The Roots of Discontent: Socioeconomic Transformation and Political Shifts in Eastern Germany

1. Introduction

Despite the passage of 35 years since German reunification, the differences between the east and west of the republic have not been erased. There are many examples, ranging from religiosity, average earnings, voter turnout, and party preferences in elections to both the https://ipr.blogs.ie.edu/ Socioeconomic Shifts in Eastern of persistent social discontent in the territory of the former Despite 35 years since reunification, mental divisions have process lies at the root of the frustration. The liquidation of state-owned enterprises, and the sharp rise in colonization” and of being “second-class citizens.” personnel in favor of West German elites and the unfulfilled are compounded by contemporary crisis factors, such and the consequences of the energy transition, which are to a deep crisis of confidence in the establishment. The Saxony Landtag elections and the 2025 Bundestag elections. the AfD is becoming a mass party in the east , and the new At the national level, the AfD has become the second governing coalition (SPD, Grüne, FDP) have suffered a of divisions and the strengthening of protest parties perspective into account in federal politics will lead to a Economic Transformation Landtags and the Bundestag. The economic and social changes brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the accession to the federation, not on an equal footing but subordinate to the old Länder (die Alten Länder), continue to shape the social and political awareness of citizens to this day. One of the consequences of historical difficulties such as the economic transformation and the failure of traditional West German parties to fulfill the promises made during this process. All this has contributed to a crisis of confidence in such parties and an increase in the popularity of extreme parties, which oppose the established establishment originating in the FRG, citing, among other things, a lack of understanding and failure to adapt to the needs of the new areas of the union. After 1990, Saxony, as one of the new federal states (die Neue Bundesländer) forming part of the Federal Republic, faced numerous challenges related to political, economic, and social changes. The transformation involved a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, which led to the collapse or takeover of many state-owned companies by West German capital. An example of a company that was taken over and restructured, in this case by the Volkswagen Group, is HQM Sachsenring GmbH – a symbol of East German engineering producing Trabant passenger cars. These vehicles gained cult status in the GDR and were the most popular car of the average “Ossi”, which is evident in the so-called Trabant Revolution (the name of this event refers to the car in which Germans left the Eastern sphere of influence during the pan-European “picnic” on the Hungarian-Austrian border to get to the West). As a consequence, economic changes led to a sharp increase in unemployment, even reaching a ceiling of approximately 20%, and, as a result, a decline in the standard of living. These changes led to mass internal migration, particularly of young and skilled people, to Western states offering better prospects for life and employment.

2. Background

Like other eastern states, Saxony experienced a sharp decline in population after 1990. According to data from the Federal Statistical Office, Saxony's population fell from around 4.9 million in 1990 to around 4 million in 2022, with further declines forecast. The main reason for this was migration to the west, but also within the state, with the largest cities benefiting. In addition, the birth rate declined and did not guarantee a level sufficient for generational replacement, which, combined with increasing life expectancy, exacerbated the dynamic process of population aging. However, the demographic characteristics in 2010-2022 differ from those seen in 1990-2009, as a certain stabilization of demographic trends can be observed after

2010. This is mainly due to immigration from Central and

Eastern European countries (mainly Poland, Romania, Russia, and, in recent years, also Ukraine) and the wave of migration from the Middle East (Syria, Afghanistan) during the migration crisis in 2015. Despite the negative balance of internal migration in most of the state - agricultural and less urbanized regions, in some areas of the state - especially large urban agglomerations such as Leipzig and Dresden - a clear increase in population has begun to be recorded, and these two cities are now among the most dynamically developing urban centers in Germany, both demographically and economically. A particularly positive growth trend can be seen for the former, with the Free State of Saxony's statistical office predicting, in its most optimistic scenario, a 16% increase by 2035, from 587,000 in 2018 to 681,000 in the aforementioned year. The outlook for Dresden is also positive, although not quite as good, with the most optimistic scenario predicting a 6% increase in population from 554,000 to 587,000 in 2035. In contrast to the rest of the state, these cities attract young and well-educated people thanks to well-paid jobs in the service and information technology sectors in initiatives such as Silicon Saxony, or Saxony's Silicon Valley, near Dresden. It is a semiconductor manufacturing cluster employing around 100,000 people in every branch of the industry, from suppliers to programmers. Another example of a modern industry thriving in Saxony is green hydrogen, which is set to replace the declining lignite mining industry and help both meet the goals of Germany's green transition and stimulate economic growth by increasing the number of jobs. It is estimated that the hydrogen economy will create 4,800 jobs and generate €1.7 billion in revenue for local companies.

3. Analysis

3.1 Results of the 2024 Saxony state election The CDU won the 2024 elections with a small lead over the second-placed AFD. The Christian Democrats' modest success can be attributed to the strong campaigning of the popular and respected Prime Minister Michael Krteschmer, who hails from Görlitz, a city heavily affected by economic change, and to the votes of the oldest voters, those over 60, among whom they won 42% of the vote. This group is the most determined electoral group voting for establishment parties both in Saxony and throughout Germany, although their attachment to the party stems from other motives. In this group, the AfD won 34% and the BSW 14%. In other age groups, the results differed significantly: the younger the group of voters, the lower the result for traditional parties, which shows their erosion in the eyes of the youngest voters in particular. In the 18-29 age group, the clear winner was the AfD, which received as much as 29% of the vote, compared to only 15% for the CDU. 18 This shows that in eastern Germany, parties commonly regarded as protest parties (AFD, BSW), mainly in opposition to the volkspartei, i.e., the traditional people's parties that traditionally attract the majority of votes, are no longer perceived in this way. It is worth noting that the Saxon Christian Democratic Union is the most conservative of all the party's regional structures. One of the reasons for this shift is the desire to win back some of the conservative Saxons who are negatively disposed towards the West and vote for the AFD. In the election campaign led by the aforementioned Prime Minister Kretschmer, the CDU often used rhetoric similar to that of the far right, especially on issues related to migration in the broad sense, such as the right to asylum or relations with Russia. Despite the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the prime minister is openly pro-Russian, advocating for the lifting of sanctions and the reactivation of the Nord Stream 2 project. The high support for the AfD in every voter group shows both a red card for the federal government led by Olaf Scholz and the undeniable fact that this party has become a mass party in the east. Germans from the east have begun to see it as a force representing their views and needs on the national stage, which are often ignored in the West by the federal government. However, the undisputed winner is Sahra Wagenknecht's alliance, which espouses extreme anti-immigrant and pro-Russian views. Despite its lack of structure and short history, the group gained significant support, largely at the expense of Die Linke, whose support fell by more than half. The party focused mainly on pan-German issues such as foreign policy, even though the federal states have no influence on it. The campaign raised demands to limit migration, curtail military aid to Ukraine, and end the war in Ukraine through diplomatic means. The Greens and the FDP are virtually irrelevant in state politics, and the SPD, which has little support, is expected to play the role of a minor coalition partner. These parties have few members in Saxony, which means they have small structures and limited campaign finances. The former GDR is a lost cause, especially for the Greens and the FDP. The only places where the former receives consistent support in Saxony are the large academic centers of Leipzig and Dresden. In Germany, both at the federal and state levels, the AfD is surrounded by a “cordon sanitaire” to prevent it from coming to power. The BSW's high result made it impossible to form a majority government in the state without its participation, and the party leaders firmly rejected the possibility of cooperation with the AfD. This situation is controversial among conservative Christian Democratic activists, as cooperation with the far right is ideologically much closer in the east than with the Social Democrats or the Greens. With such election results, a peculiar point of attention was the aforementioned BSW, as initially a CDU-BSW-SPD coalition was considered, but coalition talks ended in failure precisely because of the BSW. As a result, in the face of growing support for the AFD, a CDU-SPD minority government was formed under the leadership of Michael Kretschemer, which must rely on the votes of other parties to prevent extremists from coming to power in the state.

3.2. Analysis of the results of the Bundestag elections in

Saxony in 2025 Unlike in the state elections, the AfD received the highest support in the state, thus cementing its dominance not only in Saxony but also in the entire eastern part of the country. The Christian Democrats recorded a slight increase in support compared to the previous elections and maintained their second position. Despite a slight increase, Die Linke achieved great success. In January, the party was polling at around 3%, and analysts were “burying it politically,” with nothing to suggest a potential reversal of the downward trend. Heidi Reichinnek and her speeches on the CDU's controversial cooperation with the AFD on tightening migration policy broke popularity records on platforms such as TikTok and Instagram, particularly among the youngest voters, among whom it became the most popular party, garnering 25% of the vote nationwide, while taking votes away from the extreme BSW party. Traditional parties, in particular those that formed the previous federal government (SPD, FDP, and Grüne), saw significant declines in support at both the state and federal levels, the reasons for which are described above. 3.3 Analysis of the results of the Bundestag elections in Germany in 2025 At the national level, the alliance of Christian Democratic parties (CDU, CSU) won with 28.5% of the vote (+4.3 percentage points compared to the last election), giving them 208 of the 630 seats. This was a moderate success, as pre-election polls had given it over 30%. The party gained increased support thanks to inflows from the parties that formed the previous government: 1.7 million SPD supporters and 1.3 million FDP voters. The Christian Democrats also benefited from a very high turnout of 82.5%, as an additional 900,000 people who had not previously voted cast their ballots for these parties. Another factor that favored the high turnout was the population over 70 years of age, among whom as many as 43% chose this party. The Christian Democrats owe their result to several factors, including disappointment with the actions of Olaf Scholz's government, but also to their program and their perceived competence in the areas of the economy and migration policy, which dominated the election campaign. The AfD achieved its best result in federal elections to date, winning 20.8% of the vote (+10.4 percentage points) and 152 seats, establishing the party as the second political force in Germany. The AfD is no longer a protest party, as only 39% of voters chose it for this reason, while 54% voted for it because of its policies. It received the most support in the eastern states, where it won 32% of the vote. The party not only mobilized the largest number of previously non-voters (1.8 million people), but also 1 million CDU/CSU voters. The biggest loser of the election was the SPD, whose 16.4% result was almost 10 p.p. lower than in 2021 and was the worst result for the party in Germany's post-war history. The outflow of voters was visible in every direction, with an emphasis on the CDU/CSU. Robert Habeck's Green Party won 11.6% of the vote (down 3.1 percentage points) and 85 seats. The party leader took responsibility for the result and resigned as party leader. The party lost its largest group of voters to Die Linke, which, as I mentioned above, became the most popular party among young Germans. In the new Bundestag, the party will seek to sharpen its left-wing profile. The Left achieved unquestionable success, winning 8.8% of the vote. In addition to the social media campaign described above, it focused on social issues, in which other left-wing parties lost trust after their unsuccessful coalition with the liberal FDP. The liberals did not enter parliament, and their leader announced his departure from politics. The new government will be formed by the CDU/CSU and SPD parties, whose coalition was previously called the Grand Coalition (it currently does not meet the requirement of at least 60% of the vote and being formed by the two largest parties), with Chancellor Friedrich Merz. The new coalition has set as its priorities stimulating economic growth and continuing the previously established course in climate and energy policy, lowering taxes, digitization, and reducing bureaucracy, counteracting illegal immigration, maintaining social policy, and strengthening defense.

4. Discussion of Findings

4.1 The Start of Transformation and Grand Promises From the perspective of other Eastern Bloc countries, East Germany's path to freedom and integration into Western structures was a source of envy. In a single day, on October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist, and a unified Germany returned to the map. The then Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Helmut Kohl, promised to quickly bring the two German states into line with each other. As the years passed, the vision of complete unification receded, and to this day, there is no end in sight to the changes taking place in this part of the country. Over time, frustration also began to grow on both sides of society, on the eastern side (the inhabitants were called “Ossi”) due to disappointment with the effects of the transformation, and in the west (the inhabitants were called “Wessi,” but only when they left the west for the east) due to the too slow process of equalizing the east of the country, which was to be ensured by the introduction of taxes paid by the inhabitants of the old states. 4.2 Identity Crisis and "Ostalgie" The differences and views of people on both sides of the country are reflected in surveys conducted in the 1990s. In 1990, 61% of East Germans said they felt German, not East German, and in 1994 this figure fell to 35%. It was also then that the term Ostalgie became popular, meaning nostalgia for a lost country that gave people jobs and relative stability, which they lost during the economic transformation. The rapid blurring of economic differences was not helped by the introduction of the aforementioned taxes, such as Solidarpakt I and II, or the Aufbau Ost and Fonds Deutsche Einheit funds, which transferred hundreds of billions of euros to the east. The “Ossis” felt like second-class citizens, treated as a market for their western cousins. 4.3 "Economic Colonization" and the Treuhandanstalt The residents of the newly annexed states felt that a kind of “economic colonization” was taking place, expressed, for example, in the Treuhandanstalt agency. This institution was intended to privatize East German enterprises, but it operated at a rapid pace without taking local interests into account, leading to the mass liquidation of unprofitable workplaces and a huge increase in unemployment, reaching as high as 20%. The “Wessis” not only took over the productive assets of the former GDR, but also eliminated the social elites, with West Germans taking over key positions in state administration, the judiciary, higher education, and the media, often marginalizing local staff. Universities, government offices, and regional media were largely taken over by newcomers from West Germany. This kind of policy was perceived by local communities as a sign of mistrust and deepened their sense of alienation from the federal state. Despite gradual adaptation, it was not until 2005 that the majority of Germans from the east since 1994 described themselves as full Germans, but their priorities remained different. According to research by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, differences in views between Germans from East and West were evident, among other things, in their approach to the value system. When asked what they considered more important – “freedom” or “equality and social justice” – 51% of Germans from the East opted for equality, while only 36% indicated freedom as a priority. Among Germans from the West, the trend was reversed: 53% considered freedom to be more important, and 37% considered equality and social justice to be more important. On October 3, 2010, public information prepared for the celebration of German reunification revealed that a court in Stuttgart had dismissed a lawsuit filed by a woman from East Berlin who had been discriminated against because of her origin. The woman applied for an accounting job in the western part of the country, and her resume said “keine Ossis,” meaning no Ossis. The court ruled that this was not discrimination because “Ossis” are not a recognized ethnic or national minority. West German politicians did not understand the principles of operation and thinking of citizens in the east, and problems were often marginalized. Due to the low population of the former GDR in relation to the FRG. The problems of voters in the east were ignored because it was not profitable to court them, as the vast majority of voters were in the west. The words of a leading politician that illustrate the marginalization of the “Ossis” may be those of CSU politician and 2002 chancellor candidate Edmund Stoiber, who, referring to the victory of the Social Democrats led by Gerhard Schröder in East Germany in 2002, said: "I will not accept that the East should again decide who becomes German chancellor. We cannot allow the future of Germany to be decided by frustrated people." . 4.4 The Lack of Representation Furthermore, there was no party in the mainstream representing the needs of Germans in the east. The party focused on these voters was the post-communist PDS, later transformed into Die Linke, which hovered around the electoral threshold for many years and often only managed to get members into the Bundestag thanks to so-called compensatory mandates. It was not until 2005 that the party managed to break through in the west thanks to the addition of rebellious SPD members who left the party in protest against Gerhard Schröder's Agenda 2010 program (and especially the Hartz IV package) aimed at reducing the German welfare state. In the same year, left-wing parties achieved a surprisingly good result of over 50% support, which forced Angela Merkel's new cabinet to adopt more left-wing demands concerning, among other things, the energy transition, which is a sensitive issue in the east, which is much more conservative than the west. 4.5 The rise of the far-right In 2015, the same Chancellor Merkel uttered the famous words “Wir Schaffen Das” (“We can do it”) in the context of the wave of refugees. After a brief wave of sympathy and hospitality from the Germans, the so-called Wilkommenskultur, there was a wave of hostility towards both migrants and the chancellor. The peak of hostility came after the events in Cologne on New Year's Eve 2015/2016, when there were numerous attacks by immigrants on German women. These events made the public aware of the level of self-censorship in the media on issues related to the crisis. The aftermath of the wave of migration can be seen in the 2017 Bundestag elections, where the far-right, anti-immigrant AFD party became the second political force in the new federal states, winning as much as 21.9% of the vote there. Since then, the party has been gaining strength with each election in the east, representing their views and needs on the national stage. 4.6 The Challenges of Energy Transition Angela Merkel is also known as the “Klimakanzlerin” (Climate Chancellor). In 2020, Merkel’s government decided to phase out lignite mining by 2038, which hit Saxony and the coal-mining areas in that state particularly hard, as they had played a major role in shaping the region's identity for years. Although plans have been made to restructure these areas, there are problems with their implementation due to bureaucracy and a shortage of workers. The jobs created as a result of this process are often lower-paid than those in the mining sector, which only exacerbates the economic differences between small and large centers. urban areas, which leads to a lower standard of living and causes frustration among those affected by the transformation of residents, and provides “fuel” for the aforementioned AFD to act.

5. Policy Recommendations

Having considered the analyzed socioeconomic indicators and electoral shifts in Eastern Germany and Saxony in particular, one can conclude that the current relationship between the federal establishment and Eastern Germany has reached a critical impasse. The consolidation of populist parties indicates that the only solution to the crisis is restoring trust in the democratic system and to abandon the strategy of paternalism and directly address the structural roots of Eastern discontent. Foremost, federal policymakers must cease the practice of moral exclusion toward Eastern voters and instead acknowledge the legitimacy of their specific security and economic concerns. This objective requires an immediate effort to bridge the representation gap by actively promoting East Germans into leadership positions within federal ministries, the judiciary, and public media, where they remain disproportionately underrepresented. These actions are directly connected with the need for symbolic recognition and the federal historical narrative must formally integrate the hardships of the post-1990 transformation especially the controversial legacy of the Treuhandanstalt to dismantle the lingering perception of "economic colonization" and second-class citizenship. However these will only be a step towards restoring social cohesion. To fully return to the path of internal integration, the federal government must ensure that the energy transition (Energiewende) becomes fair in every way. This requirement includes the implementation of a holistic economic strategy for mining regions, guaranteeing that new industries, such as the hydrogen sector, offer wages and job security comparable to the industries being phased out. To make this possible, the state must simultaneously launch reskilling programs, enabling the existing workforce to transition seamlessly from the coal sector to these emerging high-tech branches. Additionally, investment policies must prioritize connecting rural, depopulating areas with booming economic hubs like Leipzig and Dresden to prevent a decreasing economic role of rural areas. These are just a few of the necessary adjustments whose fulfillment would make it possible to reintegrate the East emotionally and politically withy the West. Without a genuine will to treat the East as an equal partner rather than a problem to be managed, the political divergence between the two parts of the country is likely to become permanent.

6. Conclusion

The analysis of social and political processes in Eastern Germany since 1990 confirms a persistent division within the country compared to the western Länder. While the introduction of aid programs like Solidarpakt contributed to significant improvements in infrastructure and living standards, they failed to eliminate the deep-seated feeling of social and political marginalization among residents of the former GDR. This was exacerbated by the perceived "economic colonization" following the Treuhandanstalt's rapid privatization and the dominance of West German personnel in key elite positions across administration and media. This cultural and political marginalization established profound differences between citizens from the two parts of the country. This discontent manifests in a growing revolt against the traditional Volksparteien, clearly reflected in the electoral preferences of residents in Saxony and other former GDR states. Protest parties are gaining popularity and consolidating their permanent role in the German political system, impacting the entire nation. The future success of social integration depends on the explicit acknowledgment and inclusion of the needs and expectations of the new lands in national policy. Without this political recognition, the existing divisions are likely to deepen further, rather than disappear. This polarization calls into question the stability of governing coalitions, both at the land and federal levels. The lasting overcoming of these antagonisms is currently one of the greatest challenges for German democracy.