is essential to assessing whether the current order is in terminal decline or undergoing a process of adaptive transformation.

3. Literature Review

The contrasting nature of the liberal economic order has set the stage for the creation of distinct and divisive opinions on how power is built and legitimacy constructed in global politics. The schools of thought that are of interest for the purpose of this paper are the realist, the liberal-institutionalist, and the postcolonial. 3.1 Realism From a realist point of view, scholars argue that the re-emergence of spheres of influence is not surprising and instead represents the predictable outcome of power politics. Scholar Graham Allison’s (2017) “Thucydides Trap” framework suggests that the rise of competition between rising or established superpowers, such as in the case of China, the USA, and Russia, makes tensions almost inevitable. Realist scholars, therefore, do not view the return of spheres of influence as a collapse of the international liberal order; instead, they argue that it is a natural phenomenon that would eventually occur, but the positive sentiment of a new political dimension following the end of the Cold War obscured these structural realities. 3.2 Liberal-Institutionalism In contrast with the realist school, the liberal-institutionalist considers the liberal international order as adaptive rather than obsolete. G. John Ikenberry (2020) refers to it as a system of “bounded openness”, in which rules and institutions have the power to both benefit global actors and constrain them. Liberal-institutionalist scholars argue that, while it is true that they challenge various liberal norms, Russia and China also adhere to global markets, financial systems, and multilateral platforms. As a result, current fragmentation entails renegotiation of key elements of the structure, rather than its absolute collapse. 3.3 Postcolonialism From a completely different perspective, the postcolonial school of thought, which largely derives from the points of view of the Global South, questions the moral standards and validity of the liberal norms in the first place. Many postcolonial scholars, including Amitav Acharya (2014), argue that the liberal international order perpetuates a legacy of Western dominance and colonial hierarchies. There is a large belief that, if Western analysts describe it as “return of spheres of influence,” it can instead be viewed as a pluralization of order, in which a reality that once was largely Eurocentric has now gradually shifted. On one hand, Chinese scholars argue that the BRI provides an input for shared development. Conversely, Russian ones invoke a “multipolar” world as a corrective to Western liberalism. In order to ensure its balance and avoidance of bias, the analysis of this paper makes reference to sources and scholars from all three schools of thought. It adopts a hybrid theoretical approach that combines the realist approach with the liberal-institutionalist and, finally, the postcolonial one. The combination of the three approaches produces the overall argument that the liberal international order should not be viewed as dissolving but instead as reconfiguring its scope and mechanisms.

4. Discussion of Findings

4.1 Ukraine—Russia’s Near-Abroad Strategy and Territorial Revisionism Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin has consistently demonstrated expansionist ambitions in Eastern Europe. Examples of this are the short conflict in Georgia in 2008 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in

2022. In official rhetoric, President Putin repeatedly

invokes the concept of “historical unity” between Russians and Ukrainians, stating that his actions represent cultural and civilizational preservation. Such a narrative reflects the dual nature of Russia’s actions; domestically, it represents a reinforcement of national identity and territorial sovereignty, whilst internationally, it threatens global stability by challenging the norms of sovereign equality. Internationally, mixed opinions on the matter have risen. If, on one hand, the Chatham House views President Putin’s actions as an inevitable continuation of the USSR narrative, on the other, they also argue that the country’s actions are a response to Western policymaking, especially in regard to NATO’s expansion eastwards. Realist scholars argue that this behavior is entirely predictable. For example, Mearsheimer (2024) claims that Western countries have failed to recognize the real implications that policies such as NATO enlargement would have on their relations with Russia, and the latter’s capabilities to retaliate. In the case of Ukraine, Mearsheimer argues that if it were to join NATO, the Kremlin would face a hostile military alliance with a country it directly shares a border with, a scenario that he describes as “unacceptable from any rational great-power standpoint”. Hence, Ukraine’s invasion does not only represent an attempt to bring back its imperialist strength, but instead a strong attempt at securing the country’s hegemonic power. On the other hand, the liberal-institutionalist point of view disagrees with the realist perspective. The scholar Ikenberry (2020) admits that, while NATO’s expansion exacerbated tensions with Russia, the Kremlin’s aggressive expansionist policies not only represent a breach of international law, but also undermine the core principles of the liberal international order—sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of interstate aggression. However, he also argues that while Russian aggression has disrupted the international order, it has also resulted in creating stronger Western alliances, promoting multilateralism, and boosting institutional cooperation. At the core of this mechanism lay the shared intelligence programs among Western countries, multilateral decisions on sanctions, and the acceleration of NATO enlargement (Sweden and Finland). Therefore, the liberal-institutionalist school of thought states that the core roots of the liberal international order remain solid, despite the transformation that is characterizing this historical period. Additionally, the postcolonial school of thought introduces further complexities that the others fail to take into account. If, on one hand, Buzan (2021) does not justify Russian aggression, he also claims that non-Western experts are capable of evaluating the situation with much more objectivity than Western ones, by offering a broader critique of Western dominance. Many nations of the Global South have abstained from condemning Russian actions in the past not because they are supportive of them, but instead because they view the Western line of thought as inconsistent with their political and military interventions in the past, such as in the case of Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011). Therefore, to conclude, the Ukraine case highlights a deeper fracture in the structure of the international order. Whilst Russia attempts to establish hegemony once again in the Eastern European region, the Western response instead defies the narrative of liberal decline. In fact, as a result, Western alliances have strengthened and institutional power has increased, despite the intensification of great-power rivalries. As a result, a hybrid order has risen, and the global dynamics are now characterized by operative but contested liberal norms. 4.2 Taiwan—China’s Multi-Domain Pressure and Security Coercion The Taiwan Strait situation presents a different political scenario. However, it can be agreed that both cases reveal models of modern sphere-of-influence dynamics. Unlike the Russian case, China operates in Taiwan through a multi-domain coercion system, by implementing a sophisticated strategy that combines military threats, economic leverage, information warfare, and legal narratives to ensure the status quo shifts in its favor. From a military point of view, Van Jackson (2020) views the situation as one of “a powerful state” that exercises “control over a neighboring polity while preventing third-party actors—primarily the United States—from exerting influence.” The frequent naval drills around the island, along with numerous military exercises aimed at simulating blockades, strengthen the message that the Chinese government views the Taiwan strait as a security space in which foreign involvement is not allowed. Economically, due to its evident advantage in market size, labor force, and international political involvement, China is able to leverage the economic interdependence between itself and Taiwan. Through import bans and sanctions targeted at pro-independence stakeholders, Beijing has created a coercive economic mechanism that does not breach international trade regulations, but yet makes Taiwan dependent on China. Thus, these tools expose China’s reliance on economic statecraft, one which enables it to maintain economic control over Taiwan without violating international norms. The realist school of thought interprets China’s actions as an approach that aims at increasing regional hegemony in a geographical area originally controlled by the United States. Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” (2017) sustains that the increase of tensions in the Taiwan Strait are likely to result in direct confrontation in the near future, as the White House is keen on maintaining control over the area, whilst China wants to disrupt it. Liberal-institutionalist scholars present an interesting claim. Whilst the general opinion leads to assuming that Beijing’s actions in Taiwan directly threaten the liberal international order, the latter highlights that the country operates within it rather than going against it. Firstly, because it is a competitive actor in the international market, and secondly, because it relies on World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanisms and multilateral organizations to expand its global alliances. The scholar Ikenberry (2020) claims that this clearly evidences the international liberal order’s gravitational pull: even revisionist powers must engage with it in order to achieve their hegemonic goals. The postcolonial perspective further develops the case of China’s rights over the Taiwanese territory by using the claim of “Chinese historical justice”. The Chinese claim that Taiwan is an internal affair aligns with the one of the Global South countries, that views western involvement in Asian politics as a continuation of its historical imperialism. Acharya (2014) points out that many Asian political actors support the idea of “Asian solutions for Asian problems”, despite remaining skeptical of Chinese policies and of how these could affect the region. Thus, in this case, China’s actions in Taiwan represent a multifaceted approach to build influence in the region. It blends coercion with institutional engagement and historical claims. Additionally, it is fundamental to point out that China’s case demonstrates that the concept of spheres of influence is coming back in a more sophisticated and layered dynamic than in the case of the rigid blocs of the Cold War. 4.3 The Belt and Road Initiative — Economic Statecraft and Developmental Influence On the surface, the Chinese BRI can be viewed as an economic project used as a tool to promote development within the country. However, on a deeper level, it represents a sophisticated strategy to shape global governance. Unlike the two case studies previously analyzed, the BRI operates through economic penetration and infrastructural integration. The mechanisms of the Chinese initiative entail long-term loans, construction agreements, resource-for-infrastructure deals, and state-backed enterprise activity, all of which have inevitably created deep structural ties and expanded China’s influence across multiple countries and continents. As reported by the Green Finance and Development Center (2025), China has recently become the largest bilateral lender to multiple African and Asian nations, thus shifting the global financial landscape. Firstly, the realist school of thought claims that the BRI is a tool utilized by China to geoeconomically balance its power. It not only allows the country to secure targeted chokepoints, but also differentiate supply chains, and increase countries’ dependence on its infrastructure and technology. Furthermore, China further gains much from this by being enabled to make use of other countries’ facilities. For example, marine ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Greece represent strategic footholds that China can use for geopolitical objectives. On the other hand, liberal-institutionalist scholars explain the nature of the initiative: the BRI does not reject global markets but instead reframes them. Furthermore, the global power is also expanding its international capabilities by building parallel institutions—for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This school of thought affirms that these complement Western institutions, rather than entirely replacing them. Ikenberry (2020) surfaces an interesting point: the liberal order is no longer characterised by unipolarity, but is instead polycentric, with competing development models. Finally, the postcolonial critique claims that the reason why the BRI is so compelling to many international actors is precisely because it refuses to accept Western conditionality. Acharya (2014) highlights that, for many countries of the Global South, this initiative represents an opportunity for agency, finance, and recognition that Western institutions have failed to provide in the past. Despite this analysis leaning toward the idea that the BRI is a great success for China’s global power, the influence generated by it is hierarchical and asymmetric, aligning with Van Jackson’s definition of spheres of influence. The economic dependency that the latter has created ensures that countries that are indebted to China adjust voting patterns in international institutions in favor of China, that they are supportive of geopolitical matters such as the situation in the South China Sea, and even make use of Chinese standards for digital infrastructure. In conclusion, the BRI clearly demonstrates how economic tools have the capability of generating political alignment and increasing influence without breaching any international norm. It can be agreed that the latter represents a new and increasingly multifaceted form of sphere-of-influence dynamics—one rooted in financial interdependence and global connectivity rather than on territorial coercion.

5. Policy Recommendations

The findings presented in the previous section confirm the thesis that the liberal international order is not collapsing, but instead it is undergoing a dynamic transformation shaped by competing institutional structures and a modern model of spheres of influence. In this regard, it is fundamental for Western institutions to adapt their political approach to the new environment, to enhance resilience, reduce over-reliance on unilateral power, and address the skepticism originating from the Global South. 5.1 Reinforce Institutional Flexibility and Pluralism As presented by liberal-institutionalist scholars like Ikenberry, the international order can only survive by adapting, under the principle of bounded openness. In this regard, the first policy recommendation suggests that Western policymakers actively support international reforms that aim at boosting the growth of emerging economies within institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank. In order to do so, the latter must prioritize flexible regional partnerships rather than continue to follow rigid alliance structures. Furthermore, Western institutions must demonstrate a willingness to accommodate non-Western norms and embrace multilateral priorities that evidence it. Only like this can the critiques of Western dominance be positively addressed, and cooperation between Western and non-Western actors boosted. 5.2 Address Economic Inequities That Fuel Alternative Orders One of the key drivers of the outstanding success achieved by the BRI is the presence of a development gap that remains unaddressed by the West. Thus, in order to strongly respond to the boom of Chinese economic statecraft without making use of direct confrontation, the former can start by increasing infrastructure financing through the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. Furthermore, actors like the European Union can offer debt restructuring and transparency initiatives to become increasingly competitive with the BRI. These strategies enable Western actors to reduce dependency imbalances, resulting in a diminishment of the leverage that China is gaining through its economic campaigns. 5.3 Strengthen Deterrence While Avoiding Escalation In the case of hard security threats, such as the ones deriving from the situations in Ukraine and Taiwan, a nuanced approach is necessary to strengthen deterrence while avoiding escalation at the same time. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must maintain its strong deterrence position while simultaneously promoting a diplomatic pathway that comprehensively addresses Russia’s security concerns. However, it must be ensured that this process does not diminish Ukraine’s sovereignty. Conversely, in the case of Asia, the United States must continue to demonstrate its support in Taiwan by enhancing its defense capabilities. At the same time, they should stop short of making formal moves towards the island’s independence in order to avoid direct military confrontation with China. Finally, the defense budget invested by NATO and the European Union should increase, with its allocation specifically going into cyber defense, maritime surveillance, and hybrid war preparation. This would send a clear message that, if on one hand Western powers are prepared to adapt to the transformation of the liberal international order in a diplomatic way, they also possess the capabilities to respond militarily should Russia’s and China’s expansionist mechanisms go too far. 5.4 Promote Normative Legitimacy Through Consistency One of the greatest critiques of Western dominance posed by the postcolonial school of thought is its policy inconsistency—supporting sovereignty in Ukraine while largely ignoring it elsewhere. Hence, in order to rebuild credibility, Western policymakers must ensure that international law is applied in all global cases without any exception. This includes cases like Palestine, Myanmar, and conflicts in Africa like the ongoing civil war in Sudan. Additionally, the latter must introduce a program to strengthen governance mechanisms for sanctions, human rights, and conflict resolution. This way, the West can raise support for its values while weakening the narratives offered by China and Russia. 5.5 Support Regional Organizations in the Global South In order to address the current tensions caused by the return of modern spheres of influence, the West must differentiate its alliance structure through an expansion of its global cooperation. Specifically, it has to create alliances with key actors of the Global South like the African Union, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR. This aligns with scholar Acharya’s vision of a multipolar world in which international order coexists instead of competing.

6. Conclusion

The economic and military development of Russia and China in the past decades represents the biggest challenge to the concept of liberal international order. However, the findings presented in this article indicate that this is a driver of transformation rather than of collapse of the political environment that has characterised global politics since the end of the Cold War. The key evidence for this are the cases of Ukraine, Taiwan, and the BRI. Firstly, Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrate a return in territorial coercion but also highlight the cooperative capabilities of Western institutions like NATO. Moreover, the case of China in the Taiwan Sea evidences how security coercion can coexist with global economic behavior and multilateral engagement. Finally, the BRI can be instead regarded as a driver of a new economic statecraft hierarchy, while at the same time demanding more inclusive development frameworks outside Western models. In terms of the schools of thought, realist scholars correctly predict the return of spheres of influence and great-power rivalry. Conversely, liberal-institutionalists align with the belief that global rules and multilateral mechanisms are durable and solid. Finally, postcolonial experts take into account a consideration that the latter and former don’t: the deeper structural inequalities driving dissatisfaction with Western-led governance. Put together, these perspectives demonstrate that power politics currently operates through a hybrid and multilayered system instead of a strict or hierarchical form.

While it is true that spheres of influence are coming back, it is not mutually exclusive to the maintenance of the liberal international order. Thus, the solution for Western policymakers in order to maintain their global power is not to restore an idealized past but to adapt to a more pluralistic future. Only through the reform of institutions, the management of security competition, and the rebuilding of normative legitimacy can the West guide this transformation towards stability rather than fragmentation. It is possible to conclude that the liberal international is not collapsing, but it is becoming an order of many instead of solely the West. The latter is characterized by competing visions, regional dynamics, and evolving distribution of economic and military power. In order to ensure the preservation of global stability in the decades ahead, it is essential to properly understand and manage this transition.