Ethnopopulism in the Context of Migration
Edited by Agustin Plaza
Abstract
The rise of ethnopopulism across the European Union has been a phenomenon that has characterized the last decade. It allows for the identification of a main group of individuals based on a series of ethnic or cultural values and sees others as menaces to their security and identity. The analysis of various countries will show how parties frame their narratives and use other crises to mobilize support, creating a series of factors that together can trigger democratic erosion and provide for legitimate justifications for not safeguarding the rule of law with regard to migration and asylum proceedings.
In recent years, the EU has been going through an increase in popularity of far-right parties appealing to populist ideals, specially concerning the topic of immigration. This has been the case in countries which have suffered deeply the consequences of the previous immigration crisis, such as Italy or Hungary. However, other European crises have also played a role in the rising influence of these parties, which has had considerable repercussions on the continent’s foreign policy, particularly concerning European integration.[1] More specifically, within the strand of populism, the
role of ethnopopulism is crucial for understanding this. It is defined as a specific branch of populism where "the people" are defined in ethnic or cultural terms, drawing a clearer boundary between in-group and out-group collective identities in society. Thus, in order to rise to power, political parties may use narratives concerning minorities to gain popularity and ensure governance claiming to defend the traditional values and economic integrity against the impositions of globalized elies . The 2015 refugee crisis has provided these parties to legitimise their actions and a base for grounding their policies in order to address ongoing concerns.
Often, these parties associate migration with terrorism or criminal activity, which prompts citizen hatred towards them and aim for a divide between the nationals and these targeted groups, and them as their protectors and acting in their best interest. The propaganda and frame elaborated by these governments promote public distrust not only between individuals but also in institutions. This raises the question of the extent to which the efficiency of application of migration measures and derogations justify undermining the rule of law and individual rights. Firstly, there will be a historical context providing insight on countries such as Poland, Hungary, Italy and Spain. This will be followed by an analysis of how ethnopopulist governments mobilize the masses and gain supporters. After that, the role of emergency situations as legitimate justifications for undermining democracy will be taken into account, as well as current legislation and stances of European institutions. Finally, policy recommendations will be made for future reference.
As a consequence of crises in Europe during the early 2000s including the Eurozone’s 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 migration crisis, together with the growing effects of globalization, Europe underwent a wave of popularity among far-right, and to a lesser extent left-right parties across the continent. These groups directly appealed to the concerns of citizens in the face of the emerging threats of the century through the form of ethnopopulism.[2]
Even though there are differences in its emergence and development across countries, this poltical approach uses similar strategies to mobilise support. One of its central drivers has been the categorization of migration as a structural threat to the national order rather than a policy challenge. This mechanism has enabled parties to reconstruct the narrative around it and challenge pre-existing notions of national identity among groups, framing migrants as threats to security, welfare and identity notwithstanding the actual levels of migration.[3] Populism per se is not necessarily an instrument for democratic backsliding (Bonikowski 2017) because it is merely a way of doing politics. Outcomes depend on institutions, and though it is a risk factor that could trigger democratic erosion depending on the context and circumstances where it emerges, populist rhetoric by itself does not automatically dismantle democracy. Thus, ethnopopulism’s anti-pluralist essence of defending the people against dangers can bring about democratic erosion. In this sense, since ethnopopulist incumbents are the only ones who represent the interests of the “true” people, opposition parties and leaders are illegitimate and dangerous.[4]
In countries like Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic which previously were liberal democracies, ethnopopulist appeals took root. The Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, the Fidesz government in Hungary with Viktor Orbán, or the Czech President Miloš Zeman use this narrative to present themselves as protectors of traditional values and the people, defined not in terms of a nation but including many different values including culture, religion, ethnicity, etc. The racialization of the immigrant threat in this region was targeted towards brown Muslim refugees in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis of Muslims.
In this context, leaders saw an opportunity to delegitimize domestic opponents and international organizations arguing that they favoured the Muslim migrants’ welfare to the detriment of ordinary citizens. Moreover, they took advantage of the lack of previous experience on the managing of the crisis to deceive the population.
In the 2018 elections, Orbán built his campaign around the slogan of “Stop Soros” alluding to the opposition leader George Soros, who was working alongside EU institutions to bring Muslims into Europe to “destroy European culture” and ground for terrorism.[5]
In Southern Europe, Italy, with the power vacuum left after the 2018 coalition of the Five Star Movement and the Lega, Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing Fratelli d’Italia (FDI) secured the highest vote share.[6] Meloni’s government is characterized by anti-immigrant rhetoric and Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, since after the COVID-19 crisis and war in Ukraine, ethnopopulist countries had to cooperate with recovery plans of the EU and refugee management, allowing a distinction between refugees and illegal immigrants as the external menace. This moderation in the external threat was countered by a radicalization of the internal political opponents.[7]
With respect to Spain, the ethnopopulist wave arrived later on with the rapid growth in popularity of the far-right, in part as a reaction to internal Catalan nationalist secession attempts in 2017 with an illegal referendum. Moreover, Spain was, in 2022 according to the Eurostat, one of the countries with the biggest populations of foreign-born citizens. Most of the irregular flow of refugees access Spain either: through the ‘Western Mediterranean route’, crossing the Gibraltar Strait, reaching the Canary Islands; or reaching Spain by land, through its cities in North African territory, Ceuta and Melilla[8].
As previously mentioned, the spread of new technologies and the reach of news and media is a factor worth bearing in mind for the development of ethnopopulism which strengthened its power, especially due to the ease in manipulation of the information. During the financial crisis, investors sold local media outlets to local oligarchs, concentrating it in the hands of politically connected elites, which made small media markets in Eastern Europe susceptible to manipulation (Štetka 2019) due to its alignment to the government and provided a tool for broadcasting a favourable rhetoric to their interests.
Beyond domestic politics, ethnopopulism has also had systemic consequences for European foreign policy and EU cohesion. The European Council on Foreign Relations shows that populist parties increasingly act as “challengers” to EU foreign policy consensus, particularly on Russia, migration governance, and multilateralism, even when they do not hold executive power.[9]
Overall, ethnopopulism since 2015 has reshaped European politics not only by mobilising voters, but by altering institutional practices, policy agendas, and the normative foundations of liberal democracy and European integration.
3.1 Creating the Narrative
Leaders in different countries or parties gaining influence take advantage of the situation of vulnerability in a country and frame the narrative to fit their interests, not only to gain favor and votes among the population but also to justify a series of acts that undermine democracy without being held accountable. Ethnopopulism allows them to be flexible in identifying those who belong to the group vs. those who are outsiders. Moreover, with the new developments and reach of the media through globalization, this amplifies their ability to racialize the situation, benefiting from the outcomes of past crises such as the 2015 refugee crisis. In this sense, they use these past examples as tools to turn the population against liberal economic policies and depict irregular immigrants as a threat.[10] They redirect social frustration towards a group, favouring social polarization and exclusion, especially prejudicing regular migrants in these affected countries.
Some of the main arguments that are used which favor democratic erosion and bolster social unrest include mainly:
Firstly, redistribution of resources in areas with limitations or shortages. In situations with scarce resources, they are often portrayed as undeserving beneficiaries of social service who make use of them without contributing proportionally and taking advantage of those who are.
Closely related to this, is the fiscal burden argument, claiming that they might have a negative impact because they might consume more social benefits than contribute to the payment of taxes, which reinforces the resentment toward migrants, while also justifying restrictive welfare policies that may weaken democratic governance. Research shows that during economic uncertainty this assumption is amplified, which results in immigrants being classified as economic burdens that the rest of society has to endure, and scapegoats for more structural problems such as job scarcity and wage stagnation.[11]
Moreover, security regarding border control of irregular migration and rhetoric that immigrants contribute to higher crime rates. They let the population rely on assumptions rather than facts to instigate fear and distrust among the population. In Belgium, the politician Bart De Wever has publicly related immigration with criminality and social disorder and called for a stricter migration policy.
Additionally, the threat to national cultural identity. By redefining citizenship and political legitimacy in ethnical parameters or values, it is an issue that transcends material concerns and reinforces ethnopopulist conceptions of belonging. Terms such as ‘foreign infiltration’ have been used to challenge national unity, particularly in Muslim communities of Western European countries.[12]
Finally, labor market competition, especially for low-skilled national workers. The migrant influx allows local companies to undercut wages and give them a comparative advantage over nationals, at the risk of increasing unemployment or degrading work conditions. These governments, with their strict immigration policy proposals, provide a sense of ease and symbolic recognition of the concerns of the people and a feeling of representation of their fears for which they are granted protection. In this sense, it is not posed as an administrative challenge, but as a structural threat to public order and national identity. In this context, rights may be undermined justifiably to guarantee security and normalize executive discretion.
3.2 Capture of supporters
How are these governments able to translate in-group concerns into durable institutional support? Governance relies on establishing a structural moral hierarchy exacerbating the distinction between deserving insiders and undeserving outsiders. This creates a political ground that rewards loyalty. Nevertheless, studies show differences in these incentives according to the different types of political systems in a country.
There are three main types of logics describing voting to a certain block: policy-based logic, when individuals vote a certain party to develop policies that provide benefits for them as a group; grievance-based logic, mobilizing deprived groups; and clientelism-based logic, in which members of a group may support a particular party due to the expectation of receiving direct benefits. Even though policy-based and grievance-based logics are more powerful in democracies than autocracies, clientelism is a critical determinant for ethnic voting in autocratic governments. However, political context matters in establishing this claim. This is because in democracies clientelism is merely used to build support, while on the other hand, in autocratic regimes, it is used as a mechanism to establish social and economic dependencies that sustain the regime, rewarding supporters through the manipulation of formal resource distribution mechanisms, due to the greater hold and discretion they have over them.[13]
The promise of policies targeting the preferences of the in-group identity with leaders who represent a similar background to which citizens relate to, is crucial for a party’s ethnic mobilization strategy.
3.3 Emergency Governance and Exceptions
Following this train of thought, emergency situations and crises contribute greatly to the weakening of democratic institutions and work in favor of populist parties. These circumstances can call to legitimize assaults to formal or informal democratic standards as a means to debilitate the enemies of the true people (Grzymala-Busse 2019). And it is this sense of uncertainty and urgent necessity that validates actions against the non-well performing institutions which do not live up to their expectations.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that they will necessarily perform better than democratic governments, especially regarding exogenous crises that they have not created. This is because coming from outside, it is more challenging for them to control the rhetoric and blame the opposition for the issues arising from its poor management. It is a strategy which would otherwise be exploited, as it happened with the COVID-19 crisis. Also, using their usual modus operandi would be, in terms of healthcare, much more costly, so they had to rely on the knowledge of experts to avoid criticism. Nonetheless, they still managed to politicise the situation, link it to existing grievances and deepen polarization, as well as construct artificially a political crisis deriving from it, even if it was not initially originated within the country. [14] Moreover, they may use these emergencies to justify power grabs to counterbalance and provide a harsher response to the effects of the pandemic, such as in Slovakia, or the Czech Republic. In these countries, the pandemic allowed for the establishment of technocratic populism and in both, populists used emergencies to weaken institutional accountability.[15]
Within the context of asylum and migration law in the EU, the EU Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation (Regulation EU 2024/1359) adopted by the Council on May 14th 2024 will enter into force in 2026. It provides flexibility within the Dublin System during situations of crisis. This regulation, more specifically Article 11(1) of the Regulation, provides for derogation regimes in cases of ‘force majeure’, which allows for extension of asylum registration deadlines by an additional period of maximum 6 weeks. It provides leeway and a discretion which allows for a ‘reasonable’ justification of violations under certain circumstances. Though, the question whether efficiency outweighs the respect of the rule of law is contested. The regulation frames crisis in a very narrow way and provides for three main criteria to determine a crisis and force majeure, which could give grounds for derogations. The situation has to involve large-scale arrivals of third-country nationals or stateless persons entering a Member State. Secondly, these arrivals must be provided with the necessary asylum reception services of said Member State as well as special treatment to those who require it.
As for force majeure, these are unforeseeable consequences out of the Member State’s control which prevent the Member State from complying with its obligations under Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (EU) 2024/1351[16] and Asylum Procedures Regulation (EU) 2024/1348.[17]
It is worth differentiating these exceptional circumstances to those the State faces as a result of the cumulative effect of arrivals without reaching the level of mass arrivals, in which measures for dealing with this are portrayed under Regulation (EU) 2024/1351.[18] The regulation also includes rules for the improvement of solidarity and safeguards such as information in their language about the derogations, the duration, and how to appeal asylum applications. Moreover, special needs for international protection of applicants must be addressed, and derogations can not last longer than 12 months. With this, there is the constant monitoring of the Commission and the Council who address the proportionality and necessity of these derogations and the possibility for prima facie recognition.[19]
Moreover, the solidarity rules introduced raise concerns, since extending the deadline of border procedures to 18 weeks during a crisis of force majeure could cause further gridlock and excessive periods of detention in border areas. Furthermore, even if there exist special considerations for those with special needs and vulnerable asylum seekers, identifying them amongst the mass of the influx appears not to be very feasible in practice.
However, when such derogations become the default procedure and are repeatedly relied upon as an ordinary tool for migration governance, and deadlines are extended instead of offering protection and reception, this becomes a concern. This mechanism can lead to undermining State’s obligations under international law, and the problem of mass influx remains unsolved.
Having this in mind, it is worth analysing the outcomes of populist governance for human rights, democratic institutions and the attitudes towards international organizations.
Dissatisfied voters in several Eastern European countries have been more likely to vote for a larger number of completely new parties to punish incumbent parties (Pop-Eleches 2010; Haughton and Deegan Krause 2015; Aha 2019). This volatility made ethnopopulists rise and are willing to make considerable efforts to reduce electoral turnover and consolidate power.[20]
Once in power, populist governments prioritize short-term quick wins over long-term unpopular policies and use the media and means of communication to influence the behaviour of citizens.[21]
In Poland and Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic, populist leaders initially acknowledged scientific expertise to counter the threat and present themselves as ‘defenders of the people’, but at the same time, this allowed them to hold back from following these recommendations when they became politically inconvenient. This shows how ethnopopulism can undermine evidence-based decision-making and the effectiveness of emergency risk communication, as well as the capacity of society to move the population towards a consensus in solidarity for an efficient action plan.[22]
There can also be gradual redefinitions of the “other” under the populist rule, it is a dynamic and evolving concept. In countries like Italy, Fratelli d’Italia, with a long history of populism, have shifted their stances on topics regarding the EU, migration and national politics. This change has become more noticeable, as previously mentioned, with the course of international crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the 2022 Italian Government Crises.
The definition of the party’s “other" primarily identifies the party’s internal political enemy, that is the Italian left, rather than the external threat. It has targeted national opposition much more aggressively and has adopted a more moderate stance towards migration and EU integration.[23]
Regarding institutions, populists weaken judicial independence and undermine other constitutional checks. Constitutional reforms in Hungary with Fidesz and Poland with the Law and Justice (PiS) party have loosened constraints on executive power, reducing protection of individual rights and undermining the rule of law and separation of powers.[24]
These events and clashing ideals have raised concerns within the EU which have led to the opening of procedures under Article 7(1) TEU to suspend certain membership rights from these member states for serious and persistent breaches of the core values of the EU including: human dignity, the rule of law, freedom, democracy, equality, and respect for human rights including minorities.
Poland’s procedure was officially closed in 2024, though Hungary’s procedure triggered in 2018 is still ongoing. Nevertheless, the determination of the suspension of voting rights under Article 7(2) TEU requires unanimous decision by the European Council, which so far has not yet been acquired.
In order to mitigate this situation that is extending throughout the continent, the EU has to focus on achieving the following main goals to strengthen democracy and prevent democratic backsliding.
Firstly, it is necessary to strengthen the role of the courts to act as guardians against executive aggrandizement, through judicial review, the imposition of party-financing rules and constitutional scrutiny and oversight. Additionally, support political party system development in countries like Slovakia to make them more compatible with key principles of European ideologies pertaining to the same wing.
Moreover, media pluralism and independence is crucial for providing diverse sources of reliable information criticizing those in power and holding them accountable for their actions. Without independent broadcasters or transparency of ownership, media is a powerful tool for populist governments to advertise false information favouring their rhetoric, as happened in Hungary during 2015 refugee crisis, where the government spent around 28M euros on an anti-immigrant campaign and protection against ‘terrorists’ to Christianity and national values.[25] It can also help to provide a narrative for the necessity of supporting refugees to reduce polarization and support integration measures among the population.
What is more, independent oversight in migration governance is crucial to ensure that decisions are made on long-term policy goals. Studies show that long-term reception policies, which include central and local governments, are better equipped to meet local necessities and benefit both host communities and immigrants.[26]
It is also necessary to make key policy documents more practical and with alternative approaches to different scenarios.[27]
The COVID-19 pandemic further stressed the need to maintain autonomy of science, public health and ability to communicate with the public in order to avoid excessive politicization in emergency communication in the face of common threats and erosion of trust.[28] It is necessary for health communicators to achieve this by anticipating these situations and incorporating political contention and transparent responses with the public.
There is a need for an administrative reform through digitalisation of processes and improvement of democratic resilience. Though the administration cannot act alone in the fight against these challenges, the involvement of the citizens, political parties, academia and state actors is of most importance.[29]
To sum up, this paper has shown that ethnopopulism has become a central force in reshaping European politics, particularly through the instrumentalisation of migration and emergency narratives. Through the dynamic definition of “the people” according to specific cultural and national values, migrants are perceived as external actors endangering the community. In this context, extreme and restrictive lengths will be reached to safeguard the population, even if that means weakening democracy and undermining human rights. The examples of Hungary, Poland, Italy and Spain have portrayed how these narratives are translated in practice and how the different actors intervening, such as the media or the judiciary, are slowly corrupted.
International emergencies such as the 2015 refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the war in Ukraine have provided parties with further opportunities to increase discretionary measures in derogations of asylum procedures, raising questions concerning the respect of the rule of law. Moreover, the procedure under Article 7 TEU and the new Crisis Regulation have been analysed, though their effectiveness remains somewhat limited.
Finally, policy recommendations include strengthening the role of courts, plural and independent media, promoting multiparty systems, evidence-based policymaking, long-term policy goals, and the inclusion of society along with the administration and European institutions as safeguards towards democratic resilience.
Immigration has become a central axis of ethnopopulist mobilization in the United States. Politicians increasingly define “the people” in ethnopopulist terms, portraying migrants, particularly undocumented and non-European immigrants, as threats to national identity, security, and economic stability. This article will discuss how the ethnopopulist framing of immigration contributes to a broader trend toward democratic backsliding in the United States by analyzing it as a political tool that continues to enable democratic erosion. Drawing on peer-reviewed literature and examples from U.S. politics, this article situates American ethnopopulism within the broader trend of the erosion of democratic institutions.
Throughout American history, immigration has long been a source of debate. However, in recent years, it has become a central flashpoint for ethnopopulist mobilization. Erin K. Jenne at the Central European University defined ethnopopulism as an outlook “that equates ‘the people’ with ‘the nation’ and holds that sovereignty should be an expression of the will of the ‘nation-people.’[30] It has recently functioned as a strategy for taking control of the polity by providing leaders with an opportunity to and racializing e immigrant threat and promote clientelist behavior. Jenne further , argued that ethnopopulist governments vilify both elites and national outgroups, while centering the national “in-group” that is aligned with the leader. Within this framework, refugees and immigrants are part of a design by these vilified forces to destroy the national in-group.[31] In the United States, this dynamic has intensified since the 2016 presidential election, when immigration narratives increasingly frame demographic change as an existential threat rather than a policy challenge. This article examines the mechanisms through which ethnopopulist narratives surrounding immigration impact democratic backsliding in the United States.
The United States has a long history of nativism, often emerging from periods of economic and cultural anxiety. During the first half of the twentieth century, American immigration attitudes were largely restrictionist, though gradual liberalization began in the 1940s. By the 1950s and 1960s, public advocacy for decreased immigration restrictions declined.[32] By the early 2000s, immigration enforcement had already expanded significantly through bureaucratic mechanisms, particularly after the September 11 attacks . The 2008 financial crisis and 2016 presidential election were also major turning points in attitudes toward immigration.
By 2019, studies showed that despite “anxiety-fueled nativism,” true attitudes on immigration are more complex. According to Wright and Levy (2019), Americans generally hold positive views about immigration, although they are not consistent in policy attitudes. Thus, despite the prevailing ethnocentralism, true sentiments are less negative than often assumed.[33] The study concluded that few Americans hold uniformly pro, or anti immigration views
Along the same lines, Card et al. (2022) conducted a comprehensive quantitative analysis of congressional and presidential immigration rhetoric from 1880 to 2022. Their findings showcase that political rhetoric surrounding immigration is relatively positive, compared to pre-World War II attitudes and the period surrounding the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The authors note that polarization increased in the late 1970s, as Republicans became more likely to use hostile language surrounding immigration.[34]
Since President Trump took office in 2017, immigration narratives have been become overwhelmingly negative. President Trump has not only given outsized attention to the topic, but has also attempted to eliminate “sanctuary cities.” .[35] His harsh rhetoric surrounding immigration has affected the behavior of individuals, as immigrant communities attempt to “stay under the radar.” However, extreme rhetoric alone does not seem to impact potential migrants’ calculations about whether to enter the U.S.[36]
In his second administration, Trump appointed Stephen Miller to deliver his immigration promises. Nagel (2025) outlined how the Trump and Miller policies have enabled “anxieties over labor competition and racial/cultural integrity” to justify immigration enforcement and restriction. Miller frames immigration control as a matter of national sovereignty and cultural integrity. Indeed,“a common refrain among MAGA loyalists is that Western ‘Judeo-Christian’ culture is under threat from non-European (especially Muslim) immigration, and from the ‘woke’ ideology that legitimizes non-Western identities and norms.” This tactic reflects how ethnopopulist sentiment results in stricter attitudes surrounding immigration[37]
Ethnopopulist immigration governance in the U.S. exploits federalism to bypass national constraints. When federal institutions block restrictive measures, states implement their own policies, including state-level immigration enforcement laws, restrictions on access to public services, and cooperation mandates between local police and federal immigration authorities. Particularly, restrictive issue entrepreneurs can intensify voters’ cultural anxieties around immigration, proposing anti-immigration laws and policies and defend them in a federal court system. Cornelius et al. (2024) argue that state governors Greg Abbot and Ron DeSantis represent a “new breed of anti-immigrant issue entrepreneurs.” They both use “subnational policies to signal opposition to the federal government for personal political gain, and create new models for immigration control policies.”[38] Subnational immigration “entrepreneurship” and policymaking transforms federalism from a system of democratic constraint into a means for ethnopopulist escalation. Actors supporting the latter can convert immigration into a mechanism for mobilizing identity-based support and eroding rights protections without directly violating the constitution.
President Trump’s “border czar,” Tom Homan, advocates for the policy of not granting citizenship to U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants. Although these children are citizens by birth under the 14th Amendment and the proposal was meant to address the logistics of enforcing President Trump’s deportation orders, it raises genuine constitutional concerns.[39] Immigration narratives increasingly intersect with electoral administration and constitutional rights. Restricting birthright citizenship would increase the federal government’s power to determine who is recognized as a citizen; this is a mechanism that would disproportionately impact minority communities, functioning as a form of democratic erosion through a weakening of inclusive, representative democracy.
Hart et al. (2025) discusses the privatization of mass detention facilities in the U.S., which has been driven by increased immigration enforcement policies. Private prison companies have grown in response.[40] This mechanism of privatizing immigration enforcement through detention centers and contracted service providers obscures the realities of enforcement processes, thereby decreasing accountability. Privatization also incentivizes prolonged detention. Additionally, investigative reporting documents systemic abuse and rights violations in privately operated detention facilities. These facilities are an important partner for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as the Trump Administration executes its immigration policy. For example, in Dilley, Texas, one detained individual described the conditions of the detention facility to a local news outlet: “We live in a trailer— it’s like a metal container— with six bunk beds. [...] There are three families in my room.”[41] Thus, the privatization and outsourcing of coercive authority serves to weaken democratic liberties.[42]
One person, in Exhibit 11 of the lawsuit, said they lived with multiple families in one trailer.
“We live in a trailer — it’s like a metal container — with six bunk beds," the person said. “There are three families in my room — and I have all four of my kids.”
To combat the ethnopopulist portrayal of immigration and its democratic consequences, federal baseline standards for immigration enforcement should be clearly articulated. Such standards would limit state and local overreach while preventing fragmentation of rights. Varsanyi (2010) analyzes the various categories of local immigration policy, highlighting the “growing involvement of subnational governments in the formulation and implementation of immigrant and immigration policy.”[43] However, some scholars, such as Rodriguez et al. (2009) argue that the federal exclusivity principle in immigration policy should be challenged. He highlights that the federal government has not been able to manage immigration properly without the assistance and input of state and local governing bodies. Instead, a cooperative approach that includes all levels of government is necessary.[44]
Felipe Amin Filomeno, a political scientist at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, noted that in the United States, local governments can collaborate with federal authorities in the enforcement of immigration law under programs. Filomeno writes that local immigration policy, which largely centers around metropolitan areas, have the capacity to affect national immigration policies, with the potential to collide with federal rules and create conflict.[45] Overall, this literature suggests that neither complete federal exclusivity nor complete local autonomy provides an adequate framework for immigration policy.
In order to guard against immigration policies and narratives that undermine democratic institutions, federal baseline standards should be clearly set. These standards should not only be articulated, but also legally enforced, while allowing room for structured and collaborative engagement with state and local governments. They would create protections for civil liberties of migrants and serve as prevention for the fragmentation of immigrant rights. However, within this framework emerges the possibility of local governments participating in immigration-related functions, such as community integration and limited enforcement cooperation, but only within the bounds of the agreed upon federal standards. Thus, this approach would not strip autonomy completely from local and state governments,but instead preserve the federal government’s constitutional authority over immigration. A coordinated federal-local collaboration would limit ethnopopulist narratives and ensure that immigration policy does not become a means of erosion of democratic liberties.
Additionally, judicial enforcement of immigration policy should be be strengthened by improved monitoring of noncompliance with federal court rulings on immigration, asylum, and civil rights. Legomsky (1984) critiques the plenary power doctrine in U.S. immigration law. This doctrine grants the Congress and President authority over immigration, which requires the Supreme Court to defer to these powers, which Legomsky argues is unjust. The plenary power doctrine allows for federal control over borders and regulation of foreign nationals. Instead, he argues for an approach in which courts employ usual constitutional principles to immigration cases, instead of deferring to legislative powers.[46] Similarly, Dutta (2022) argues that Congress should assert its oversight authority over executive immigration policies. This is because the judicial branch, Dutta writes, is limited by the plenary power doctrine on U.S. immigration. Congress has a constitutional responsibility, then, to oversee immigration actions.[47] Under this reasoning, Benson (2007) exhibits that judicial review in immigration cases is often undertaken using flawed, quick-fix solutions. Instead, Benson urges for a more holistic review of the complexities of the system.[48]
The American Immigration Council outlines the various barriers to judicial review. First, the law states that an appeal of a removal order must be filed in federal court within 30 days, a non-negotiable deadline. Additionally, Congress restricts the arguments one is permitted to make on an appeal, including the inability to challenge “discretionary” determinations made by immigration judges and officers, and the inability of those removed through “expedited removal” processes are barred from appealing. Lastly, it is difficult for individuals without lawyers to pursue judicial review from outside the U.S.; and even for those who are successfully able to pursue their appeals from abroad may still be stranded outside the country because “the law is not clear about the procedures for return.”[49] Together, these barriers undermine judicial oversight, leaving executive enforcement actions to remain unchecked in a structure that enables democratic backsliding.
Carlson et al. (2016) note that under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), individuals may petition for judicial review if their immigration decision constitutes a “final order of removal.” The authors put forth two recommendations for reform: first, a uniform definition of finality adopted across the courts of appeals, and second, a “reform that would define what specifically constitutes a final order removal for purposes of judicial review.”[50] The scholarship reveals an essential tension in U.S. immigration governance, involving the courts’ authority to review immigration decisions, but their ultimate deference to legislative powers under the plenary power doctrine. This structure undermines the judiciary’s ability to serve as a check on executive and administrative overreach, which provides the preconditions for democratic backsliding and authoritarian styles of governance with respect to immigration. Non-compliance with federal court rulings and constitutional principles in immigration enforcement can be left insufficiently monitored, which threatens immigrants’ civil and political rights within a democratic system. As judicial oversight erodes, ethnopopulist narratives become exempt from accountability.
Therefore, judicial enforcement mechanisms in immigration policy are necessary. Congress should codify clear standards for compliance with federal court ruling in immigration and asylum cases. This is particularly relevant for executive agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security, which should be subject to mandatory reporting requirements when court orders are issued. Additionally, there could be room for independent monitoring bodies, either within the judiciary or through oversight offices, to identify noncompliance. Finally, reforms that ensure genuine access to courts could be implemented. For example, extending appeal deadlines beyond 30 days, guaranteeing access to legal counsel, and establishing clear guidelines for return to the United States after a successful appeal of a removal order would collectively empower the judiciary to serve as a check on federal power.
For-profit immigration prisons also contribute to democratic backsliding in immigration enforcement. Jefferis (2020) argued that for-profit, civil immigration detention is one of the fastest growing industries in the United States. A large proportion of individuals in the custody of immigration enforcement authorities experience a private, corporate-run prison that contracts with the federal government. Within these facilities, conditions are often unsafe and unregulated. Jefferis writes that there is no meaningful difference between civil immigration confinement and criminal incarceration, and recommends that constitutional principles of dignity must allow for “a constitutional tort remedy for people whose rights are violated in for-profit immigration prisons.” Otherwise, these systems continue to serve as a human rights affront to thousands of people, many of whom are people of color.[51] Similarly, Ackerman and Furman (2012) note increased criminalization of immigration and use of private prisons. They argue that “privatization creates a powerful opportunity for the social construction of the undocumented immigrant into a powerful potential source of revenue for for-profit corporations.”[52] Here, it is evident that ethnopopulist narratives combined with incentives for profit create conditions that disregard civil liberties and dignity. Under this basis, Pahnke (2025) exposes how Trump administration officials have recently employed unverified claims about ICE arrests in order to justify mass deportations, enabling privatized detention facilities and tech firms to profit.[53]
To counter the democratic backsliding associated with privatized immigration enforcement, oversight and reform for for-profit detention systems are essential. To combat the immediate human rights violations in detention facilities, the federal government should implement uniform standards for conditions of confinement, regardless of whether the facility is publicly or privately operated. These uniform standards should include protections related to healthcare, humane treatment, and due process. Independent inspections should be publicly accessible and transparent. Without this level of oversight, private detention facilities are incentivized to maximize profit without regard to the physical conditions of the prison; they are able to exercise power over a highly vulnerable population.
Additionally, Congress should explicitly extend constitutional protections to individuals held in for-profit immigration detention, as Jefferis argues. The federal government could also reassess the role of private detention facilities in immigration enforcement at large, by limiting contracts with private prison corporations, curbing this fast-growing industry. By reducing such reliance on private detention facilities, policymakers can attempt to sever the convergence of the federal government’s ethnopopulist narratives with corporate incentives. In this way, immigration enforcement would be more closely aligned with democratic principles, guarding against authoritarian styles of governance.
This article demonstrates that ethnopopulist framings of immigration in the United States have functioned as a mechanism of democratic backsliding, rather than an expression of political polarization. By positioning immigrants as threats to the national “in-group,” ethnopopulist actors enable the implementation of policies that marginalize immigrants and limit rights protections. Through federalism, citizenship policing, and the outsourcing of immigration enforcement to private companies, immigration governance has expanded illiberal practices.
The extreme criminalization of immigration has shielded ethnopopulist actors from democratic accountability.
The U.S. case reflects a scenario in which immigration serves as an entry point for authoritarian styles of governance. However, this analysis illustrates the existing capacity of democratic institutions to combat this erosion of civil liberties and dignity. Strengthening federal immigration standards, enabling judicial review, and overseeing or limiting privatized immigration enforcement all serve as mechanisms to limit the discretionary power that emerges from ethnopopulist narratives and extreme criminalization of immigration. Overall, an immigration policy and governance plan which centers democratic freedoms is essential to maintaining political accountability during periods of polarization and political strain.